History of Julius Caesar Vol. 2 of 2

After the close of the deliberations, they returned, secretly and in tears, to solicit his support against the Germans and Ariovistus, one of their kings. These peoples were separated from the Gauls by the Rhine, from its mouth to the Lake of Constance. Among them the Suevi occupied the first rank. They were by much the most powerful and the most warlike. They were said to be divided into a hundred cantons, each of which furnished, every year, a thousand men for war and a thousand men for agriculture, taking each other’s place alternately: the labourers fed the soldiers. No boundary line, among the Suevi, separated the property of the fields, which remained common, and no one could prolong his residence on the same lands beyond a year. However, they hardly lived upon the produce of the soil: they consumed little wheat, and drank no wine; milk and flesh were their habitual food. When these failed, they were fed upon grass.[197 - Appian, De Bello Celt., IV. i. 3.] Masters of themselves from infancy, intrepid hunters, insensible to the inclemency of the seasons, bathing in the cold waters of the rivers, they hardly covered a part of their bodies with thin skins. They were savages in manners, and of prodigious force and stature. They disdained commerce and foreign horses, which the Gauls sought with so much care. Their own horses, though mean-looking and ill-shaped, became indefatigable through exercise, and fed upon brushwood. Despising the use of the saddle, often, in engagements of cavalry, they jumped to the ground and fought on foot: their horses were taught to remain without moving.[198 - Tacitius (Germania, iv. 32.) speaks of this custom of the German horsemen of fighting on foot. Titus Livius (XLIV. 26) ascribes this practice to the Bastarni (the Moldavians.)] The belief in the dogma of the immortality of the soul, strengthened in them the contempt for life.[199 - Appian, De Bello Celt., IV. i. 3.] They boasted of being surrounded by immense solitudes: this fact, as they pretended, showed that a great number of their neighbours had not been able to resist them: and it was reported, indeed, that on one side (towards the east) their territory was bounded, for an extent of 600 miles, by desert plains; on the other, they bordered upon the Ubii, their tributaries, the most civilised of the German peoples, because their situation on the banks of the Rhine placed them in relation with foreign merchants, and because, neighbours to the Gauls, they had formed themselves to their manners.[200 - De Bello Gallico, IV. 1, 2, 3. – General de Gœler, in our opinion, extends the territory of the Ubii much too far to the south.]

Two immense forests commenced not far from the Rhine, and extended, from west to east, across Germany; these were the Hercynian and Bacenis forests. (See Plate 2.) The first, beginning from the Black Forest and the Odenwald, covered all the country situated between the Upper Danube and the Maine, and comprised the mountains which, further towards the east, formed the northern girdle of the basin of the Danube; that is, the Boehmerwald, the mountains of Moravia, and the Little Carpathians. It had a breadth which Cæsar represents by nine long days’ march.[201 - De Bello Gallico, VI. 25. – This statement agrees well enough with the length of the Black Forest and the Odenwald, which is sixty leagues.] The other, of much less extent, took its rise in the forest of Thuringia; it embraced all the mountains to the north of Bohemia, and that long chain which separates the basins of the Oder and the Vistula from that of the Danube.

The Suevi inhabited, to the south of the forest Bacenis, the countries situated between the forest of Thuringia, the Boehmerwald, the Inn, and the Black Forest, which compose, in our days, the Duchies of Saxe-Meiningen and Saxe-Coburg, Bavaria, and the greater part of Wurtemberg.[202 - It is difficult to fix with precision the localities inhabited at this period by the German peoples, for they were nearly all nomadic, and were continually pressing one upon another. Cæsar, in his fourth book De Bello Gallico (cap. I), asserts that the Suevi never occupied the same territory more than one year.] To the east of the Suevi were the Boii (partly in Bohemia and partly in the north-west of Austria);[203 - Strabo (VII., p. 244) relates, after Posidonius, that the Boii had inhabited first the Hercynian forest; elsewhere he says (V. 177) that the Boii established themselves among the Taurisci, a people dwelling near Noricum. The same author (VII. 243) places the solitudes inhabited by the Boii to the east of Vindelicia (Southern Bavaria and Western Austria). Lastly, he says (IV. 471) that the Rhætii and the Vindelicii are the neighbours of the Helvetii and the Boii. The Nemetes and the Vangiones subsequently passed over to the left bank of the Rhine, towards Worms and Spire, and the Ubii towards Cologne.] to the north, the Cherusci, separated from the Suevi by the forest Bacenis; to the west, the Marcomanni (the upper and middle course of the Maine) and the Sedusii (between the Maine and the Neckar); to the south, the Harudes (on the north of the Lake of Constance), the Tulingi, and the Latobriges (the southern part of the Grand Duchy of Baden).

