The Taking of Louisburg 1745

April 24, Connecticut Forces arrive.

On the following day, the Connecticut forces joined Pepperell. The shores of Cape Breton were now eagerly scanned for the first appearance of open water, but even as late as the 28th Pepperell wrote to Shirley, saying, “We impatiently wait for a fair wind to drive the ice out of the bay, and if we do not suffer for want of provisions, make no doubt but we shall, by God’s favor, be able soon to drive out what else we please from Cape Breton.” The consumption of stores, occasioned by the unlooked-for detention at Canso, had, in fact, become a matter of serious concern with Pepperell, whose nearest source of supply was Boston.

VIII

THE SIEGE

Fleet sails from Canso, April 29.

Our guard-vessels having reported the shores to be at last free from ice, and the wind coming fair for Louisburg, the welcome signal to weigh anchor was given on the 29th of April. On board the fleet all was now bustle and excitement. In a very short time a hundred transport-vessels were standing out of Canso Harbor, under a cloud of canvas, for Gabarus Bay, the place fixed upon by Shirley for making the contemplated descent.

Night Assault given up.

Bound to the letter of his orders, Pepperell seems to have first purposed making an attempt to put Shirley’s rash project in execution. To do this, he must have so timed his movements as to reach his anchorage after dark, have landed his troops without being able to see what obstacles lay before them, have marched them to stations situated at a distance from the place of disembarkation, over ground unknown, and not previously reconnoitred, to throw them against the enemy’s works before they should be discovered. And this most critical of all military operations, a night assault, was to be attempted by wholly undisciplined men.

Providentially for Pepperell, the wind died away before he could reach the designated point of disembarkation, so that this mad scheme perished before it could be put to the test; but early the next morning the flotilla was discovered entering Gabarus Bay, five miles southeast from the fortress, and in full view from its ramparts. So, also, the New England forces could see the gray turrets of the redoubtable stronghold rising in the distance, and could hear the bells of Louisburg pealing out their loud alarm. The fortress instantly fired signal guns to call in all out parties. It is said that there had been a grand ball the night before, and that the company had scarce been asleep when called up by this alarm. The booming of artillery, sounding like the drowsy roar of an awakening lion, was defiantly echoed back from the bosom of the deep, and borne on the cool breeze to the startled foemen’s ears the distant roll of drum, and bugle blast, peopled the lately deserted sea with voices of the coming strife.

Duchambon, commander of the fortress, instantly hurried off a hundred and fifty men to oppose the landing of our troops.

Landing at Gabarus Bay, April 30.

The fleet quickly came to an anchor, and the signal was hoisted for the troops to disembark at once. Before them stretched the lonely Cape Breton shore, on which the breakers rose and fell in a long line of foam. Though this heavy surf threatened to swamp the boats, the men crowded into them as if going to a merry-making. It was a gallant and inspiring sight to see them dash on toward the beach, emulous who should reach it first, and eager to meet the enemy, who were waiting for them there. By making a feint at one point, and then pulling for another at some distance from the first, the boats gained an undefended part of the shore before the French could come up with them. As soon as one struck the ground, the men jumped into the water, each taking another on his back and wading through the surf to the shore. In this manner the landing went on so rapidly that, when the enemy finally came up, they were easily driven off, with the loss of six or seven men killed, and some prisoners. Before it was dark two thousand men bivouacked for the night within cannon shot of Louisburg.

Vaughan now led forward a party after the retreating enemy, who, finding themselves pursued, set fire to thirty or forty houses outside the city walls.

On the next day, the work of landing the rest of the army, the artillery and stores, was pushed to the utmost, though the heavy surf rendered this a work of uncommon difficulty. Pepperell now pitched his camp in an orderly manner next the shore, at a place called Flat Point Cove, where he could communicate with the transports and fleet, and they with him. He now took his first step towards clearing the two miles of open ground lying between him and Louisburg harbor, with the view of fixing the location of his batteries, and of driving the enemy inside the walls of the fortress.

Royal Battery deserted.

