History of Julius Caesar Vol. 2 of 2

CAMPAIGN AGAINST THE HELVETII

(Year of Rome 696.)

(Book I. of the “Commentaries.”)

Projects of Invasion by the Helvetii.

I. CÆSAR, as we have seen, had received from the Senate and people a command which comprised the two Gauls (Transalpine and Cisalpine) and Illyria.[153 - The limits of Illyria, in the time of Cæsar, are hardly known; yet it appears that this province comprised the modern Istria and part of Carniola. Aquileia was its capital, situated at the head of the gulf of the Adriatic Sea, not far from the Isonzo. In fact, Strabo (I., p. 178) says that Aquileia was situated without the frontiers of the Veneti, in whose territory this town was included under Augustus. On another side, Titus Livius (XXXIX. 55) informs us that the colony of Aquileia had been founded in Istria; and Herodotus (I. 196), as well as Appian, reckons the Istrians among the peoples of Illyria.] Yet the agitation which continued to reign in the Republic was retaining him at the gates of Rome, when suddenly, towards the spring of 696, news came that the Helvetii, returning to their old design, were preparing to invade the Roman province. This intelligence caused a great sensation.

The Helvetii, proud of their former exploits, confident in their strength, and incommoded by excess of population, felt humiliated at living in a country the limits of which had been made narrow by nature, and for some years they meditated quitting it to repair into the south of Gaul.

As early as 693, an ambitious chieftain, Orgetorix, found no difficulty in inspiring them with the desire to seek elsewhere a more fertile territory and a milder climate. They resolved to go and establish themselves in the country of the Santones (the Saintonge), situated on the shores of the ocean, to the north of the Gironde. Two years were to be employed in preparations, and, by a solemn engagement, the departure was fixed for the third year. But Orgetorix, sent to the neighbouring peoples to contract alliances, conspired with two influential personages – one of the country of the Sequani, the other of that of the Ædui. He induced them to undertake to seize the supreme power, promised them the assistance of the Helvetii, and persuaded them that those three powerful nations, leagued together, would easily subjugate the whole of Gaul. This conspiracy failed, through the death of Orgetorix, accused in his own country of a design to usurp the sovereignty. The Helvetii persisted, nevertheless, in their project of emigration. They collected the greatest possible number of wagons and beasts of burden; and, in order to destroy all idea of returning, they burnt their twelve towns, their four hundred hamlets, and all the wheat they could not carry with them. Each furnished himself with meal[154 - “Molita cibaria.” (De Bello Gallico, I. 5.)] for three months; and after persuading their neighbours, the Rauraci,[155 - Inhabitants of the country of Bâle. The Rauraci inhabited the diocese of Bâle, which was called Augusta Rauracorum.] the Tulingi, and the Latobriges,[156 - Inhabitants of the south of the Grand Duchy of Baden. The town of Stulingen, near Schaffhausen, is believed to derive its name from the Tulingi.] to imitate their example and follow them, and having drawn to them those of the Boii who had moved from Noricum to the neighbourhood of the Rhine, they fixed the rendezvous on the banks of the Rhone for the 5th of the Calends of April (the 24th of March, the day of the equinox).[157 - De Bello Gallico, I. 3, 4, and 5. – Scholars have taken great pains to determine the concordance between the ante-Julian calendar and the Julian calendar; unfortunately, the results at which they have arrived are very imperfect. We have asked M. Le Verrier to solve this difficult problem, and we owe to his courtesy the tables placed at the end of this volume. (Appendix A.)]

There were only two roads by which they could leave Helvetia; one crossed the country of the Sequani, the entrance to which was defended by a narrow and difficult defile, situated between the Rhone and the Jura (the Pas-de-l’Ecluse), and where the wagons could with difficulty pass one at a time. As this defile was commanded by a very lofty mountain, a handful of men was sufficient to prevent the access. The other road, less contracted and more easy, crossed the Roman province, after having passed the Rhone, which separated the Allobroges from the Helvetii, from Lake Léman to the Jura. Within this distance the river was fordable in several places.[158 - The bed of the Rhone has changed at several points since the time of Cæsar; at present, according to the report of those who live on its banks, there are no fords except between Russin, on the right bank, and the mill of Vert, on the left bank. (See Plate 3.)] At Geneva, the extreme limit of the territory of the Allobroges towards Helvetia, a bridge established a communication between the two countries. The Helvetii decided on taking the most convenient road; they reckoned, moreover, on the co-operation of this neighbouring people, who, but recently subjugated, could have but doubtful sympathies for the Romans.[159 - De Bello Gallico, I. 6.]

Cæsar’s Arrival at Geneva.

II. Cæsar, learning that the Helvetii intended to pass through the Roman province, left Rome hastily in the month of March, hurried by forced marches into Transalpine Gaul, and, according to Plutarch, reached Geneva in eight days.[160 - Plutarch, Cæsar, 18.] As he had in the province only a single legion, he ordered a levy of as many men as possible, and then destroyed the bridge of Geneva. Informed of his arrival, the Helvetii, who were probably not yet all assembled, sent their men of noblest rank to demand a passage through the country of the Allobroges, promising to commit no injury there; they had, they said, no other road to quit their country. Cæsar was inclined to refuse their demand at once, but he called to mind the defeat and death of the Consul L. Cassius; and wishing to obtain time to collect the troops of which he had ordered the levy, he gave them hopes of a favourable reply, and adjourned it to the Ides of April (8th of April). By this delay he gained a fortnight; it was employed in fortifying the left bank of the Rhone, between Lake Léman and the Jura.[161 - This part of the Jura on the left bank of the Rhone is called the Mont du Vuache.] If we estimate at 5,000 men the legion which was in the province, and at 5,000 or 6,000 the number of soldiers of the new levies, we see that Cæsar had at his disposal, to defend the banks of the Rhone, about 10,000 or 11,000 infantry.[162 - De Bello Gallico, I. 8.]

Description of the Retrenchment of the Rhone.