On the two banks of the Rhine dwelt the Rauraci (the territory of Bâle and part of the Brisgau); the Triboces (part of Alsace and of the Grand Duchy of Baden): on the right bank were the Nemetes (opposite Spire); the Vangiones (opposite Worms); the Ubii, from the Odenwald to the watershed of the Sieg and the Ruhr. To the north of the Ubii were the Sicambri, established in Sauerland, and nearly as far as the Lippe. Finally, the Usipetes and the Tencteri were still farther to the north, towards the mouth of the Rhine. (See Plate 2.)

The Gauls solicit Cæsar to come to their assistance.

II. The Gaulish chiefs who had come to solicit the succour of Cæsar made the following complaints against Ariovistus: – “The German king,” they said, “had taken advantage of the quarrels which divided the different peoples of Gaul; called in formerly by the Arverni and the Sequani, he had gained, with their co-operation, several victories over the Ædui, in consequence of which the latter were subjected to the most humiliating conditions. Shortly afterwards his yoke grew heavy on the Sequani themselves, to such a degree that, though conquerors with him, they are now more wretched than the vanquished Ædui. Ariovistus has seized a third of their territory;[204 - Which formed the present Upper Alsace.] another third is on the point of being given up, by his orders, to 24,000 Harudes, who have joined him some months ago. There are 120,000 Germans in Gaul. The contingents of the Suevi have already arrived on the banks of the Rhine. In a few years the invasion of Gaul by the Germans will be general. Cæsar alone can prevent it, by his prestige and that of the Roman name, by the force of his arms, and by the fame of his recent victory.”

Gaul thus came voluntarily, in the persons of her chiefs, to throw herself into the arms of Cæsar, take him for the arbiter of her destiny, and implore him to be her saviour. He spoke encouragingly, and promised them his support. Several considerations engaged him to act upon these complaints. He could not suffer the Ædui, allies of Rome, to be brought under subjection by the barbarians. He saw a substantial danger for the Republic in the numerous immigrations of fierce peoples who, once masters of Gaul, would not fail, in imitation of the Cimbri and Teutones, to invade the Roman province, and thence fall upon Italy. Resolved to prevent these dangers, he proposed an interview with Ariovistus, who was probably occupied, since the defeat of the Helvetii, in collecting an army among the Triboci (towards Strasburg),[205 - We look upon it as certain, from the tenth chapter of Book IV. of the “Commentaries,” that the Triboci occupied also the left bank of the Rhine. We therefore naturally place among this German people the spot where the army of Ariovistus was assembled. Moreover, to understand the campaign about to be related, we must not seek this place, in the valley of the Rhine, higher than Strasburg.] as well to oppose the further designs of the Romans, as to defend the part of the country of the Sequani which he had seized. Ariovistus, it will be remembered, had been declared, under Cæsar’s consulate, ally and friend of the Roman people; and this favour would encourage the expectation that the head of the Germans would be willing to treat; but he refused with disdain the proposed interview. Then Cæsar sent messengers to him to reproach him with his ingratitude. “If Ariovistus cares to preserve his friendship, let him make reparation for all the injury he has inflicted upon the allies of Rome, and let him bring no more barbarians across the Rhine; if, on the contrary, he rejects these conditions, so many acts of violence will be punished in virtue of the decree rendered by the Senate, under the consulate of M. Messala and M. Piso, which authorises the governor of Gaul to do that which he judges for the advantage of the Republic, and enjoins him to defend the Ædui and the other allies of the Roman people.”

By this language, Cæsar wished to show that he did not violate the law, enacted a year before under his consulate, which forbade the governors to leave their provinces without an order of the Senate. He purposely appealed to an old decree, which gave unlimited powers to the governor of Gaul, a province the importance of which had always required exceptional laws.[206 - In the speech which Dio Cassius puts in the mouth of Cæsar before entering on the campaign against Ariovistus, he dilates upon the right which the governor of the Roman province has to act according to circumstances, and to take only his own advice. This speech is naturally amplified and arranged by Dio Cassius, but the principal arguments must be true. (Dio Cassius, XXXVIII. 41. —De Bello Gallico, I. 33, 34, 35.)] The reply of Ariovistus was equally proud: —

“Cæsar ought to know as well as he the right of the conqueror: he admits no interference in the treatment reserved for the vanquished; he has himself causes of complaint against the proconsul, whose presence diminishes his revenues; he will not restore the hostages to the Ædui; the title of brothers and allies of the Roman people will be of little service to them. He cares little for threats. No one has ever braved Ariovistus with impunity. Let anybody attack him, and he will learn the valour of a people which, for fourteen years, has never sought shelter under a roof.”[207 - De Bello Gallico, I. 36.]

