The Works of Samuel Johnson, LL.D. Volume 11

But what to the pride of a Spaniard must be yet a more severe affliction, they have on the same continent a natural confederate, who is yet so intimidated by the British fleets, that he dares neither afford them refuge in his dominions, nor send his troops to their assistance. The queen, amidst all the schemes which her unbounded ambition forms for the exaltation of her family, finds her own son, after having received a kingdom from her kindness, restrained from supporting her, and reduced to preserve those territories which she has bestowed upon him, by abandoning her from whom he received them.

These, my lords, are the inconveniencies which the Spaniards feel from our fleets in the Mediterranean; and even these, however embarrassing, however depressing, are lighter than those which our American navy produces. It is apparent, that money is equivalent to strength, a proposition of which, if it could be doubted, the Spanish monarchy would afford sufficient proof, as it has been for a long time supported only by the power of riches. It is, therefore, impossible to weaken Spain more speedily or more certainly, than by intercepting or obstructing the annual supplies of gold and silver which she receives from her American provinces, by which she was once enabled to threaten slavery to all the neighbouring nations, and incited to begin, with the subjection of this island, her mighty scheme of universal monarchy, and by which she has still continued to exalt herself to an equality with the most powerful nations, to erect new kingdoms, and set at defiance the Austrian power.

These supplies, my lords, are now, if not wholly, yet in a great measure, withheld; and by all the efforts which the Spaniards now make, they are exhausting their vitals, and wasting the natural strength of their native country. While they made war with adventitious treasures, and only squandered one year what another would repay them, it was not easy to foresee how long their pride would incline them to hold out against superiour strength. While they were only engaged in a naval war, they might have persisted for a long time in a kind of passive obstinacy; and while they were engaged in no foreign enterprises, might have supported that trade with each other which is necessary for the support of life, upon the credit of those treasures which are annually heaped up in their storehouses, though they are not received; and by which, upon the termination of the war, all their debts might at once be paid, and all their funds be reestablished.

But at present, my lords, their condition is far different; they have been tempted by the prospect of enlarging their dominions to raise armies for distant expeditions, which must be supported in a foreign country, and can be supported only by regular remittances of treasure, and have formed these projects at a time when the means of pursuing them are cut off. They have by one war increased their expenses, when their receipts are obstructed by another.

In this state, my lords, I am certain the Spaniards are very far from thinking the hostility of Britain merely nominal, and from inquiring in what part of the world their enemies are to be found. The troops in Italy see them sailing in triumph over the Mediterranean, intercepting their provisions, and prohibiting those succours which they expected from their confederate of Sicily. In Spain their taxes and their poverty, poverty which every day increases, inform them that the seas of America are possessed by the fleets of Britain, by whom their mines are made useless, and their wealthy dominions reduced to an empty sound. They may, indeed, comfort themselves in their distresses with the advantages which their troops have gained over the king of Sardinia, and with the entrance which they have forced into his dominions; but this can afford them no long satisfaction, since they will, probably, never be able to break through the passes at which they have arrived, or to force their way into Italy; and must perish at the feet of inaccessible rocks, where they are now supported at such an expense that they are more burdensome to their own master than to the king of Sardinia.

Of this prince, I know not why, it has been asserted that he will probably violate his engagements to Britain and Austria; that he will purchase peace by perfidy, and grant a passage to the army of Spain. His conduct has certainly given, hitherto, no reason for such an imputation; he has opposed them with fortitude, and vigour, and address; nor has he failed in any of the duties required of a general or an ally; he has exposed his person to the most urgent dangers, and his dominions to the ravages of war; he has rejected all the solicitations of France, and set her menaces at defiance; and surely, my lords, if no private man ought to be censured without just reason, even in familiar discourse, we ought still to be more cautious of injuring the reputation of princes by publick reproaches in the solemn debates of national assemblies.

The same licentiousness of speech has not, indeed, been extended to all the princes mentioned in this debate. The emperour has been treated with remarkable decency as the lawful sovereign of Germany, as one who cannot be opposed without rebellion, and against whom we, therefore, cannot expect that the troops of Hanover should presume to act, since they must expose their country to the severities of the imperial interdict.