III. The distance from Lake Léman to the Jura, following the sinuosities of the river, is 29½ kilomètres, or 19,000 Roman paces (millia passuum decem novem).[163 - M. Queypo, in his learned work on the weights and measures of the ancients, assigns to the Roman foot, subdivided into twelve inches, a length of 0·29630m. The Roman pace was five feet, so that the mile was equivalent to a length of 1481·50m.] It is on the space comprised between these two points that a retrenchment was raised which is called in the “Commentaries” murus fossaque. This could not be a continuous work, as the ground to be defended is intersected by rivers and ravines, and the banks of the Rhone are almost everywhere so precipitous that it would have been useless to fortify them. Cæsar, pressed for time, can only have made retrenchments on the weakest points of the line where the passage of the river was easy; indeed, this is what Dio Cassius tells us.[164 - Dio Cassius says that “Cæsar fortified with retrenchments and walls the most important points.” (XXXVIII. 31.)] The labours of the Romans were only supplementary, on certain points, to the formidable natural obstacles which the Rhone presents in the greater part of its course. The only places where an attempt could be made to pass it, because the heights there sink towards the banks of the river into practicable declivities, are situated opposite the modern villages of Russin, Cartigny, Avully, Chancy, and Cologny. In these places they cut the upper part of the slope into a perpendicular, and afterwards hollowed a trench, the scarp of which thus gained an elevation of sixteen feet. These works, by uniting the escarpments of the Rhone, formed, from Geneva to the Jura, a continuous line, which presented an impassable barrier. Behind and along this line, at certain distances, posts and closed redoubts rendered it impregnable. (See Plate 3.)[165 - The retrenchments which Cæsar calls murus fossaque could not be a wall, in the usual acceptation of the word: first, because a wall would have been but a weak obstacle; further, because the materials were not found on the spot; and lastly, because if so great a quantity of stones had been collected on the bank of the Rhone, we should still find traces of them. I have therefore sought another explanation, and thought that murus might be understood of a natural escarpment rendered steeper by a slight work. Penetrated with this idea, I sought Baron Stoffel, the commandant of artillery, to inspect the localities, and the result of his researches has fully confirmed my suppositions. The following is a summary of his report: —Considered in its ensemble, from Geneva to the Pas-de-l’Ecluse, the Rhone presents the appearance of an immense fosse from 100 to 120 mètres broad, with abrupt and very elevated scarp and counter-scarp. The parts where it does not present this character are few, and of relatively small extent. They are the only ones where operations for passing the river could be attempted – the only ones, consequently, which Cæsar would have need to fortify on the left bank.1. From Geneva to the confluence of the Arve and the Rhone, an extent of 1½ kilomètres. Breadth of the river, 90 to 100 mètres. – The left bank is flat in the whole of this extent. The right bank has escarpments almost vertical, the height of which varies from 15 to 35 mètres. (See Plate 3, mean profile between Geneva and the Arve.) No attempt at passage could have taken place, neither at Geneva, nor between the town and the Arve.2. From the Arve to the plateau of Aire-la-Ville, extent 12½ kilomètres. – After leaving the confluence of the Arve, the heights of the right bank of the Rhone increase in elevation; the escarpments become formidable. – The left bank is bordered with similar escarpments, and the river runs thus between high and abrupt banks, everywhere impassable. It preserves this character to a kilomètre above the ravine of Avril, near Peney. The profiles a a and b b give an idea of the escarpments of the banks from the Avre to the ravine of Avril. (See Plate 3.) – The heights which, on the right bank of the Rhone, extend from Vernier to Peney, sink gradually from one of these villages towards the other, and they form to the east of the ravine of Avril a plateau, the mean elevation of which above the bed of the river is only 20 mètres. Opposite, on the left bank, extends the plateau of Aire-la-Ville. Length 1,700 mètres; breadth, 700 mètres; mean elevation above the bed of the Rhone, 20 to 25 mètres. The heights of the Peney are well disposed for the establishment of an army, and the plateau of Aire-la-Ville would permit an army, the Rhone once passed, to deploy easily. But, in spite of these advantages, it is certain that the Helvetii attempted no operation on this side, for the Rhone flows at the foot of a slope of the height of from 14 to 16 mètres and an inclination of at least 45 degrees.3. From the plateau of Aire-la-Ville to the point of Epeisses, extent 6 kilomètres. – Down the river from the escarpments of Peney, the heights of the right bank (heights of Russin) form with those of the left bank an immense amphitheatre, nearly circular, the arena of which would be the ground represented green on Plate 3 (diameter, 1½ kilomètres). From the heights of Russin we can descend into the plain to the water of the river. The Rhone, in this part, has never been deep or rapid. The left bank is little elevated, entirely flat opposite the mill of Vert, and the slope of the heights which command it is far from impracticable.Thus, it was here possible for the Helvetii to effect the passage of the river, and climb the heights of the left bank, if they had not been fortified or guarded. This operation presented least difficulty in the part t t o. And we can hardly doubt that the Romans fortified it to add to the natural obstacles, which were insufficient in this extent. (See the profile c c.)An attentive examination of the locality, the discovery of certain irregularities of ground, which we may be allowed to consider as vestiges, lead us to explain in the following manner the expression murum fossamque perducit.Cæsar took advantage of the mean heights at the foot of which the Rhone flows, to cause to be made, on the slope towards the river, and beginning with the crest, a longitudinal trench, of such a depth that the main wall had an elevation of 16 feet. The earth arising from the excavation was thrown down the side of the slope, and the crest was furnished with palisades. (See the profile of the retrenchment.) It was, properly speaking, a fosse, the scarp of which was higher than the counter-scarp.The hills on the left bank, which rise opposite Russin, are accessible, especially in an extent of 900 mètres, reckoning from the point where the ravine which descends to Aire-la-Ville opens upon the river. They form there, among other peculiarities of the ground, a terrace 8 mètres in breadth, rising from 13 to 14 mètres above the plain, and descending to this by a tolerably uniform talus of 45 degrees.The Romans would be able to prevent the access by means of the trench just described. They, no doubt, continued it to the point o, where the terrace ceases, and the heights become impracticable. It would then have been from 800 to 900 mètres long.If we continue to descend the Rhone, we meet, on the left bank, first with the perpendicular escarpments of Cartigny, which are 70 or 80 mètres in height, and then abrupt beaches to near Avully. Below Cartigny, the Rhone surrounds a little plain, very slightly inclined towards the river, and presenting a projection of land (v r) from 5 to 6 mètres high, with a talus of less than 45 degrees. The bank being of small elevation, the Helvetii might have landed there. To prevent this, the Romans opened, in the talus which fronted the Rhone, a trench similar to the preceding; it was 250 mètres long.The heights of Avully and Epeisses leave between them and the river a tolerably vast space, composed of two distinct parts. The first is formed of gentle slopes from Avully to a projection of land, q p; the other part is a plain comprised between this projection of land and the left bank of the river. On the right bank a torrent-like river, the London, debouches into flat ground named La Plaine. The Helvetii might have made their preparations for passing the Rhone there, and directed their efforts towards the western point of La Plaine, in face of the low and flat land comprised between the left bank and the escarpment q p. In this part the left bank is only from 1½ to 2 mètres high. Moreover, the slopes of Avully are not difficult to climb, and therefore the Romans must have sought to bar the passage in this direction. (See the broken profile d e f.) The escarpment q p, from its position and height, is easy to fortify. Its length is 700 mètres; its mean elevation above the plain, 18. It presents to the river a talus of less than 45 degrees. The Romans made