To this end four hundred men were sent out to destroy the enemy’s magazines situated at the head of the harbor, Vaughan again marching with them. This detachment having set fire to some warehouses containing naval stores, the smoke from which drifted down upon the Royal Battery, the officer in command there, convinced that the provincials were about to fall upon him, spiked his cannon and abandoned the works in haste, though not till after receiving permission to do so.

In the morning, as Vaughan was returning to camp with only thirteen men, the deserted appearance of the battery caused him to carefully examine it, when, seeing no signs of life about the place, – no flag flying or smoke rising or sentinels moving about, – he sent forward an Indian of his party, who, finding all silent, crept through an embrasure, and undid the gate to them. Vaughan then despatched word to the camp that he was in possession of the place, and was waiting for a re-enforcement and a flag; but meantime, before either could reach him, one of his men climbed up the staff, and nailed his red coat to it for a flag.

Vaughan attacked.

At about the same hour Duchambon was sending a strong detachment back to the battery, to complete the work of destruction that his lieutenant had left unfinished. At least this is his own statement. It was supposed that the battery was still unoccupied or occupied weakly, otherwise the French would hardly have risked much for its possession. When this detachment came round in their boats to the landing-place, near the battery, Vaughan’s little band attacked them with great spirit, keeping them at bay until other troops had time to join him, when the discomfited Frenchmen were driven back whence they came.

Advantage of this Capture.

Thus unexpectedly did one of the most formidable defences fall into our hands; for though its isolated situation invited an attack, and though communication with the city could be easily cut off except by water, the prompt attempt to recover the Royal Battery implies that its abandonment was at least premature. Yet as this work was primarily a harbor defence only, it was evidently not looked upon as tenable against a land attack, although it is quite as clear that the time had not yet come for deserting it. But the fact that it was left uninjured instead of being blown up assures us that the garrison must have left in a panic.

But whether the French attached much or little consequence to this battery so long as it remained in their hands, it became in ours a tremendous auxiliary to the conquest of the city. By its capture we obtained thirty heavy cannon, all of which were soon made serviceable, besides a large quantity of shot and shell, than which nothing could have been more acceptable at this time. And although only three or four of its heavy guns could be trained upon the city, its capture removed one of the most formidable obstacles to the entrance of our fleet. It also afforded an excellent place of arms for our soldiers, whose confidence was greatly strengthened. In a word, the siege was making progress.

We cannot help referring here to the fact that notwithstanding Shirley’s idea had met with so much ridicule it had, nevertheless, come true in one part at least, since if the proposal to turn the enemy’s own cannon against them had seemed somewhat whimsical when it was broached, it certainly proved prophetic in this case, for within twenty-four hours after its taking the guns of the Royal Battery were thundering against the city.

Firing begun.

Pepperell had at once ordered Waldo’s regiment into the captured battery. The enemy had not even stopped to knock off the trunnions of the cannon, so that the smiths, under the direction of Major Pomeroy,[18 - Major Seth Pomeroy of Northampton, Mass., was lieutenant-colonel of Williams’s regiment in the battle of Lake George, 1755, succeeding to the command after Williams’s death. At the beginning of the Revolution he fought as a volunteer at Bunker Hill.] who was himself a gun-smith, had only to drill them out again. Waldo fired the first shot into the city. It is said to have killed fourteen men. The fire was maintained with destructive effect, and it drew forth a reply from the enemy, with both shot and shell.

The siege may now be said to have fairly begun, and begun prosperously. Both sides had stripped for fighting, and it remained to be seen whether Pepperell’s raw levies would continue steadfast under the many trials of which these events were but a foretaste.

Louisburg was now practically invested on the land side, the fleet, with its heavy armament, remaining useless, however, with respect to active co-operation in the siege itself, because its commander dared not take his ships into the harbor under fire of the enemy’s batteries. The army and navy were acting therefore without that concert which alone would have allowed their united strength to be effectively tested. On its part, the navy was simply making a display of force which could not be employed, though it maintained a strict blockade. In any case, then, the brunt of the siege must fall on the army, since, as Warren informed Pepperell, the fleet could take no part in battering the city until the harbor defences should first have been taken or silenced. And when this was done, the siege must probably have been near its end, fleet or no fleet.