The noble lords who have thus ardently asserted the rights of the emperour, who have represented in such strong language the crime of violating the German constitutions, and have commended the neutrality of the king of Prussia, as proper to be imitated by all the rest of the princes 'of the empire, have forgotten, or hoped that others Would forget, the injustice and violence by which he exalted himself to the throne, from which they appear to think it a sacrilegious attempt to endeavour to thrust him down. They forget that one of the votes was illegally suspended, and that the rest were extorted by the terrour of an army. They forget that he invited the French into the empire, and that he is guilty of all the ravages which have been committed and all the blood that has been shed, since the death of the emperour, in the defence of the Pragmatick sanction which he invaded, though ratified by the solemn consent of the imperial diet.

In defence of the Pragmatick sanction, my lords, which all the princes of the empire, except his majesty, saw violated without concern, are we now required to exert our force; we are required only to perform what we promised by the most solemn treaties, which, though they have been broken by the cowardice or ambition of other powers, it will be our greatest honour to observe with exemplary fidelity.

With this view, as your lordships have already been informed, the Hanoverian troops will march into the empire; nor has their march been hitherto delayed, either because there was yet no regular scheme projected, or because they were obliged to wait for the permission of the king of Prussia, or because they intended only to amuse Europe with an empty show: they were detained, my lords, in Flanders, because it was believed that they were more useful there than they would be in any other place, because they at once encouraged the states, alarmed the French, defended the Low Countries, and kept the communication open between the queen's dominions and those of her allies. Nor were these advantages, my lords, chimerical, and such as are only suggested by a warm imagination; for it is evident that by keeping their station in those countries they have changed the state of the war, that they have protected the queen of Hungary from being oppressed by a new army of French, and given her an opportunity of establishing herself in the possession of Bavaria; that the French forces, instead of being sent either to the assistance of the king of Spain against the king of Sardinia, or of the emperour, for the recovery of those dominions which he has lost by an implicit confidence in their alliance, have been necessarily drawn down to the opposite extremity of their dominions, where they are of no use either to their own country, or to their confederates. The united troops of Britain and Hanover, therefore, carried on the war, by living at ease in their quarters in Flanders, more efficaciously than if they had marched immediately into Bavaria or Bohemia.

Thus, my lords, I have endeavoured to show the justice of our designs, and the usefulness of the measures by which we have endeavoured to execute them; and doubt not but your lordships will, upon considering the arguments which have been urged on either side, and those which your own reflections will suggest, allow that it was not only just but necessary to take into our pay the troops of Hanover, for the support of the Pragmatick sanction, and the preservation of the house of Austria; and that since the same reasons which induced the government to hire them, still make it necessary to retain them, you will prefer the general happiness of Europe, the observation of publick faith, and the security of our own liberties and those of our posterity, to a small alleviation of our present expenses, and unanimously reject a motion, which has no other tendency than to resign the world into the hands of the French, and purchase a short and dependant tranquillity by the loss of all those blessings which make life desirable.

Lord LONSDALE spoke next to the following effect:—My lords, notwithstanding the confidence with which the late measures of the government have been defended by their authors, I am not yet set free from the scruples which my own observations had raised, and which have been strengthened by the assertions of those noble lords, who have spoken in vindication of the motion.

Many of the objections which have been raised and enforced with all the power of argument, have yet remained unanswered, or those answers which have been offered are such as leave the argument in its full strength. Many of the assertions which have been produced seem the effects of hope rather than conviction, and we are rather told what we are to hope from future measures, than what advantages we have received from the past.

I am, indeed, one of those whom it will be difficult to convince of the propriety of engaging in a new war, when we are unsuccessful in that which we have already undertaken, and of provoking a more powerful enemy, when all our attempts are baffled by a weaker; and cannot yet set myself free from the apprehension of new defeats and new disgraces from the arms of France, after having long seen how little we are able to punish the insolence of Spain. I cannot but fear that by an ill-timed and useless opposition to schemes which, however destructive or unjust, we cannot obviate, we shall subject ourselves to numberless calamities, that the ocean will be covered with new fleets of privateers, that our commerce will be interrupted in every part of the world, and that we shall only provoke France to seize what she would at least have spared some time longer.

But, my lords, if it be granted, that the Pragmatick sanction is obligatory to us, though it is violated by every other power; that we should labour to reduce the powers of Europe to an equipoise, whenever accident or folly produces any alteration of the balance; and that we are now not to preserve the house of Austria from falling, but raise it from the dust, and restore it to its ancient splendour, even at the hazard of a war with that power which now gives laws to all the western nations; yet it will not surely be asserted, that we ought to be without limits, that we ought to preserve the house of Austria, not only by the danger of our own country, but by its certain ruin, and endeavour to avert the possibility of slavery, by subjecting ourselves to miseries more severe than the utmost arrogance of conquest, or the most cruel wantonness of tyranny, would inflict upon us.