in this talus, along the crest, a trench, forming wall and fosse. Its length was 700 mètres.4. From the point of Epeisses to the escarpments of Etournel, extent 6 kilomètres. – From Epeisses to Chancy the Rhone flows in a straight line, and presents the appearance of a vast fosse, 100 mètres wide, the walls of which have an inclination of more than 45 degrees. (See the profile g g.)At 200 mètres above Chancy, at k, the character of the banks changes suddenly. The heights on the right sink towards the river in tolerably gentle slopes, through an extent of 2,300 mètres, reckoning from k to the escarpments of Etournel. Opposite, on the left bank, extends the plateau of Chancy. It presents to the Rhone, from k to z, in a length of 1,400 mètres, an irregular crest, distant from 50 to 60 mètres from the river, and commanding it by about 20 mètres. The side towards the Rhone, from k to z, presents slopes which are very practicable. (See the profile h h.)The position of Chancy was certainly the theatre of the most serious attempts on the part of the Helvetii. Encamped on the heights of the right bank, they could easily descend to the Rhone, and there make their preparations for passing, on an extent of 1,500 mètres. The river once crossed, they had only before them, from k to z, slopes which were practicable to debouch on the plateau of Chancy.The Romans had then to bar the gap k z by joining the impassable escarpments which terminate in k with those which commence at z, and which are also inaccessible. To effect this, they opened from one of these points to the other, in the upper part of the slope at the foot of which the Rhone flows, a longitudinal trench k z, similar to that already spoken of. It was 1,400 mètres in length.5. From the escarpments of Etournel to the Pas-de-l’Ecluse, an extent of 6 kilomètres. – At the escarpments of Etournel, the Rhone removes from the heights on the right, and only returns to them towards the hamlet of the Isles, 2 kilomètres farther down. These heights form a vast semi-elliptical amphitheatre, embracing a plain slightly inclined towards the river. It is marked by a green tint on Plate 3. People can descend from all sides and approach the Rhone, the bank of which is flat. Opposite, the left bank presents insurmountable obstacles until below Cologny, at s. But below this point, from s to y, the bank is flat, and the heights situated behind are accessible on an extent of 2 kilomètres.The Helvetii, established on the heights of Pougny and Colonges, could descend to the Rhone, and cross it between Etournel and the hamlet of Les Isles. The Romans had thus to unite the escarpments which terminate at Cologny with the impracticable slopes of the mountain of Le Vuache. Here again we shall see that they took advantage of the peculiarities of the ground.At the village of Cologny, the heights form a triangular plateau, s u x, of which the point s advances like a promontory towards the Rhone, which it commands perpendicularly by at least 20 mètres. A projection of land, s u, bounds it in front, and separates it from a plain which extends to the river. The escarpment produced by this projection of land presents to the Rhone a slope of about 45 degrees. It rises over the plain about 14 mètres towards its extremity s, but diminishes gradually in height, until it is only 2 to 3 mètres in height near the point u. (See the profile n n.) The Romans hollowed, on the slope of the escarpment from s to u, a length of 800 mètres, a trench forming wall and fosse. The plateau of Cologny, situated in the rear, offered a favorable position for the defence of this retrenchment. (See the profile p p.) They prolonged their works towards the west as far as y; beyond that, the heights presented sufficient natural obstacles. We may thus estimate that, from Cologny to the mountain of Le Vuache, the Romans executed from 1,600 to 1,700 mètres of retrenchments.To sum up: the works executed on five principal points, between Geneva and the Jura, represent a total length of about 5,000 mètres, that is, less than the sixth part of the development of the course of the Rhone.Admitting that Cæsar had at his disposal 10,000 men, we may suppose that he distributed them in the following manner: – 3,000 men on the heights of Avully, his head-quarters; 2,500 at Geneva; 1,000 on the plateau of Aire-la-Ville; 2,000 at Chancy; and 1,500 on the plateau of Cologny. These 10,000 men might be concentrated: in two hours, on the heights between Aire-la-Ville and Cartigny; in three hours, on the heights of Avully; in three hours and a half, on the plateau of Chancy; in three hours and a half, these troops, with the exception of those encamped at Geneva, might be brought together between Cologny and the fort of L’Ecluse. It would require five hours to carry the detachment from Geneva thither.The detachments mentioned above, with the exception of that of Geneva, were established in what Cæsar calls the castella. These were constructed on the heights, in the proximity of the retrenchments which had to be defended – namely, at Aire-la-Ville, Avully, Chancy, and Cologny. They consisted probably of earthen redoubts, capable of containing a certain number of troops. They are represented by squares in Plate 3.Cæsar could reconnoitre every instant the march and designs of the Helvetii, the heights of the left bank of the Rhone presenting a great number of positions where it was easy to place advantageously posts of observation. Commandant Stoffel has pointed out six, which are marked on Plate 3. As it will be observed, the Helvetii, in crossing the Rhone, could not be disturbed by darts thrown from the top of the retrenchments, for these darts would not carry to the left bank of the river. Now there exists at present, between this bank and the foot of the heights in which these trenches were cut, flat ground of more or less extent. Admitting, then, that the Rhone flowed nineteen centuries ago in the same bed as at the present day, we may ask if the Romans did not construct, in these low parts near the bank, ordinary retrenchments, composed of a fosse and rampart. The excavations undertaken by the Commandant Stoffel have revealed everywhere, in these plains, the existence of ground formed by alluvium, which would lead us to believe that the Rhone once covered them. However, even if at that epoch these little plains had been already uncovered, either wholly or in part, we can hardly suppose that Cæsar would have raised works there, since the heights situated in the rear permitted him, with less labour, to create a more redoubtable defence – that of the trenches opened along the crests. As we see, the obstacle presented to the assailants began only with these trenches, at the top of the slopes.As to the vestiges which still appear to exist, they may be described as follows. The slopes which the Romans fortified at Chancy, from k to z, and at Cologny, from s to y, present, in the upper parts, in some places, undulations of ground, the form of which denotes the work of man. On the slope of Chancy, for instance, the ground presents a projection, i i (see the profile h h), very distinctly marked, and having the remarkable peculiarity that it is about 11 feet high and 8 to 9 feet broad. Now, is it not evident that, if one of the fosses which have been described should get filled up, either naturally, by the action of time, or by the processes of agriculture, it would take absolutely the form i i, with the dimensions just indicated? It would not, therefore, be rash to consider these peculiarities of the ground, such as i i, as traces of the Roman trenches.We must further mention the projection of land v r, situated below Cartigny. Its form is so regular, and so sharply defined, from the crest to the foot of the talus, that it is difficult not to see in it the vestiges of a work made by men’s hands.It is easy to estimate approximately the time which it would have taken Cæsar’s troops to construct the 5,000 mètres of trenches which extended, at separate intervals, from Geneva to the Jura.Let us consider, to fix our ideas, a ground A D V, inclined at 45 degrees, in which is to be made the trench A B C D. The great wall A B C had 16 Roman feet in elevation: we will suppose that A B was inclined at 5 on 1, and that the small wall D C was 6 feet high.The amount of rubbish removed would be as follows: – Section A B C D = 64 square feet, or, reducing it into square mètres, A B C D = 5 square mètres 60 centimètres.The mètre in length of the earth thrown out would give thus 5·60 cubic mètres.If we consider the facility of labour in the trench, since the earth has only to be thrown down the slope, we shall see that two men can dig three mètres in length of this trench in two days. Therefore, admitting that the 10,000 men at Cæsar’s disposal had only been employed a quarter of the time, from two to three days would have been sufficient for the execution of the complete work.]