March of Cæsar upon Besançon.

III. This arrogant reply, and news calculated to give alarm, hastened Cæsar’s decision. In fact, on one side the Ædui complained to him of the devastation of their country by the Harudes; and, on the other, the Treviri announced that the hundred cantons of the Suevi were preparing to cross the Rhine.[208 - Since this information was given to Cæsar by the Treviri, it is certain that the Suevi assembled on the Rhine, opposite or not far from the country of the Treviri, and, in all probability, towards Mayence, where the valley of the Maine presents a magnificent and easy opening upon the Rhine.] Cæsar, wishing to prevent the junction of these new bands with the old troops of Ariovistus, hastened the collecting of provisions, and advanced against the Germans by forced marches. The negotiations having probably lasted during the month of July, it was now the beginning of August. Starting from the neighbourhood of Tonnerre, where we have supposed he was encamped, Cæsar followed the road subsequently replaced by a Roman way of which vestiges are still found, and which, passing by Tanlay, Gland, Laignes, Etrochey, and Dancevoir, led to Langres.[209 - Between Tanlay and Gland, the Roman way is still called the Route de César. (See the map of the Etat-Major.)] (See Plate 4.) After three long days’ marches, on his arrival towards Arc-en-Barrois, he learnt that Ariovistus was moving with all his troops to seize Besançon, the most considerable place in Sequania, and that he had already advanced three days’ march beyond his territory. Cæsar considered it a matter of urgency to anticipate him, for this place was abundantly provided with everything necessary for an army. Instead of continuing his march towards the Rhine, by way of Vesoul, Lure, and Belfort, he advanced, day and night, by forced marches, towards Besançon, obtained possession of it, and placed a garrison there.[210 - To explain this rapid movement upon Besançon, we must suppose that Cæsar, at the moment when he received news of the march of Ariovistus, believed him to be as near Besançon as he was himself. In fact, Cæsar might fear that during the time the news had taken to reach him, the German king, who had already advanced three days’ journey out of his territory, might have arrived in the neighbourhood of Mulhausen or Cernay. Now Cæsar was at Arc-en-Barrois, 130 kilomètres from Besançon, and the distance from this latter town to Cernay is 125 kilomètres.]

The following description, given in the “Commentaries,” is still applicable to the present town. “It was so well fortified by nature, that it offered every facility for sustaining war. The Doubs, forming a circle, surrounds it almost entirely, and the space of sixteen hundred feet,[211 - The “Commentaries” give here the erroneous number DC: the breadth of the isthmus which the Doubs forms at Besançon cannot have undergone any sensible variation; it is at present 480 mètres, or 1,620 Roman feet. The copyists have, no doubt, omitted an M before DC.] which is not bathed by the water, is occupied by a high mountain, the base of which reaches, on each side, to the edge of the river. The wall which encloses this mountain makes a citadel of it, and connects it with the oppidum.”[212 - De Bello Gallico, I. 38.]

During this rapid movement of the Roman army on Besançon, Ariovistus had advanced very slowly. We must suppose, indeed, that he halted when he was informed of this march; for, once obliged to abandon the hope of taking that place, it was imprudent to separate himself any farther from his re-enforcements, and, above all, from the Suevi, who were ready to pass the Rhine towards Mayence, and await the Romans in the plains of Upper Alsace, where he could advantageously make use of his numerous cavalry.

Panic in the Roman Army.

IV. During the few days which Cæsar passed at Besançon (the middle of August), in order to assure himself of provisions, a general panic took possession of his soldiers. Public rumour represented the Germans as men of gigantic stature, of unconquerable valour, and of terrible aspect. Now there were in the Roman army many young men without experience in war, come from Rome, some out of friendship for Cæsar, others in the hope of obtaining celebrity without trouble. Cæsar could not help receiving them. It must have been difficult, indeed, for a general who wished to preserve his friends at Rome, to defend himself against the innumerable solicitations of influential people.[213 - “ … qui ex urbe, amicitiæ causa, Cæsarem secuti, non magnum in re militari usum habebant.” (De Bello Gallico, I. 39.) – We see in the subsequent wars Appius repairing to Cæsar to obtain appointments of military tribunes, and Cicero recommending for the same grade several persons, among others, M. Curtius, Orfius, and Trebatius. “I have asked him for a tribuneship for M. Curtius.” (Epist. ad Quint., II. 15; Epist. Famil., VII. 5, a letter to Cæsar.) Trebatius, though a bad soldier, was treated with kindness, and at once appointed a military tribune. “I wonder that you despise the advantages of the tribuneship, especially since they have allowed you to dispense with the fatigues of the military service.” (Cicero, Epist. Famil., VII. 8.) – “Resign yourself to the military service, and remain.” (Cicero, Epist. Famil., VII. 11.) – Trebatius appeared little satisfied, complained of the severity of the service, and, when Cæsar passed into Britain, he prudently remained on the Continent.] This panic had begun with these volunteers; it soon gained the whole army. Every one made his will; the least timid alleged, as an excuse for their fear, the difficulty of the roads, the depth of the forests, the want of provisions, the impossibility of obtaining transports, and even the illegality of the enterprise.[214 - Dio Cassius, XXXVIII. 36.]