I have observed, that many lords have expressed in this debate an uncommon ardour for the support of the queen of Hungary; nor is it without pleasure, that I see the most laudable of all motives, justice and compassion, operate in this great assembly with so much force. May your lordships always continue to stand the great advocates for publick faith, and the patrons of true greatness in distress; may magnanimity always gain your regard, and calamity find shelter under your protection.

I, likewise, my lords, desire to be remembered among those who reverence the virtues and pity the miseries of this illustrious princess, who look with detestation on those who have invaded the dominions which they had obliged themselves by solemn treaties to defend, and who have taken advantage of the general confederacy against her, to enrich themselves with her spoils, who have insulted her distress and aggravated her misfortunes.

But, my lords, while I feel all these sentiments of compassion for the queen of Hungary, I have not yet been able to forget, that my own country claims a nearer regard; that I am obliged both by interest and duty to preserve myself and my posterity, and my fellow-subjects, from those miseries which I lament; when they happen to others, however distant, I cannot but remember, that I am not to save another from destruction by destroying myself, nor to rescue Austria by the ruin of Britain.

Though I am, therefore, my lords, not unwilling to assist the queen of Hungary, I think it necessary to fix the limits of our regard, to inquire how far we may proceed with safety, and what expenses the nation can bear, and how those expenses may be best employed. The danger of the queen of Hungary ought not to have an effect which would be reproachful, even if the danger was our own. It ought not so far to engross our faculties as to hinder us from attending to every other object. The man who runs into a greater evil to avoid a less, evidently shows that he is defective either in prudence or in courage; that either he wants the natural power of distinguishing, or that his dread of an approaching, or his impatience of a present evil, has taken it away.

Let us, therefore, examine, my lords, the measures with which those who are intrusted with the administration of publick affairs, would persuade us to concur, and inquire whether they are such as can be approved by us without danger to our country. Let us consider, my lords, yet more nearly, whether they are not such as we ourselves could not be prevailed upon even to regard as the object of deliberation, were we not dazzled on one part by glaring prospects of triumphs and honours, of the reduction of France, and the rescue of the world; of the propagation of liberty, and the defence of religion; and intimidated on the other by the view of approaching calamities, the cruelties of persecution, and the hardships of slavery.

All the arts of exaggeration, my lords, have been practised to reconcile us to the measures which are now proposed, and, indeed, all are necessary; for the expenses to which we are about to condemn this nation, are such as it is not able to bear, and to which no lord in this house would consent, were he calm enough to number the sums.

To prove the truth of this assertion, one question is necessary. Is any lord in this assembly willing to assist the queen of Hungary at the expense of sixteen hundred thousand a year? I think the universal silence of this assembly is a sufficient proof, that no one is willing; I will, however, repeat my question. Is any lord in this assembly willing that this nation should assist the queen of Hungary at the annual expense of sixteen hundred thousand pounds? The house is, as I expected, still silent, and, therefore, I may now safely proceed upon the supposition of an unanimous negative. Nor does any thing remain in order to evince the impropriety of the measures which we are about to pursue, but that every lord may reckon up the sum required for the support of those troops. Let him take a view of our military estimates, and he will quickly be convinced, how much we are condemned to suffer in this cause. He will find, that we are about not only to remit yearly into a foreign country more than a million and a half of money, but to hazard the lives of multitudes of our fellow-subjects, in a quarrel which at most affects us but remotely; that we are about to incur as auxiliaries an expense greater than that which the principals sustain.

The sum which I have mentioned, my lords, enormous as it may appear, is by no means exaggerated beyond the truth. Whoever shall examine the common military estimates, will easily be convinced, that the forces which we now maintain upon the continent cannot be supported at less expense; and that we are, therefore, about to exhaust our country in a distant quarrel, and to lavish our blood and treasure with useless profusion.

This profusion, my lords, is useless, at least useless to any other end, than an ostentatious display of our forces, and our riches; not because the balance of power is irrecoverably destroyed, not because it is contrary to the natural interest of an island to engage in wars on the continent, nor because we shall lose more by the diminution of our commerce, than we shall gain by an annual victory. It is useless, not because the power of France has by long negligence been suffered to swell beyond all opposition, nor because the queen of Hungary ought not to be assisted at the hazard of this kingdom, though all these reasons are of importance enough to claim our consideration. It is useless, my lords, because the queen of Hungary may be assisted more powerfully, at less charge; because a third part of this sum will enable her to raise, and to maintain, a greater body of men than have now been sent her.

