Numerous definitions of concept of truth affects only its separate sides, but doesn't penetrate into its sense. inasmuch classical definition of truth, in which the main criterion of truth is identity of thinking and beingness, rests against the fuzzy concepts "thinking" and "beingness" which yet should be brought into accord somehow.
Nevertheless, to truth anyway only consciousness can come, "having looked" at itself, at the surrounding and, further selecting subjects, to try to bring into accord with own intentions these subjects, most likely, changing them in own highest expression, than adapting of yourself under them.
Therefore truth in the course of cognition is always specific and depends on the level of knowledge and ability to put them, i.e. it is checked by practice, as a rule, and only limited is checked by favor so how seeming pragmatically superfluous and even unwanted for this moment of knowledge and skills can "flip" the world in the sequel, whereas the aspiration to benefit, to satisfaction of the desires, determined only by conviction (belief) is downfall of the person up to level of "consumption" only the useful that is similar to the animal adaptation to the environment instead of its conversion, and it leads eventually to degradation of the person. So that Pierce too narrows concept of truth: "A true proposition is a proposition belief in which would never lead to such disappointment so long as the proposition is not understood otherwise than it was intended” [6, p.242-257].
Another definition of "the father" of pragmatism Peirce pertaining to truth: “Consider what effects that might conceivably have practical bearings you conceive the object of your conception to have. Then your conception of those effects is the WHOLE of your conception of the object” [7, p. 331-346] proposes to take into account all "conceivably practical”.
Here, too, it appears a insufficiency of two types: the practical today may seem by one circle of things, tomorrow – another, that introduces uncertainty in the concept of the object, which also can be seen from an unexpected quarter – so appear inventions; besides, the practical is nevertheless mostly the useful, the utilitarian, excluding imagination, flight of thought, "mad" ideas, which are capable to change radically our life, and really changed it, especially for the last decades.
Truth in accordance with the growth of knowledge and practical application changes its appearance so how human consciousness goes from essences of one level to essences which are deeper. And in this sense truth corresponds to essences revealed.
Here it is possible to agree with Lenin V. I., which declared: “For the materialist the “success” of human practice proves the correspondence between our ideas and the objective nature of the things we perceive” [1, chapter 1.2]; with the amendment that "the objective nature of things," initially no, because things, which are independent of consciousness, are not exist – all of them, or rather their copies are formed by consciousness in accordance with its form-building capabilities and these copies are "given" to a person for his life and development, in the course of which evolves and changes his consciousness itself, which acquires a "transient" independence in each life of individual consciousness. Therefore, only for a individual consciousness in the person, which is "clipped" one-sided from the single consciousness, all things become independent of him during his lifetime, acquiring still and motion, change precisely in order that he could overcome the resistance of the medium out of things and other people with their own individual consciousnesses competing with him and could "compel" things to "obey" to him.
Except of the practice the stability can be criterion of truth. The stability is expressed in a number of logical deductions, virtually no checking, but based on known laws.
One cannot deny touch to truth of and by means of intuition, i.e. as the process of finding truth without the intermediate steps from the first principle to whom may be just aught appearing, inasmuch human consciousness cannot penetrate into "space" from where is taken all, that appear.
Hobbes and Berkeley till Husserl have understood this situation with the relation of sensations (consciousness) and things.
Hobbes detaches sensations with all their derivatives from objects, generating in us sensations: “And though at some certain distance, the real and very object seem invested with the fancy it begets in us; yet still the object is one thing, the image or fancy is another” [8, p. 1-2].