Cæsar, surprised at this state of feeling, called a council, to which he admitted the centurions of all classes. He sharply reproached the assembled chiefs with wishing to penetrate his designs, and to seek information as to the country into which he intended to lead them. He reminded them that their fathers, under Marius, had driven out the Cimbri and the Teutones; that, still more recently, they had defeated the German race in the revolt of the slaves;[215 - This shows that then, in Italy, a great number of slaves were Germans.] that the Helvetii had often beaten the Germans, and that they, in their turn, had just beaten the Helvetii. As to those who, to disguise their fears, talk of the difficulty of the roads and the want of food, he finds it very insolent in them to suppose that their general will forget his duty, or to pretend to dictate it to him. The care of the war is his business: the Sequani, the Leuci, and the Lingones will furnish wheat; in fact, it is already ripe in the fields (jamque esse in agris frumenta matura). As to the roads, they will soon have the opportunity of judging of them themselves. He is told the soldiers will not obey, or raise the ensigns (signa laturi).[216 - This Latin phrase indicated the putting the troops in march.] Words like these would not shake him; the soldier despises the voice of his chief only when the latter is, by his own fault, abandoned by fortune or convicted of cupidity or embezzlement. As to himself, his whole life proves his integrity; the war of the Helvetii affords evidence of his favour with fortune; for which cause, without delay, he will break up the camp to-morrow morning, for he is impatient to know if, among his soldiers, fear will prevail over honour and duty. If the army should refuse to follow him, he will start alone, with the 10th legion, of which he will make his prætorian cohort. Cæsar had always loved this legion, and, on account of its valor, had always the greatest confidence in it.

This language, in which, without having recourse to the rigours of discipline, Cæsar appealed to the honour of his soldiers, exciting at the same time the emulation both of those whom he loaded with praise and of those whose services he affected to disdain, – this proud assertion of his right to command produced a wonderful revolution in the minds of the men, and inspired the troops with great ardour for fighting. The 10th legion first charged its tribunes to thank him for the good opinion he had expressed towards them, and declared that they were ready to march. The other legions then sent their excuses by their tribunes and centurions of the first class, denied their hesitations and fears, and pretended that they had never given any judgment upon the war, as that appertained only to the general.[217 - De Bello Gallico, I. 41.]

March towards the Valley of the Rhine.

V. This agitation having been calmed, Cæsar sought information concerning the roads from Divitiacus, who, of all the Gauls, inspired him with the greatest amount of confidence. In order to proceed from Besançon to the valley of the Rhine, to meet Ariovistus, the Roman army had to cross the northern part of the Jura chain. This country is composed of two very distinct parts. The first comprises the valley of the Doubs from Besançon to Montbéliard, the valley of the Oignon, and the intermediate country, a mountainous district, broken, much covered with wood, and, without doubt, at the time of Cæsar’s war in Gaul, more difficult than at present. The other part, which begins at the bold elbow made by the Doubs near Montbéliard, is composed of lengthened undulations, which diminish gradually, until they are lost in the plains of the Rhine. It is much less wooded than the first, and offers easier communications. (See Plate 4.)

Cæsar, as he had announced, started early on the morrow of the day on which he had thus addressed his officers, and, determined on conducting his army through an open country, he turned the mountainous and difficult region just described, thus making a circuit of more than fifty miles (seventy-five kilomètres),[218 - There has been much discussion on the meaning of the words millium amplius quinquaginta circuitu. Some pretend that the number of fifty miles means the whole distance, and that thus Cæsar would have taken seven days to travel fifty miles, which would make about seven kilomètres a day: this supposition is inadmissible. Others pretend, on the contrary, that we must add fifty miles to the direct distance. This last interpretation is refuted by a passage in the “Commentaries” (De Bello Civili, I. 64). We read there, Ac tantum fuit in militibus studii, ut, millium vi. ad iter addito circuito, &c. This shows that when Cæsar means to speak of a turn of road, to be added to the total length of the route, he is careful to indicate it. We consider it more simple, therefore, to admit that the fifty miles are only a part of the distance performed during the seven days’ march; that is, that after making a circular détour of fifty miles, which required three or four days, Cæsar had still to march some time before he met the enemy, following the direct road from Besançon to the Rhine. The study of the ground completely justifies this view, for it was sufficient for Cæsar to make a circuit of fifty miles (or seventy-five kilomètres) to turn the mass of mountains which extends from Besançon to Montbéliard.] which is represented by a semi-circumference, the diameter of which would be the line drawn from Besançon to Arcey. It follows the present road from Besançon to Vesoul as far as Pennesières, and continues by Vallerois-le-Bois and Villersexel to Arcey. He could perform this distance in four days; then he resumed, on leaving Arcey, the direct road from Besançon to the Rhine by Belfort and Cernay.