This retrenchment, which required only from two to three days’ labour, was completed when the deputies returned, at the time appointed, to hear Cæsar’s reply. He flatly refused the passage, declaring that he would oppose it with all his means.

Meanwhile the Helvetii, and the people who took part in their enterprise, had assembled on the right bank of the Rhone. When they learnt that they must renounce the hope of quitting their country without opposition, they resolved to open themselves a passage by force. Several times – sometimes by day, and sometimes by night – they crossed the Rhone, some by fording, others with the aid of boats joined together, or of a great number of rafts of timber, and attempted to carry the heights, but, arrested by the strength of the retrenchment (operis munitione), and by the efforts and missiles of the soldiers who hastened to the threatened points (concursu et telis), they abandoned the attack.[166 - De Bello Gallico, I. 8.]

The Helvetii begin their March towards the Saône. Cæsar unites his Troops.

IV. The only road which now remained was that which lay across the country of the Sequani (the Pas-de-l’Ecluse); but this narrow defile could not be passed without the consent of its inhabitants. The Helvetii charged the Æduan Dumnorix, the son-in-law of Orgetorix, to solicit it for them. High in credit among the Sequani, Dumnorix obtained it; and the two peoples entered into an engagement, one to leave the passage free, the other to commit no disorder; and, as pledges of their convention, they exchanged hostages.[167 - De Bello Gallico, I. 9. – The country of the Sequani comprised the Jura, and reached to the Pas-de-l’Ecluse. (See Plate 2, Map of Gaul.)]

When Cæsar learned that the Helvetii were preparing to pass through the lands of the Sequani and the Ædui on their way to the Santones, he resolved to oppose them, unwilling to suffer the establishment of warlike and hostile men in a fertile and open country, neighbouring upon that of the Tolosates, which made part of the Roman province.[168 - It has been considered to have been an error of Cæsar to place the Santones in the proximity of the Tolosates: modern researchers have proved that the two peoples were not more than thirty or forty leagues from each other.]

But, as he had not at hand sufficient forces, he resolved on uniting all the troops he could dispose of in his vast command. He entrusts, therefore, the care of the retrenchments on the Rhone to his lieutenant T. Labienus, hastens into Italy by forced marches, raises there in great haste two legions (the 11th and 12th), brings from Aquileia, a town of Illyria,[169 - Several authors have stated wrongly that Cæsar went into Illyria; he informs us himself (De Bello Gallico, III. 7) that he went thither for the first time in the winter of 698.] the three legions which were there in winter quarters (the 7th, 8th, and 9th), and, at the head of his army, takes across the Alps (see Plate 4) the shortest road to Transalpine Gaul.[170 - We believe, with General de Gœler, from the itinerary marked on the Peutingerian table, that the troops of Cæsar passed by Altinum (Altino), Mantua, Cremona, Laus Pompei (Lodi Vecchio), Pavia, and Turin; but, after quitting this last place, we consider that they followed the route of Fenestrella and Ocelum. Thence they directed their march across the Cottian Alps, by Cesena and Brigantium (Briançon); then, following the road indicated by the Theodosian table, which appears to have passed along the banks of the Romanche, they proceeded to Cularo (Grenoble), on the frontier of the Vocontii, by Stabatio (Chahotte or Le Monestier, Hautes-Alpes), Durotineum (Villards-d’Arenne), Melloseeum (Misoen or Bourg-d’Oysans, Isère), and Catorissium (Bourg-d’Oysans or Chaource, Isère).] The Centrones, the Graioceli, and the Caturiges (see page 24, note), posted on the heights,[171 - “Locis superioribus occupatis.” (De Bello Gallico, I. 10.)] attempt to bar his road; but he overthrows them in several engagements, and from Ocelum (Usseau),[172 - There is difference of opinion as to the site of Ocelum. The following remark has been communicated to me by M.E. Celesia, who is preparing a work on ancient Italy: Ocelum only meant, in the ancient Celtic or Iberian language, principal passage. We know that, in the Pyrenees, these passages were called ports. There existed places of the name of Ocelum, in the Alps, in Gaul, and as far as Spain. (Ptolemy, II. 6.) – The itineraries found in the baths of Vicarello indicate, between Turin and Susa, an Ocelum, which appears to us to have been that of which Cæsar speaks; there was a place similarly named in Maurienne, on the left bank of the Arc, at an equal distance from the source of that river and the town of Saint-Jean; it is now Usseglio. There was another in the valley of the Lanzo, on the left bank of the Gara, from which appears to be derived the name of Garaceli or Graioceli; it was called Ocelum Lanciensium. The Ocelum of Cæsar, according to M. Celesia, who adopts the opinion of D’Anville, was called Ocelum ad Clusonem fluvium; it was situated in the valley of the Pragelatto, on the road leading from Pignerol to the defile of Fenestrella. This place has continued to preserve its primitive name of Ocelum, Occelum, Oxelum, Uxelum (Charta Adeladis, an. 1064), whence by corruption its modern name of Usseau. According to this hypothesis, Cæsar would have passed from the valley of Chiusone into that of Pragelatto, and thence, by Mount Genèvre, to Briançon, in order to arrive among the Vocontii. – Polyænus (Stratag., VIII. xxiii. 2) relates that Cæsar took advantage of a mist to escape the mountaineers.] the extreme point of the Cisalpine, reaches in seven days the territory of the Vocontii, making thus about twenty-five kilomètres a day. He next penetrates into the country of the Allobroges, then into that of the Segusiavi, who bordered on the Roman province beyond the Rhone.[173 - “Segusiavi sunt trans Rhodanum primi.” (De Bello Gallico, I. 10.) It is to be supposed that there existed a bridge on the Rhone, near Lyons.]

These operations took two months;[174 - Cæsar had deferred his reply till the Ides of April (April the 8th). If it were then decided to bring the legions from Aquileia, the time necessary to bring them would have been as follows:According to this reckoning, Cæsar required 60 days, reckoning from the moment when he decided on this course, to transport his legions from Aquileia to Lyons; that is to say, if he sent, as is probable, couriers on the 8th of April, the day he refused the passage to the Helvetii, the head of his column arrived at Lyons towards the 7th of June.] the same time had been employed by the Helvetii in negotiating the conditions of their passage through the country of the Sequani, moving from the Rhone to the Saône, and beginning to pass the latter river. They had passed the Pas-de-l’Ecluse, followed the right bank of the Rhone as far as Culoz, then turned to the east through Virieu-le-Grand, Tenay, and Saint-Rambert, and, thence crossing the plains of Ambérieux, the river Ain, and the vast plateau of the Dombes, they had arrived at the Saône, the left bank of which they occupied from Trévoux to Villefranche. (See Plate 4.) The slowness of their march need not surprise us if we consider that an agglomeration of 368,000 individuals, men, women, and children, dragging after them from 8,000 to 9,000 wagons, through a defile where carriages could only pass one abreast, would necessarily employ several weeks in passing it.[175 - To estimate the volume and weight represented by the provisions for three months for three hundred and sixty-eight thousand persons of both sexes and of all ages, let us allow that the ration of food was small, and consisted, we may say, only in a reserve of meal, trium mensium molita cibaria, at an average of ¾ of a pound (¾ of a pound of meal gives about a pound of bread); at this rate, the Helvetii must have carried with them 24,840,000 pounds, or 12,420,000 kilogrammes of meal. Let us allow also that they had great four-wheeled carriages, capable each of carrying 2,000 kilogrammes, and drawn by four horses. The 100 kilogrammes of unrefined meal makes 2 cubic hectolitres; therefore, 2,000 kilogrammes of meal make 4 cubic mètres, so that this would lead us to suppose no more than 4 cubic mètres as the average load for the four-wheeled carriages. On our good roads in France, levelled and paved, three horses are sufficient to draw, at a walking pace, during ten hours, a four-wheeled carriage carrying 4,000 kilogrammes. It is more than 1,300 kilogrammes per collar.We suppose that the horses of the emigrants drew only 500 kilogrammes in excess of the dead weight, which would give about 6,000 carriages and 24,000 draught animals to transport the three months’ provisions.But these emigrants were not only provided with food, for they had also certainly baggage. It appears to us no exaggeration to suppose that each individual carried, besides his food, fifteen kilogrammes of baggage on an average. We are thus left to add to the 6,000 provision carriages about 2,500 other carriages for the baggage, which would make a total of 8,500 carriages drawn by 34,000 draught animals. We use the word animals instead of horses, as at least a part of the teams would, no doubt, be composed of oxen, the number of which would diminish daily, for the emigrants would be led to use the flesh of these animals for their own food.Such a column of 8,500 carriages, supposing them to march in file, one carriage at a time, on a single road, could not occupy less than thirty-two leagues in length, if we reckon fifteen mètres to each carriage. This remark explains the enormous difficulties the emigration would encounter, and the slowness of its movements: we need, then, no longer be astonished at the twenty days which it took three quarters of the column to pass the Saône.We have not comprised the provisions of grain for the animals themselves: yet it is difficult to believe that the Helvetii, so provident for their own wants, had neglected to provide for those of their beasts, and that they had reckoned exclusively for their food on the forage they might find on the road.] Cæsar, no doubt, calculated beforehand, with sufficient accuracy, the time it would take them to gain the banks of the Saône; and we may therefore suppose that, at the moment when he repaired into Italy, he hoped to bring thence his army in time to prevent them from passing that river.