Nor will the troops which she may be thus enabled to raise, my lords, be only more numerous, but more likely to prosecute the war with ardour; and to conclude it, therefore, with success. They will fight for the preservation of their own country, they will draw their swords to defend their houses and their estates, their wives and their children from the rage of tyrants and invaders; they will enter the field as men who cannot leave it to their enemies, without resigning all that makes life valuable; and who will, therefore, more willingly die than turn their backs.

It may reasonably be imagined, my lords, that the queen will place more confidence in such forces, than in troops which are to fight only for honour or for pay; and that she will expect from the affection of her own subjects, a degree of zeal and constancy which she cannot hope to excite in foreigners; and that she will think herself more secure in the protection of those whose fidelity she may secure by the solemnity of an oath, than those who have no particular regard for her person, nor any obligations to support her government.

It is no inconsiderable motive to this method of assisting our ally, that we shall entirely take away from France all pretences of hostilities or resentment, since we shall not attack her troops or invade her frontiers, but only furnish the queen of Hungary with money, without directing her how to apply it. I am far, my lords, from being so much intimidated by the late increase of the French greatness, as to imagine, that no limits can be set to their ambition. I am far from despairing, that the queen of Hungary alone, supported by us with pecuniary assistance, may be able to reduce them to solicitations for peace by driving them out of her dominions, and pursuing them into their own. But as the chance of war is always uncertain, it is surely most prudent to choose such a conduct as may exempt us from danger in all events; and since we are not certain of conquering the French, it is, in my opinion, most eligible not to provoke them, because we cannot be conquered without ruin.

This method is yet eligible on another account; by proceeding with frugality, we shall gain time to observe the progress of the war, and watch the appearance of any favourable opportunity, without exhausting ourselves so far as to be made unable to improve them.

The time, my lords, at which we shall be thus exhausted, at which we shall be reduced to an absolute inability to raise an army or equip a fleet, is not at a great distance. If our late profusion be for a short time continued, we shall quickly have drained the last remains of the wealth of our country. We have long gone on from year to year, raising taxes and contracting debts; and unless the riches of Britain are absolutely unlimited, must in a short time reduce them to nothing. Our expenses are not all, indeed, equally destructive; some, though the method of raising them be vexatious and oppressive, do not much impoverish the nation, because they are refunded by the extravagance and luxury of those who are retained in the pay of the court; but foreign wars threaten immediate destruction, since the money that is spent in distant countries can never fall back into its former channels, but is dissipated on the continent, and irrecoverably lost.

When this consideration is present to my mind, and, on this occasion, no man who has any regard for himself or his posterity can omit it, I cannot but think with horrour on a vote by which such prodigious sums are wafted into another region: I cannot but tremble at the sound of a tax for the support of a foreign war, and think a French army landed on our coasts not much more to be dreaded than the annual payment to which we appear now to be condemned, and from which nothing can preserve us but the address which is now proposed.

By what arguments the commons were persuaded, or by what motives incited to vote a supply for the support of this mercenary force, I have not yet heard; nor, as a member of this house, my lords, was it necessary for me to inquire. Their authority, though mentioned with so much solemnity on this occasion, is to have no influence on our determinations. If they are mistaken, it is more necessary for us to inquire with uncommon caution. If they are corrupt, it is more necessary for us to preserve our integrity. If we are to comply blindly with their decisions, our knowledge and experience are of no benefit to our country, we only waste time in useless solemnities, and may be once more declared useless to the publick.

The commons, my lords, do not imagine themselves, nor are imagined by the nation, to constitute the legislature. The people, when any uncommon heat prevails in the other house, disturbs their debates, and overrules their determinations, have been long accustomed to expect redress and security from our calmer counsels; and have considered this house as the place where reason and justice may be heard, when, by clamour and uproar, they are driven from the other. On this occasion, my lords, every Briton fixes his eye upon us, and every man who has sagacity enough to discover the dismal approach of publick poverty, now supplicates your lordships, by agreeing to this address, to preserve him from it.