On the seventh day of a march uninterrupted since leaving Besançon, he learnt by his scouts that the troops of Ariovistus were at a distance of not more than twenty-four miles (36 kilomètres).

Supposing 20 kilomètres for the day’s march, the Roman army would have travelled over 140 kilomètres in seven days, and would have arrived on the Thur, near Cernay. (By the road indicated, the distance from Besançon to the Thur is about 140 kilomètres.) At this moment, Ariovistus would have been encamped at 36 kilomètres from the Romans, to the north, near Colmar.

Informed of the arrival of Cæsar, Ariovistus sent him word “that he consented to an interview, now that the Roman general had come near, and that there was no longer any danger for him in going to him.” Cæsar did not reject this overture, supposing that Ariovistus had returned to more reasonable sentiments.

The interview was fixed for the fifth day following.[219 - It is probable that, during the negotiations, Ariovistus had approached nearer to the Roman camp, in order to facilitate intercommunication; for, if he had remained at a distance of thirty-six kilomètres from Cæsar, we should be obliged to admit that the German army, which subsequently advanced towards the Roman camp, in a single day, to within nine kilomètres, had made a march of twenty-five kilomètres at least, which is not probable when we consider that it dragged after it wagons and women and children.] In the interval, while there was a frequent exchange of messages, Ariovistus, who feared some ambuscade, stipulated, as an express condition, that Cæsar should bring with him no foot soldiers, but that, on both sides, they should confine themselves to an escort of cavalry. The latter, unwilling to furnish any pretext for a rupture, consented; but, not daring to entrust his personal safety to the Gaulish cavalry, he mounted on their horses men of the 10th legion, which gave rise to this jocular saying of one of the soldiers: “Cæsar goes beyond his promise; he was to make us prætorians, and he makes us knights.”[220 - De Bello Gallico, I. 42.]

Interview between Cæsar and Ariovistus.

VI. Between the two armies extended a vast plain, that which is crossed by the Ill and the Thur. A tolerably large knoll rose in it at a nearly equal distance from either camp.[221 - Planities erat magna, et in ea tumulus terrenus satis grandis… (De Bello Gallico, I. 43) – This phrase would be sufficient itself to prove that the encounter of the two armies took place in the plains of Upper Alsace. We may ask how, in spite of a text so explicit, different writers should have placed the field of battle in the mountains of the Jura, where there is nowhere to be found a plain of any extent. It is only at Mulhausen, to the north of the Doller, that the vast plain of the valley of the Rhine opens.Cæsar employs three times the word tumulus to designate the eminence on which his interview with Ariovistus took place, and he never calls it collis. Is it not evident from this that we must consider this tumulus as a rounded knoll, insulated in the plain? Now it is to be considered that the plain which extends to the north of the Doller, between the Vosges and the Rhine, contains a rather large number of small rounded eminences, to which the word collis would not apply, and which the word knoll or tumulus perfectly describes. The most remarkable of these are situated, one near Feldkirch, the other between Wittenheim and Ensisheim. We may suppose that the interview took place on one of these knolls, marked 231 on Plate 6.General de Gœler has adopted as the place of the interview an eminence which rises on the left bank of the Little Doller, to the north of the village of Aspach-le-Bas. Cæsar would have called this eminence collis, for it is rather extensive, and, by its elongated form, but not rounded, does not at all represent to the eye what is commonly called a knoll or tumulus; moreover, contrary to the text, this elevation is not, properly speaking, in the plain. It is only separated from the hills situated to the south by a brook, and the plain begins only from its northern slope.] This was the place of meeting of the two chieftains. Cæsar posted his mounted legion at 200 paces from the knoll, and the cavalry of Ariovistus stood at the same distance. The latter demanded that the interview should take place on horseback, and that each of the two chiefs should be accompanied only by ten horsemen. When they met, Cæsar reminded Ariovistus of his favours, of those of the Senate, of the interest which the Republic felt in the Ædui, of that constant policy of the Roman people which, far from suffering the abasement of its allies, sought incessantly their elevation. He repeated his first conditions.