He established his camp near the confluence of the Rhone and the Saône, on the heights which command Sathonay; thence he could equally manœuvre on the two banks of the Saône, take the Helvetii in flank as they marched towards that river, or prevent them, if they crossed it, from entering into the Roman province by the valley of the Rhone. It was probably at this point that Labienus joined him with the troops which had been left with him, and which raised to six the number of his legions. His cavalry, composed principally of Ædui and men raised in the Roman province, amounted to 4,000 men. During this time the Helvetii were ravaging the lands of the Ambarri, those of the Ædui, and those which the Allobroges possessed on the right bank of the Rhone. These peoples implored the succour of Cæsar. He was quite disposed to listen to their prayers.[176 - De Bello Gallico, I. 11.]

Defeat of the Helvetii on the Saône.

V. The Saône, which crossed the countries of the Ædui and the Sequani,[177 - It is an error to translate Arar, quod per fines Æduorum et Sequanorum in Rhodamam influit, by the words, “the Saône, which forms the common boundary line of the Ædui and the Sequani.” Cæsar always understands by fines, territory, and not boundary line. He expresses himself very differently when he speaks of a river separating territories. (De Bello Gallico, I. 6, 83; VII. 5.) The expression per fines thus confirms the supposition that the territories of these two peoples extended on both sides of the Saône. (See Plate 2.)] flowed, then as now, in certain places with an extreme sluggishness. Cæsar says that people could not distinguish the direction of the current. The Helvetii, who had not learned to make bridges, crossed the river, between Trévoux and Villefranche, on rafts and boats joined together. As soon as the Roman general had ascertained by his scouts that three-quarters of the barbarians were on the other side of the river, and the others were still on his side, he left his camp towards midnight (de tertia vigilia) (see note 1 on page 69 (#x_5_i17)) with three legions, came upon those of the Helvetii who were still on the left bank, to the north of Trévoux, in the valley of the Formans, towards six o’clock in the morning, after a march of eighteen kilomètres, attacked them by surprise in the midst of the confusion of passing the river, and slew a great number. Those who could escape dispersed, and concealed themselves in the neighbouring forests. This disaster fell upon the Tigurini (the inhabitants of the Cantons of Vaud, Friburg, and a part of the Canton of Berne), one of the four tribes of which the nation of the Helvetii was composed, the same which, in an expedition out of Helvetia, had formerly slain the Consul L. Cassius, and made his army pass under the yoke.[178 - De Bello Gallico, I. 12. – The excavations, carried on in 1862 between Trévoux and Riottier, on the plateaux of La Bruyère and Saint-Bernard, leave no doubt of the place of this defeat. They revealed the existence of numerous sepulchres, as well Gallo-Roman as Celtic. The tumuli furnished vases of coarse clay, and many fragments of arms in silex, ornaments in bronze, iron arrow-heads, fragments of sockets. These sepultures are some by incineration, others by inhumation. In the first, the cremation had nowhere been complete, which proves that they had been burnt hastily, and excludes all notion of an ordinary cemetery. Two common fosses were divided each into two compartments, one of which contained cinders, the other human skeletons, thrown in pell-mell, skeletons of men, women, and children. Lastly, numerous country ovens line, as it were, the road followed by the Helvetii. These ovens, very common at the foot of the abrupt hills of Trévoux, Saint-Didier, Frans, Jassans, and Mizérieux, are found again on the left bank of the Ain and as far as the neighbourhood of Ambronay.]

After this combat, Cæsar, in order to pursue the other part of the enemy’s army, and prevent its marching towards the south, threw a bridge across the Saône, and transported his troops to the right bank. The barques which followed him for the conveyance of provisions would necessarily facilitate this operation. It is probable that a detachment established in the defiles on the right bank of the Saône, at the spot where Lyons now stands, intercepted the road which would have conducted the Helvetii towards the Roman province. As to the three legions which remained in the camp of Sathonay, they soon rejoined Cæsar. The Helvetii, struck by his sudden approach, and by the rapidity with which he had effected, in one single day, a passage which had cost them twenty days’ labour, sent him a deputation, the chief of which, old Divico, had commanded in the wars against Cassius. In language full of boast and threatening, Divico reminded Cæsar of the humiliation inflicted formerly on the Roman arms. The proconsul replied that he was not forgetful of old affronts, but that recent injuries were sufficient motives for his conduct. Nevertheless, he offered peace, on condition that they should give him hostages. “The Helvetii,” replied Divico, “have learned from their ancestors to receive, but not to give, hostages; the Romans ought to know that.” This proud reply closed the interview.

Nevertheless, the Helvetii appear to have been desirous of avoiding battle, for next day they raised their camp, and, cut off from the possibility of following the course of the Saône to proceed towards the south, they took the easiest way to reach the country of the Santones, by directing their march towards the sources of the Dheune and the Bourbince. (See Plate 4.) This broken country, moreover, permitted them to resist the Romans with advantage. They followed across the mountains of Charolais the Gaulish road, on the trace of which was, no doubt, subsequently constructed the Roman way from Lyons to Autun, vestiges of which still exist; the latter followed the course of the Saône as far as Belleville, where it parted from it abruptly, crossing over the Col d’Avenas, proceeding through the valley of the Grosne to Cluny, and continuing by Saint-Vallier to Autun. At Saint-Vallier they would quit this road, and march towards the Loire to pass it at Decize.[179 - Cæsar declares, on two different occasions, the fixed design of the Helvetii to establish themselves in the country of the Santones (I. 9 and 11), and Titus Livius confirms this fact in these words: “Cæsar Helvetios, gentem vagam, domuit, quæ, sedem quærens, in provinciam Cæsaris Narbonem iter facere volebat.” (Epitome, CIII.) Had they, for the execution of this project, the choice between several roads (the word “road” being taken here in the general sense)? Some authors, not considering the topography of France, have believed that, to go to the Santones, the Helvetii should have marched by the shortest line, from east to west, and passed the Loire towards Roanne. But they would have had first to pass, in places almost impassable, the mountains which separate the Saône from the Loire, and, had they arrived there, they would have found their road barred by another chain of mountains, that of Le Forez, which separates the Loire from the Allier.The only means of going from the Lower Saône into Saintonge consists in travelling at first to the north-west towards the sources of the Bourbince, where is found the greatest depression of the chain of mountains which separates the Saône from the Loire, and marching subsequently to the west, to descend towards the latter river. This is so true, that at an epoch very near to our own, before the construction of the railways, the public conveyances, to go from Lyons to La Rochelle, did not pass by Roanne, but took the direction to the north-west, to Autun, and thence to Nevers, in the valley of the Loire. We understand, in exploring this mountainous country, why Cæsar was obliged to confine himself to pursuing the Helvetii, without being ever able to attack them. We cannot find a single point where he could have gained upon them by rapidity of movement, or where he could execute any manœuvre whatever.]