Pepperell manfully turned, however, to a task which he had supposed would be shared between the commodore and himself. If he was no longer confident under fresh disappointments, they developed in him unexpected firmness and most heroic patience. Let us see what this task was, and in what manner the citizen-general set about it. That it was done with true military judgment is abundantly proved by the fact that, when Louisburg was assaulted and taken in 1758, by the combined land and naval forces of Amherst and Boscawen, Pepperell’s plan of attack was followed step by step, and to the letter.

The Harbor Defences.

The most formidable of the harbor defences were the Island Battery, to which attention has been called in a previous chapter, the Circular Battery, a work situated at the extreme northwest corner of the city walls, and forming the reverse face of the powerful Dauphin Bastion, from which the West Gate of the city opened, with the Water Battery, or Batterie de la Gréve, placed at the opposite angle of the harbor shore.[19 - Reference should be made to the plan at page 91 (#Page_91). It will greatly simplify the siege operations to the reader if he will keep in mind the fact that the land attack was wholly confined within the points designated by A and B on this plan, or between the Dauphin and King’s bastions. For our purpose, it is only necessary to add that the harbor front was defended by a strong wall of masonry, joining the Water Battery, G, with the Dauphin Bastion, A. In this wall were five gates, leading to the water-side. It was the point at which the city would be exposed to assault from shipping or their boats.] The cross-fire from these two batteries effectually raked the whole harbor from shore to shore, but it was by no means so dangerous as that of the Island Battery, where ships must pass within point-blank range of the heaviest artillery.

Such, then, was the admirable system of harbor defences still remaining intact, even after the fall of the Royal Battery. Instead, therefore, of concentrating his whole fire upon one or two points, in his front, with a view of breaching the walls in the shortest time, and of storming the city at the head of his troops, Pepperell was made to throw half his available fire upon the batteries that were not at all in his own way, though they blocked the way to the fleet.[20 - The Island Battery could not materially hinder the progress of the siege, and must have fallen with the city. The Circular Battery could not fire upon the besiegers at all, as it bore upon the harbor, but Warren insisted that he could not go in until these two works were silenced. If the time spent in doing this had been wholly employed in battering down the West Gate and its approaches, the city might have been taken without the fleet, leaving out of view, of course, the supposition of a repulse to the storming party. It is a strong assertion to say that the city could not have been taken without the fleet, because no trial was made.]

It will be seen that these circumstances imposed upon Pepperell a task of no little magnitude. They compelled him to attack the very strongest, instead of the weakest, parts of the fortress, and necessarily confined the siege operations within a comparatively small space of the enemy’s long line.

No time was lost in getting the siege train over from Gabarus Bay to the positions marked out for erecting the breaching batteries. The infinite labor involved in doing this can hardly be understood except by those who have themselves gone over the ground. Every gun and every pound of provisions and ammunition had to be dragged two miles, through marshes and over rocks, to the allotted stations. This transit being impracticable for wheel-carriages, sledges were constructed by Lieutenant-Colonel Meserve of the New Hampshire regiment, to which relays of men harnessed themselves in turn, as they do in Arctic journeys, and in this way the cannon, mortars, and stores were slowly dragged through the spongy turf, where the mud was frequently knee-deep, to the trenches before Louisburg. None but the rugged yeomen of New England – men inured to all sorts of outdoor labor in woods and fields – could have successfully accomplished such a herculean task. But such severe toil as this was soon put half the army in the hospitals.

Nova Scotia freed of Invaders.

By the 5th of May Pepperell had got two mortar-batteries playing upon the city from the base of Green Hill, over which the road passes to Sydney. Meantime, Duchambon, seeing himself blockaded both by sea and by land, had hurriedly sent off an express to recall the troops that had gone out some time before against Annapolis, in concert with a force sent from Quebec, little dreaming that he himself would soon be attacked.[21 - The Attack upon Annapolis having failed, these troops tried to get back to Louisburg, but were unable to do so. With their assistance Duchambon thinks he could have held out.] The first fruits of Shirley’s sagacity ripened thus early in relieving Nova Scotia from invasion.

First Sabbath in Camp.