Ariovistus, instead of accepting them, put forward his own claims: “He had only crossed the Rhine at the prayer of the Gauls; the lands which he was accused of having seized, had been ceded to him; he had subsequently been attacked, and had scattered his enemies; if he has sought the friendship of the Roman people, it is in the hope of benefiting by it; if it becomes prejudicial to him, he renounces it; if he has carried so many Germans into Gaul, it is for his personal safety; the part he occupies belongs to him, as that occupied by the Romans belongs to them; his rights of conquest are older than those of the Roman army, which had never passed the limits of the province. Cæsar is only in Gaul to ruin it. If he does not withdraw from it, he will regard him as an enemy, and he is certain that by his death he shall gain the gratitude of a great number of the first and most illustrious personages in Rome. They have informed him by their messengers that, at this price, he would gain their good-will and friendship. But if he be left in free possession of Gaul, he will assist in all the wars that Cæsar may undertake.”

Cæsar insisted on the arguments he had already advanced: “It was not one of the principles of the Republic to abandon its allies; he did not consider that Gaul belonged to Ariovistus any more than to the Roman people. When formerly Q. Fabius Maximus vanquished the Arverni and the Ruteni, Rome pardoned them, and neither reduced them to provinces nor imposed tribute upon them. If, then, priority of conquest be invoked, the claims of the Romans to the empire of Gaul are the most just; and if it be thought preferable to refer to the Senate, Gaul ought to be free, since, after victory, the Senate had willed that she should preserve her own laws.”

During this conversation, information was brought to Cæsar that the cavalry of Ariovistus were approaching the knoll, and were throwing stones and darts at the Romans. Cæsar immediately broke up the conference, withdrew to his escort, and forbade them to return the attack, not from fear of an engagement with his favourite legion, but in order to avoid, in case he should defeat his enemies, the suspicion that he might have taken advantage of their good faith to surprise them in an interview. Nevertheless, the arrogance of Ariovistus, the disloyal attack of his cavalry, and the rupture of the conference, were soon known, and excited the ardour and impatience of the Roman troops.

Two days afterwards, Ariovistus made a proposal for a renewal of the conference, or for the sending to him of one of Cæsar’s lieutenants. Cæsar refused, the more so because, the day before, the Germans had again advanced and thrown their missiles at the Romans, and that thus his lieutenant would not have been safe from the attacks of the barbarians. He thought it more prudent to send as his deputy Valerius Procillus, the son of a Gaul who had become a Roman citizen, who spoke the Celtic language, and who was on familiar terms with Ariovistus, and M. Mettius, with whom the German king was bound by the rights of hospitality. They had hardly entered the camp of Ariovistus, when he ordered them to be thrown into fetters, under pretence that they were spies.[222 - De Bello Gallico, I. 47.]

Movements of the two Armies.

VII. The same day, the German king broke up his camp and took another position at the foot of the Vosges (sub monte), at a distance of 6,000 paces from that of Cæsar, between Soultz and Feldkirch, not far from the Lauch. (See Plate 6.) Next day he crossed the Thur, near its confluence with the Ill, ascended the left banks of the Ill and the Doller, and only halted at Reiningen, after having gone two miles (three kilomètres) beyond the Roman camp. By this manœuvre, Ariovistus cut off Cæsar’s communication with Sequania and the Æduan country, but he left open the communications with the country of the Leuci and the Lingones.[223 - It is not unworthy of remark that Cæsar’s communications with the Leuci and the Lingones remained open. We have seen that, in his address to the troops at Besançon, he reckoned on obtaining from these peoples a part of his supplies.] (See the Map of Gaul, 2.) The two armies thus encamped at a short distance from each other. During the five following days, Cæsar drew out his troops each day, and formed them in order of battle at the head of his camp (pro castris suas copias produxit), but was not able to provoke the Germans to fight; all hostility was limited to cavalry skirmishes, in which the latter were much practised. To 6,000 horsemen was joined an equal number of picked men on foot, among whom each horseman had chosen one to watch over him in combat. According to circumstances, the horsemen fell back upon the footmen, or the latter advanced to their assistance. Such was their agility, that they kept up with the horses, running and holding by the mane.[224 - Tacitus (Germania, VI. 32) and Titus Livius (XLIV. 26) speak of this method of fighting employed by the Germans.]