Then the SPEAKER spoke to the following purport:—My lords, having very attentively observed the whole progress of this important debate, and considered with the utmost impartiality the arguments which have been made use of on each side, I cannot think the question before us doubtful or difficult; and hope that I may promote a speedy decision of it by recapitulating what has been already urged, that the debate may be considered at one view, and by adding some observations which have arisen to my own thoughts on this occasion.

At the first view of the question before us, in its present state, no man can find any reasons for prejudice in favour of the address proposed. This house is, indeed, yet divided, and many lords have spoken on each side with great force and with great address; but the authority of the other house, added to the numbers which have already declared in this for the support of the foreign troops, is sufficient to turn the balance, in the opinion of any man who contents himself to judge by the first appearance of things; and must incline him to imagine that position at least more probable, which is ratified by the determination of one house, and yet undecided by the other.

I know, my lords, what may be objected to these observations on the other house, and readily agree with the noble lord, that our determinations ought not to be influenced by theirs. But on this occasion, I introduce their decision not as the decrees of legislators, but as the result of the consideration of wise men; and in this sense it may be no less reasonable to quote the determination of the commons, than to introduce the opinion of any private man whose knowledge or experience give his opinion a claim to our regard.

Nor do I mention the weight of authority on one side as sufficient to influence the private determination of any in this great assembly. It is the privilege and the duty of every man, who possesses a seat in the highest council of his country, to make use of his own eyes and his own understanding, to reject those arguments of which he cannot find the force, whatever effect they may have upon others, and to discharge the great trust conferred upon him by consulting no conscience but his own.

Yet, though we are by no means to suffer the determinations of other men to repress our inquiries, we may certainly make use of them to assist them; we may very properly, therefore, inquire the reasons that induced the other house to approve those bills which are brought before them, since it is not likely that their consent was obtained without arguments, at least probable, though they are not to be by us considered as conclusive upon their authority. The chief advantage which the publick receives from a legislature formed of several distinct powers, is, that all laws must pass through many deliberations of assemblies independent on each other, of which, if the one be agitated by faction or distracted by divisions, it may be hoped that the other will be calm and united, and of which it can hardly be feared that they can at any time concur in measures apparently destructive to the commonwealth.

But these inquiries, my lords, however proper or necessary, are to be made by us not in solemn assemblies but in our private characters; and therefore I shall not now lay before your lordships what I have heard from those whom I have consulted for the sake of obtaining information on this important question, or shall at least not offer it as the opinion of the commons, or pretend to add to it any influence different from that of reason and truth.

The arguments which have been offered in this debate for the motion, are, indeed, such as do not make any uncommon expedients necessary; they will not drive the advocates for the late measures to seek a refuge in authority instead of reason. They require, in my opinion, only to be considered with a calm attention, and their force will immediately be at an end.

The most plausible objection, my lords, is, that the measures to which your approbation is now desired, were concerted and executed without the concurrence of the senate; and it is, therefore, urged, that they cannot now deserve our approbation, because it was not asked at the proper time.

In order to answer this objection, my lords, it is necessary to consider it more distinctly than those who made it appear to have done, that we may not suffer ourselves to confound questions real and personal, to mistake one object for another, or to be confounded by different views.

That the consent of the senate was not asked, my lords, supposing it a neglect, and a neglect of a criminal kind, of a tendency to weaken our authority, and shake the foundations of our constitution, which is the utmost that the most ardent imagination, or the most hyperbolical rhetorick can utter or suggest, may be, indeed, a just reason for invective against the ministers, but is of no force if urged against the measures. To take auxiliaries into our pay may be right, though it might be wrong to hire them without applying to the senate; as it is proper to throw water upon a fire, though it was conveyed to the place without the leave of those from whose well it was drawn, or over whose ground it was carried.

If the liberties of Europe be really in danger, if our treaties oblige us to assist the queen of Hungary against the invaders of her dominions, if the ambition of France requires to be repressed, and the powers of Germany to be animated against her by the certain prospect of a vigorous support, I cannot discover the propriety of this motion, even supposing that we have not found from the ministers all the respect that we have a right to demand. As a lawful authority may do wrong, so right may be sometimes done by an unlawful power; and surely, though usurpation ought to be punished, the benefits which have been procured by it, are not to be thrown away. We may retain the troops that have been hired, if they are useful, though we should censure the ministry for taking them into pay.

But the motion to which our concurrence is now required, is a motion by which we are to punish ourselves for the crime of the ministers, by which we are about to leave ourselves defenceless, because we have been armed without our consent, and to resign up all our rights and privileges to France, because we suspect that they have not been sufficiently regarded on this occasion by our ministers.