Cæsar followed the Helvetii, and sent before him all his cavalry to watch their march. These, too eager in the pursuit, came to blows with the enemy’s cavalry in a position of disadvantage, and experienced some loss. Proud of having repulsed 4,000 men with 500 horsemen, the Helvetii became sufficiently emboldened to venture sometimes to harass the Roman army. But Cæsar avoided engaging his troops; he was satisfied with following, day by day, the enemies at a distance of five or six miles at most (about eight kilomètres), opposing the devastations they committed on their passage, and waiting a favourable occasion to inflict a defeat upon them.

The two armies continued their march extremely slowly, and the days passed without offering the desired opportunity. Meanwhile, the provisionment of the Roman army began to inspire serious uneasiness; wheat arrived no longer by the Saône, for Cæsar had been obliged to move from it in order to keep up with the Helvetii. On another hand, the Ædui delayed, under vain pretexts, sending the grain which they had promised. The harvest, too, was not yet ripe, and even forage failed. As the day for distribution approached, Cæsar convoked the Æduan chiefs, who were numerous in his camp, and overwhelmed them with reproaches. One of them, Liscus, occupied in his country the supreme magistracy, under the name of vergobret; he denounced Dumnorix, the brother of Divitiacus, as opposing the sending of provisions; it was the same Dumnorix who had heretofore secretly negotiated the passage of the Helvetii across the country of the Sequani, and who, placed at the head of the Æduan contingent, had, in the last combat, by retreating with his men, led to the flight of the whole body of the cavalry. Cæsar sent for Divitiacus, a man devoted to the Roman people, and revealed to him the culpable conduct of his brother, which merited an exemplary punishment. Divitiacus expressed the same opinion, but, in tears, implored the pardon of Dumnorix. Cæsar granted it to him, and contented himself with placing him under surveillance. It was, indeed, good policy not to alienate the Æduan people by any excessive severity against a man of power among them.

The Helvetii, after advancing northward as far as Saint-Vallier, had turned to the west to reach the valley of the Loire. Arrived near Issy-l’Evêque, they encamped on the banks of a tributary of the Somme, at the foot of Mount Tauffrin, eight miles from the Roman army. Informed of this circumstance, Cæsar judged that the moment had arrived for attacking them by surprise, and sent to reconnoitre by what circuits the heights might be reached. He learnt that the access was easy, and ordered Labienus to gain, with two legions, the summit of the mountain by bye-roads, without giving alarm to the enemy, and to wait till he himself, marching at the head of the four other legions, by the same road as the Helvetii, should appear near their camp; then both were to attack them at the same time. Labienus started at midnight, taking for guides the men who had just explored the roads. Cæsar, on his part, began his march at two o’clock in the morning (de quarta vigilia),[180 - The Romans used little precision in the division of time. Forcellini (Lex., voce Hora) refers to Pliny and Censorinus. He remarks that the day – that is, the time between the rising and setting of the sun – was divided into twelve parts, at all seasons of the year, and the night the same, from which it would result that in summer the hours of the day were longer than in winter, and vice versa for the nights. – Galenus (De San. Tuend., VI. 7) observed that at Rome the longest days were equal to fifteen equinoctial hours. Now, these fifteen hours only reckoning for twelve, it happened that towards the solstice each hour was more than a quarter longer than towards the equinox. This remark was not new, for it is found in Plautus. One of his personages says to a drunkard: “Thou wilt drink four good harvests of Massic wine in an hour!” “Add,” replied the drunkard, “in an hour of winter.” (Plautus, Pseudolus, v. I, 302, edit. Ritschl.) – Vegetius says that the soldier ought to make twenty miles in five hours, and notes that he speaks of hours in summer, which at Rome, according to the foregoing calculation, would be equivalent to six hours and a quarter towards the equinox. (Vegetius, Mil., I. 9.)Pliny (Hist. Nat., VII. 60) remarks that, “at the time when the Twelve Tables were compiled, the only divisions of time known were the rising and setting of the sun; and that, according to the statement of Varro, the first public solar dial was erected near the rostra, on a column, by M. Valerius Messala, who brought it from Catania in 491, thirty years after the one ascribed to Papirius; and that it was in 595 that Scipio Nasica, the colleague of M. Popilius Lænas, divided the hours of night and day, by means of a clepsydra or water-clock, which he consecrated under a covered building.”Censorinus (De Die Natali, xxiii., a book dated in the year 991 of Rome, or 338 A.D.) repeats, with some additions, the details given by Pliny. “There is,” he says, “the natural day and the civil day. The first is the time which passes between the rising and setting of the sun; on the contrary, the night begins with the setting and ends with the rising of the sun. The civil day comprises a revolution of the heaven – that is, a true day and a true night; so that when one says that a person has lived thirty days, we must understand that he has lived the same number of nights.“We know that the day and the night are each divided into twelve hours. The Romans were three hundred years before they were acquainted with hours. The word hour is not found in the Twelve Tables. They said in those times, ‘before or after mid-day.’ Others divided the day, as well as the night, into four parts – a practice which is preserved in the armies, where they divide the night into four watches.” Upon these and other data, M. Le Verrier has had the goodness to draw up a table, which will be found at the end of the volume, and which indicates the increase or decrease of the hours with the seasons, and the relationship of the Roman watches with our modern hours. (See Appendix B.)] preceded by his cavalry. At the head of his scouts was P. Considius, whose former services under L. Sylla, and subsequently under M. Crassus, pointed him out as an experienced soldier.

At break of day Labienus occupied the heights, and Cæsar was no more than 1,500 paces from the camp of the barbarians; the latter suspected neither his approach nor that of his lieutenant. Suddenly Considius arrived at full gallop to announce that the mountain of which Labienus was to take possession was in the power of the Helvetii; he had recognised them, he said, by their arms and their military ensigns. At this news, Cæsar, fearing that he was not in sufficient force against their whole army, with only four legions, chose a strong position on a neighbouring hill, and drew up his men in order of battle. Labienus, whose orders were not to engage in battle till he saw the troops of Cæsar near the enemy’s camp, remained immovable, watching for him. It was broad daylight when Cæsar learnt that his troops had made themselves masters of the mountain, and that the Helvetii had left their camp. They escaped him thus, through the false report of Considius, who had been blinded by a groundless terror.