Cæsar, seeing that Ariovistus persisted in shutting himself up in his camp and intercepting his communications, sought to re-establish them, chose an advantageous position about 600 paces (900 mètres) beyond that occupied by the Germans, and led thither his army drawn up in three lines. He kept the first and second under arms, and employed the third on the retrenchments. The spot on which he established himself is perhaps the eminence situated on the Little Doller, to the north of Schweighausen. Ariovistus sent thither about 16,000 of his light troops and all his cavalry, to intimidate the Romans and impede the works. Nevertheless, the third line continued them, and the two others repelled the attack. The camp once fortified, Cæsar left in it two legions and a part of the auxiliaries, and took back the four others to the principal camp. The two Roman camps were 3,600 mètres distant from each other.

Hitherto Cæsar had been satisfied with drawing out his troops and backing them upon his retrenchments; the next day, persisting in his tactics (instituto suo) of trying to provoke Ariovistus to fight, he drew them up at a certain distance in advance of the principal camp, and placed them in order of battle (paulum a majoribus castris progressus, aciem instruxit). In spite of this advanced position (ne tum quidem), Ariovistus persisted in not coming out. The Roman army re-entered the camp towards midday, and a part of the German troops immediately attacked the small camp. Both armies fought resolutely till evening, and there were many wounded on both sides. Astonished at seeing that, in spite of this engagement, Ariovistus still avoided a general battle, Cæsar interrogated the prisoners, and learnt that the matrons charged with consulting destiny had declared that the Germans could not be conquerors if they fought before the new moon.[225 - De Bello Gallico, I. 50. – The predictions of these priestesses, who pretended to know the future by the noise of waters and by the vortexes made by the streams in rivers, forbade their giving battle before the new moon. (Plutarch, Cæsar, 21.)]

Battle against the Germans.

VIII. Next day, leaving a sufficient guard in the two camps, Cæsar placed all his auxiliaries in view of the enemy, in advance of the smaller camp; the number of the legionaries being less than that of the Germans, he sought to conceal his inferiority from the enemy by displaying other troops. While the Germans took these auxiliaries for the two legions which occupied the lesser camp, the latter left it by the Decuman gate, and, unperceived, went to rejoin the other four. Then Cæsar drew up his six legions in three lines, and, marching forward, he led them up to the enemy’s camp (usque ad castra hostium accessit). This offensive movement allowed the Germans no longer the choice of avoiding battle: they quitted their camp, descended into the plain,[226 - “Having skirmished opposite their retrenchments and the hills on which they were encamped, he exasperated and excited them to such a degree of rage, that they descended and fought desperately.” (Plutarch, Cæsar, 21.)] drew up in line, by order of nations, at equal intervals – Harudes, Marcomanni, Suevi, Triboces, Vangiones, Nemetes, and Sedusii; and, to deprive themselves of all possibility of flight, inclosed themselves on the sides and in the rear by a circuit of carriages and wagons, on which they placed their women: dishevelled and in tears, these implored the warriors, as they marched to the battle, not to deliver them in slavery to the Romans. In this position, the Roman army faced the east, and the German army the west, and their lines extended over a space now partly covered by the forest of Nonnenbruch.[227 - General de Gœler adopts this same field of battle, but he differs from us in placing the Romans with their back to the Rhine. It would be impossible to understand in this case how, after their defeat, the Germans would have been able to fly towards that river, Cæsar cutting off their retreat; or how Ariovistus, reckoning upon the arrival of the Suevi, should have put Cæsar between him and the re-inforcements he expected.]