Those noble lords who have dwelt with the greatest ardour on this omission, have made no proposition for censuring those whom they condemn as the authors of it, though this objection must terminate in an inquiry into their conduct, and has no real relation to the true question now before us, which is, whether the auxiliaries be of any use? If they are useless, they ought to be discharged without any other reason; if they are necessary, they ought to be retained, whatever censure may fall upon the ministry.

I am, indeed, far from thinking, that when your lordships have sufficiently examined the affair, you will think your privileges invaded, or the publick trepanned by artifice into expensive measures; since it will appear that the ministry in reality preferred the most honest to the safest methods of proceeding, and chose rather to hazard themselves, than to practice or appear to practice any fraud upon their country.

When it was resolved in council to take the troops of Hanover into the pay of Britain, a resolution which, as your lordships have already been informed, was made only a few days before the senate rose, it was natural to consider, whether the consent of the senate should not be demanded; but when it appeared upon reflection, that to bring an affair of so great importance before the last remnant of a house of commons, after far the greater part had retired to the care of their own affairs, would be suspected as fraudulent, and might give the nation reason to fear, that such measures were intended as the ministers were afraid of laying before a full senate. It was thought more proper to defer the application to the next session, and to venture upon the measures that were formed, upon a full conviction of their necessity.

This conduct, my lords, was exactly conformable to the demands of those by whom the court has hitherto been opposed, and who have signalized themselves as the most watchful guardians of liberty. Among these men, votes of credit have never been mentioned but with detestation, as acts of implicit confidence, by which the riches of the nation are thrown down at the feet of the ministry to be squandered at pleasure. When it has been urged, that emergencies may arise, during the recess of the senate, which may produce a necessity of expenses, and that, therefore, some credit ought to be given which may enable the crown to provide against accidents, it has been answered, that the expenses which are incurred during the recess of the senate, will be either necessary or not; that if they are necessary, the ministry have no reason to distrust the approbation of the senate, but if they are useless, they ought not to expect it. And that, instead of desiring to be exempted from any subsequent censures, and to be secured in exactions or prodigality by a previous vote, they ought willingly to administer the publick affairs at their own hazard, and await the judgment of the senate, when the time shall come, in which their proceedings are laid before it.

Such have hitherto been the sentiments of the most zealous advocates for the rights of the people; nor did I expect from any man who desired to appear under that character, that he would censure the ministry for having thrown themselves upon the judgment of the senate, and neglected to secure themselves by any previous applications, for having trusted in their own integrity, and exposed their conduct to an open examination without subterfuges and without precautions. I did not imagine, my lords, that a senate, upon whose decision all the measures which have been taken, so apparently depend, would have been styled a senate convened only to register the determinations of the ministry; or that any of your lordships would think his privileges diminished, because money was not demanded before the use of it was fully known. If we lay aside, my lords, all inquiries into precedents, and, without regard to any political considerations, examine this affair only by the light of reason, it will surely appear that the ministry could not, by any other method of proceeding, have shown equal regard to the senate, or equal confidence in their justice and their wisdom. Had they desired a vote of credit, it might have been justly objected that they required to be trusted with the publick money, without declaring, or being able to declare, how it was to be employed; that either they questioned the wisdom or honesty of the senate; and, therefore, durst undertake nothing till they were secure of the supplies necessary for the execution of it. Had they informed both houses of their whole scheme, they might have been still charged, and charged with great appearance of justice, with having preferred their own safety to that of the publick, and having rather discovered their designs to the enemy, than trusted to the judgment of the senate; nor could any excuse have been made for a conduct so contrary to all the rules of war, but such as must have dis-honoured either the ministers or the senate, such as must have implied either that the measures intended were unworthy of approbation, or that they were by no means certain, that even the best conduct would not be censured.

These objections they foresaw, and allowed to be valid; and, therefore, generously determined to pursue the end which every man was supposed to approve, by the best means which they could discover, and to refer their conduct to a full senate, in which they did not doubt but their integrity, and, perhaps, their success, would find them vindicators. Instead of applying, therefore, to the remains of the commons, a few days before the general recess; instead of assembling their friends by private intimations, at a time when most of those from whom they might have dreaded opposition, had retired, they determined to attempt, at their own hazard, whatever they judged necessary for the promotion of the common cause, and to refer their measures to the senate, when it should be again assembled.