Admitting that the Helvetii had passed near Issy-l’Evêque, Mount Tauffrin, which rises at a distance of four kilomètres to the west of that village, answers to the conditions of the text. There is nothing to contradict the notion that Labienus and Cæsar may have, one occupied the summit, the other approached the enemy’s camp within 1,500 paces, without being perceived; and the neighbouring ground presents heights which permitted the Roman army to form in order of battle.[181 - De Bello Gallico, I. 22.]

Defeat of the Helvetii near Bibracte.

VI. That day the Helvetii continued their advance to Remilly, on the Alène. Since the passage of the Saône, they had marched about a fortnight, making an average of not more than eleven or twelve kilomètres a day.[182 - They reckon from Villefranche to Remilly about 170 kilomètres.] According to our reckoning, it must have been the end of the month of June. Cæsar followed the Helvetii at the usual distance, and established his camp at three miles’ distance from theirs, on the Cressonne, near Ternant.

Next day, as the Roman army had provisions left for no more than two days,[183 - Each soldier received twenty-five pounds of wheat every fortnight.] and as, moreover, Bibracte (Mont Beuvray),[184 - It is generally admitted that Bibracte stood on the site of Autun, on account of the inscription discovered at Autun in the seventeenth century, and now preserved in the cabinet of antiquities at the Bibliothèque Impériale. Another opinion, which identifies Bibracte with Mont Beuvray (a mountain presenting a great surface, situated thirteen kilomètres to the west of Autun), had nevertheless already found, long ago, some supporters. It will be remarked first that the Gauls chose for the site of their towns, when they could, places difficult of access: in broken countries, these were steep mountains (as Gergovia, Alesia, Uxellodunum, &c.); in flat countries, they were grounds surrounded by marshes (such as Avaricum). The Ædui, according to this, would not have built their principal town on the site of Autun, situated at the foot of the mountains. It was believed that a plateau so elevated as that of Mont Beuvray (its highest point is 810 mètres above the sea) could not have been occupied by a great town. Yet the existence of eight or ten roads, which lead to this plateau, deserted for so many centuries, and some of which are in a state of preservation truly astonishing, ought to have led to a contrary opinion. Let us add that recent excavations leave no further room for doubt. They have brought to light, over an extent of 120 hectares, foundations of Gaulish towers, some round, others square; of mosaics, of foundations of Gallo-Roman walls, gates, hewn stones, heaps of roof tiles, a prodigious quantity of broken amphoræ, a semicircular theatre, &c… Everything, in fact, leads us to place Bibracte on Mont Beuvray: the striking resemblance of the two names, the designation of Φροὑριον, which Strabo gives to Bibracte, and even the vague and persistent tradition which, prevailing among the inhabitants of the district, points to Mont Beuvray as a centre of superstitious regard.] the greatest and richest town of the Ædui, was not more than eighteen miles (twenty-seven kilomètres) distant, Cæsar, to provision his army, turned from the road which the Helvetii were following, and took that to Bibracte. (See Plate 4.) The enemy was informed of this circumstance by some deserters from the troop of L. Emilius, decurion[185 - The cavalry was divided into turmæ, and the turma into three decuries of ten men each.] of the auxiliary cavalry. Believing that the Romans were going from them through fear, and hoping to cut them off from their provisions, they turned back, and began to harass the rear-guard.

Cæsar immediately led his troops to a neighbouring hill – that which rises between the two villages called the Grand-Marié and the Petit-Marié (see Plate 5) – and sent his cavalry to impede the enemies in their march, which gave him the time to form in order of battle. He ranged, half way up the slope of the hill, his four legions of veterans, in three lines, and the two legions raised in the Cisalpine on the plateau above, along with the auxiliaries, so that his infantry covered the whole height. The heavy baggage, and the bundles (sarcinæ)[186 - The word sarcinæ, the original sense of which is baggage or burthens, was employed sometimes to signify the bundles carried by the soldiers (De Bello Gallico, II. 17), sometimes for the heavy baggage (De Bello Civili, I, 81). Here we must take sarcinæ as comprising both. This is proved by the circumstance that the six legions of the Roman army were on the hill. Now, if Cæsar had sent the heavy baggage forward, towards Bibracte, as General de Gœler believes, he would have sent with it, as an escort, the two legions of the new levy, as he did, the year following, in the campaign against the Nervii. (De Bello Gallico, II. 19.)] with which the soldiers were loaded, were collected on one point, which was defended by the troops of the reserve. While Cæsar was making these dispositions, the Helvetii, who came followed by all their wagons, collected them in one place; they then, in close order, drove back the cavalry, formed in phalanxes, and, making their way up the slope of the hill occupied by the Roman infantry, advanced against the first line.[187 - De Bello Gallico, I. 24. – In the phalanx, the men of the first rank covered themselves with their bucklers, overlapping one another before them, while those of the other ranks held them horizontally over their heads, arranged like the tiles of a roof.]

Cæsar, to make the danger equal, and to deprive all of the possibility of flight, sends away the horses of all the chiefs, and even his own,[188 - According to Plutarch (Cæsar, 20), he said, “I will mount on horseback when the enemy shall have taken flight.”] harangues his troops, and gives the signal for combat. The Romans, from their elevated position, hurl the pilum,[189 - The pilum was a sort of javelin thrown by the hand: its total length was from 1·70 to 2 mètres; its head was a slender flexible blade from 0·60 to 1 mètre long, weighing from 300 to 600 grammes, terminating in a part slightly swelling, which sometimes formed a barbed point.The shaft, sometimes round, sometimes square, had a diameter of from 25 to 32 millimètres. It was fixed to the head by ferules, or by pegs, or by means of a socket.Such are the characteristics presented by the fragments of pila found at Alise. They answer in general to the descriptions we find in Polybius (VI. 28), in Dionysius (V. 46), and in Plutarch (Marius). Pila made on the model of those found at Alise, and weighing with their shaft from 700 grammes to 1·200 kilog., have been thrown to a distance of 30 and 40 mètres: we may therefore fix at about 25 mètres the average distance to which the pilum carried.] break the enemy’s phalanxes, and rush upon them sword in hand. The engagement becomes general. The Helvetii soon become embarrassed in their movements: their bucklers, pierced and nailed together by the same pilum, the head of which, bending back, can no longer be withdrawn, deprive them of the use of their left arm; most of them, after having long agitated their arms in vain, throw down their bucklers, and fight without them. At last, covered with wounds, they give way, and retire to the mountain of the castle of La Garde, at a distance of about 1,000 paces; but while they are pursued, the Boii and the Tulingi, who, to the number of about 15,000, formed the last of the hostile columns, and composed the rear-guard, rush upon the Romans, and without halting attack their right flank.[190 - Latere aperto, the right side, since the buckler was carried on the left arm. We read, indeed, in Titus Livius: “Et cum in latus dextrum, quod parebat, Numidæ jacularentur, translatis in dextrum scutis,” &c. (XXII. 50.)] The Helvetii, who had taken refuge on the height, perceive this movement, return to the charge, and renew the combat. Cæsar, to meet these two attacks, effects a change of front (conversa signa bipartito intulerunt) in his third line, and opposes it to the new assailants, while the first two lines resist the Helvetii who had already been repulsed.[191 - Dio Cassius (XXXVIII. 33) says on this subject that “the Helvetii were not all on the field of battle, on account of their great number, and of the haste with which the first had made the attack. Suddenly those who had remained in the rear came to attack the Romans, when they were already occupied in pursuing the enemy. Cæsar ordered his cavalry to continue the pursuit; with his legions, he turned against the new assailants.”]