Cæsar, still more to animate his soldiers, determined to give them witnesses worthy of their courage, and placed at the head of each legion either one of his lieutenants or his quæstor.[228 - As the legions were six in number, the above phrase proves that in this campaign Cæsar had one quæstor and five lieutenants. (See Appendix D.)] He led the attack in person, with his right wing, on the side where the Germans seemed weakest. The signal given, the legions dash forward; the enemy, on his side, rushes to the encounter. On both sides the impetuosity is so great that the Romans, not having time to use the pilum, throw it away, and fight hand to hand with the sword. But the Germans, according to their custom, to resist an attack of this kind, form rapidly in phalanxes of three or four hundred men,[229 - Dio Cassius, XXXVIII. 49. – We have adopted the version of Dio Cassius, as we cannot admit with Orosius that an army of more than 100,000 men could have formed only a single phalanx.] and cover their bare heads with their bucklers. They are pressed so close together, that even when dead they still remain standing.[230 - Dio Cassius, XXXVIII. 49.] Such was the ardour of the legionaries, that many rushed upon these sort of tortoises, tearing away the bucklers, and striking the enemies from above.[231 - Orosius expresses himself thus: “United in one phalanx, and their heads protected by their bucklers, they attempted, thus covered, to break the Roman lines; but some Romans, not less agile than bold, rushed upon this sort of tortoise, grappled with the German soldiers body to body, tore from them their shields, with which they were covered as with scales, and stabbed them through the shoulders.” (Orosius, VI. 7.)] The short and sharp-pointed swords of the Romans had the advantage over the long swords of the Germans.[232 - Dio Cassius, XXXVIII. 49.] Nevertheless, according to Appian, the legions owed their victory chiefly to the superiority of their tactics and the steadiness with which they kept their ranks.[233 - Appian, De Bello Celt., IV. 1, 3.] Ariovistus’s left did not resist long; but while it was driven back and put to flight, the right, forming in deep masses, pressed the Romans hard. Young P. Crassus, commander of the cavalry placed at a distance from the thick of the battle, and better placed to judge of its incidents, perceived this, sent the third line to the succour of the wavering legions, and restored the combat. Soon Ariovistus’s right was obliged to give way in its turn; the rout then became general, and the Germans desisted from flight only when they reached the Rhine, fifty miles from the field of battle.[234 - The manuscripts followed by the early editors of the “Commentaries” gave some the number of 50 miles, others that of 5 miles. We believe that Cæsar wrote 50 miles. This is proved by the very words he employs, neque prius fugere destiterunt … which could not be applied to a flight of merely a few miles. Moreover, the testimony of old writers confirms the number of 50 miles: Paulus Orosius relates that the carnage extended over a space of 40 miles; Plutarch, over 300 or 400 stadia, that is, 35 or 50 miles, according to the editions; and J. Celsus (Petrarch) (De Vita J. Cæsaris, I., p. 40, edit. Lemaire) says, usque ad ripam Rheni fuga perpetua fuit, a phrase in which the word perpetua is significative.Modern writers, supposing erroneously that Cæsar had indicated the distance, that is, the shortest line from the field of battle to the Rhine, have discussed lengthily the number to be adopted. They have overlooked the fact that the Latin text states, not exactly the distance from the field of battle to the Rhine, but the length of the line of retreat from the battle-field to the river. This line may have been oblique towards the Rhine, for it is probable that the retreat of the Germans lay down the valley of the Ill, which they had previously ascended. We must therefore seek towards Rhinau the point where they attempted to re-pass the river.] They descended, no doubt, the valley of the Ill as far as Rhinau, thus retracing a part of the road by which they had come. (See Plate 4.) Cæsar sent his cavalry after them; all who were overtaken were cut to pieces; the rest attempted to swim across the river, or sought safety in boats. Among the latter was Ariovistus, who threw himself into a boat[235 - According to Dio Cassius (XXXVIII. 50), Ariovistus, followed by his cavalry, succeeded in escaping. Having reached the right bank, he collected the fugitives; but he died shortly afterwards (De Bello Gallico, V. 29), perhaps of his wounds.] he found attached to the bank. According to Plutarch and Appian,[236 - Appian. De Bello Celt., IV. 1, 3. – Plutarch, Cæsar, 21.] 80,000 men perished in the combat and during the pursuit. Two of the wives of the German king experienced the same fate; one was a Sueve, the other a Norician. Of his two daughters, one was killed and the other taken prisoner. Cæsar says that, as he himself pursued the enemy with his cavalry, he experienced a pleasure equal to that given by victory when he recovered, first Procillus, loaded with a triple chain, and who had thrice seen the barbarians draw lots whether he should be burnt alive or not, and, subsequently, M. Mettius, both of whom, as we have seen, had been sent by him as messengers to Ariovistus.

The report of this glorious exploit having spread beyond the Rhine, the Suevi, who had come to its banks, returned home. The Ubii, who dwelt near the river, pursued their terrified bands, and slew a considerable number of the fugitives.

Cæsar, having concluded two great wars in one single campaign, placed his army in winter quarters among the Sequani rather sooner than the season required – at the beginning of September – and left them under the command of Labienus. He then left, and went to hold the assemblies in Cisalpine Gaul.[237 - De Bello Gallico, I. 53. – The war against Ariovistus became the subject of a poem by P. Terentius Varro Atacinus (De Bello Sequanico). (Priscian, X., p. 877, P.)]

Observations.

IX. There are several things worthy of remark in this campaign: —

1. The resolution taken by Cæsar to gain possession of Besançon, and thus to anticipate Ariovistus. We see the importance which he attaches to that military position as a point of support and of supply.

2. The facility with which a whole legion transforms itself into cavalry.

3. The judicious use which Cæsar makes of his light troops (alarii), by assembling them in mass, so that the enemy should believe in a greater number of legions.

4. Lastly, this singular circumstance, that the third line, which serves as reserve and decides the fate of the battle, receives from young P. Crassus, and not from the general-in-chief, the order to attack.

The dates of the principal events of this year may be indicated in the following manner: —

CHAPTER V.

WAR AGAINST THE BELGÆ

(Year of Rome 697.)

(Book II. of the “Commentaries.”)