This double combat was long and furious. Unable to resist the impetuosity of their adversaries, the Helvetii were obliged to retire, as they had done before, to the mountain of the castle of La Garde; the Boii and Tulingi towards the baggage and wagons. Such was the intrepidity of these Gauls during the whole action, which lasted from one o’clock in the afternoon till evening, that not one turned his back. Far into the night there was still fighting about the baggage. The barbarians, having made a rampart of their wagons, some threw from above their missiles on the Romans; others, placed between the wheels, wounded them with long pikes (mataræ ac tragulæ). The women and children, too, shared desperately in the combat.[192 - Plutarch, Cæsar, 20.] At the end of an obstinate struggle, the camp and baggage were taken. The daughter and one of the sons of Orgetorix were made prisoners.

This battle reduced the Gaulish emigration to 130,000 individuals. They began their retreat that same evening, and, after marching without interruption day and night, they reached on the fourth day the territory of the Lingones, towards Tonnerre (see Plate 4): they had, no doubt, passed by Moulins-en-Gilbert, Lormes, and Avallon. The Lingones were forbidden to furnish the fugitives with provisions or succour, under pain of being treated like them. At the end of three days, the Roman army, having taken care of their wounded and buried the dead, marched in pursuit of the enemy.[193 - De Bello Gallico, I. 26. – Till now the field of battle where Cæsar defeated the Helvetii has not been identified. The site which we have adopted, between Luzy and Chides, satisfies all the requirements of the text of the “Commentaries.” Different authors have proposed several other localities; but the first cause of error in their reckonings consists in identifying Bibracte with Autun, which we cannot admit; and further, not one of these localities fulfils the necessary topographical conditions. In our opinion, we must not seek the place of engagement to the east of Bibracte, for the Helvetii, to go from the Lower Saône to the Santones, must have passed to the west, and not to the east, of that town. Cussy-la-Colonne, where the field of battle is most generally placed, does not, therefore, suit at all; and, moreover, Cussy-la-Colonne is too near to the territory of the Lingones to require four days for the Helvetii to arrive there after the battle.]

Pursuit of the Helvetii.

VII. The Helvetii, reduced to extremity, sent to Cæsar to treat for their submission. The deputies met him on his march, threw themselves at his feet, and demanded peace in the most suppliant terms. He ordered them to say to their fellow-countrymen that they must halt on the spot they then occupied, and await his arrival; and they obeyed. As soon as Cæsar overtook them, he required them to deliver hostages, their arms, and the fugitive slaves. While they were preparing to execute his orders, night coming on, about 6,000 men of a tribe named Verbigeni (Soleure, Argovie, Lucerne, and part of the Canton of Berne) fled, either through fear that, having once delivered up their arms, they should be massacred, or in the hope of escaping unperceived in the midst of so great a multitude. They directed their steps towards the Rhine and the frontiers of Germany.

On receiving news of the flight of the Verbigeni, Cæsar ordered the peoples whose territories they would cross to stop them and bring them back, under pain of being considered as accomplices. The fugitives were delivered up and treated as enemies; that is, put to the sword, or sold as slaves. As to the others, Cæsar accepted their submission: he compelled the Helvetii, the Tulingi, and the Latobriges to return to the localities they had abandoned, and to restore the towns and hamlets they had burnt; and since, after having lost all their crops, they had no more provisions of their own, the Allobroges were ordered to furnish them with wheat.[194 - “He drove back this people into their country as a shepherd drives back his flock into the fold.” (Florus, II. x. 3.)] These measures had for their object not to leave Helvetia without inhabitants, as the fertility of its soil might draw thither the Germans of the other side the Rhine, who would thus become borderers upon the Roman province. He permitted the Boii, celebrated for their brilliant valour, to establish themselves in the country of the Ædui, who had asked permission to receive them. They gave them lands between the Allier and the Loire, and soon admitted them to a share in all their rights and privileges.

In the camp of the Helvetii were found tablets on which was written, in Greek letters, the number of all those who had quitted their country: on one side, the number of men capable of bearing arms; and on the other, that of the children, old men, and women. The whole amounted to 263,000 Helvetii, 36,000 Tulingi, 14,000 Latobriges, 23,000 Rauraci, and 32,000 Boii – together, 368,000 persons, of whom 92,000 were men in a condition to fight. According to the census ordered by Cæsar, the number of those who returned home was 110,000.[195 - De Bello Gallico, I. 29.] The emigration was thus reduced to less than one-third.

The locality occupied by the Helvetii when they made their submission is unknown; yet all circumstances seem to concur in placing the theatre of this event in the western part of the country of the Lingones. This hypothesis appears the more reasonable, as Cæsar’s march, in the following campaign, can only be explained by supposing him to start from this region. We admit, then, that Cæsar received the submission of the Helvetii on the Armançon, towards Tonnerre, and it is there that we suppose him to have been encamped during the events upon the recital of which we are now going to enter.

Observations.

VIII. The forces of the two armies opposed to each other in the battle of Bibracte were about equal, for Cæsar had six legions – the 10th, which he had found in the Roman province; the three old legions (7th, 8th, and 9th), which he had brought from Aquileia; and the two new ones (11th and 12th), raised in the Cisalpine. The effective force of each must have been near the normal number of 6,000 men, for the campaign had only begun, and their ranks must have been increased by the veterans and volunteers of whom we have spoken in the first volume (page 456). The number of the legionaries was thus 36,000. Adding 4,000 cavalry, raised in the Roman province and among the Ædui, and probably 20,000 auxiliaries,[196 - Cæsar pursued the Helvetii, taking for auxiliaries about 20,000 Gaulish mountaineers. (Appian, De Rebus Gallicis, IV. 15, edit. Schweigh.)] we shall have a total of 60,000 combatants, not including the men attached to the machines, those conducting the baggage, the army servants, &c. The Helvetii, on their side, did not count more than 69,000 combatants, since, out of 92,000, they had lost one-fourth near the Saône.

In this battle, it must be remarked, Cæsar did not employ the two legions newly raised, which remained to guard the camp, and secure the retreat in case of disaster. Next year he assigned the same duty to the youngest troops. The cavalry did not pursue the enemies in their rout, doubtless because the mountainous nature of the locality made it impossible for it to act.

CHAPTER IV.

CAMPAIGN AGAINST ARIOVISTUS

(Year of Rome 696.)

(Book I. of the “Commentaries.”)

Seat of the Suevi and other German Tribes.

I. ON the termination of the war against the Helvetii, the chiefs of nearly all Celtic Gaul went to congratulate Cæsar, and thank him for having, at the same time, avenged their old injuries, and delivered their country from immense danger. They expressed the desire to submit to his judgment certain affairs, and, in order to concert matters previously, they solicited his permission to convoke a general assembly. Cæsar gave his consent.