The 5th being Sunday, divine service was held in the chapel of the Royal Battery. Pepperell’s hardy New Englanders listened to the first Protestant sermon ever preached, perhaps, on the island of Cape Breton, from the well-chosen text “Enter into His gates with thanksgiving, and into His courts with praise.” After their devotions were over, we are told that the troops “fired smartly at the city.”

Meantime, also, Colonel Moulton, who had been left at Canso for the purpose, rejoined the army after destroying St. Peter’s. Two sallies made by the enemy against the nearest mortar-battery had been repulsed. Its fire, augmented by some forty-two-pounders taken from the Royal Battery, already much distressed the garrison, its balls coming against the caserns and into the town, where they traversed the streets from end to end, and riddled the houses in their passage. It never ceased firing during the siege. In his report Duchambon calls it the most dangerous of any that the besiegers raised.

Garrison summoned.

On the 7th a flag was sent into the city with a summons to surrender. Firing was suspended until its return, with Duchambon’s defiant message, that inasmuch “as the King had confided to him the defence of the fortress, he had no other reply but by the mouths of his cannon.”

Scouting Party defeated.

This check prompted a disposition to attack the city by storm at once, but upon reflection more moderate counsels prevailed, and the attempt was put off. Pepperell went on with his approaches toward the West Gate, under a constant fire from all the enemy’s batteries. And as every collection of men drew the enemy’s fire to the spot, this work could only be done at night, under great disadvantages. The balls they sent him were picked up and returned from his own cannon with true New England thrift, in order to husband his own ammunition. While thus engaged with the enemy in his front, he had also to keep an eye upon the outlying parties of French and Indians in his rear, who had been scraped together from scattered settlements, and were lurking about his camp with the view of raiding it unawares. On May 10, a scouting party of twenty-five men from Waldo’s regiment was sent out to find and drive off these marauders. While they were engaged in plundering some dwelling-houses at one of the out-settlements, they themselves were unexpectedly attacked by a superior force, and all but three killed, the Indians murdering the prisoners in cold blood. On the following day our men returned to the scene of disaster, and after burying their fallen comrades, they burned the place to the ground.

With these events the campaign settled down into the slow and laborious operations of a regular siege; and here began those inevitable bickerings between the chiefs of the land and naval forces, which, in a man of different temper than Pepperell was, might have led to serious results.

Disagreements.

In Shirley, his lawful captain-general, Pepperell had always a superior whose orders he felt bound to obey to the best of his ability, cost what it might. Fortunately, Shirley’s power of annoyance was limited by distance, though he kept up an animated fire of suggestions. In Warren, however, the brusque and impulsive sailor, Pepperell now found a tutor and a critic, whose irritation at the subordinate part he was playing showed itself in unreasonable demands upon his slow but sure coadjutor, and now and then even in a hardly concealed sneer. As time wore on, Warren grew more and more restive and importunate, while Pepperell continued patient, calm, and methodical to the last. Warren would call his fleet-captains together, hold a council, discuss the situation from his point of view, and send off to Pepperell the result of their deliberations, with the final exhortation attached, “For God’s sake let us do something!” – that “something” being that Pepperell should practically finish the siege without him, as we have already shown. Warren was a man standing at a door to keep out intruders, while the two actual adversaries were fighting it out inside. He might occasionally halloo to them to be quick about it, but he was hardly in the fight himself.

Pepperell would then get his council together in his turn, and, smarting under the sense of injustice, would submit the lecture that Warren had read him, with its thinly veiled irony, and unconcealed hauteur, to which the imputation of ignorance was not lacking. The situation would then be again discussed in all its bearings, from the army’s standpoint, which might be stated as follows: The fortress cannot be stormed until we have made a practicable breach in the walls. We must finish our batteries before this can be done. Or let the commodore bring in his ships and assist in silencing the enemy’s fire. The army is losing strength every day by sickness, while the fleet is gaining by the arrival of fresh ships. We cannot, if we would, pull the commodore’s chestnuts out of the fire and our own too.

IX

THE SIEGE CONTINUED

Camp Routine.

The routine of camp life is not without interest as tending to show what was the temper of the men under circumstances of unusual trial and hardship. They were housed in tents, most of which proved rotten and unserviceable, or in booths, which they built for themselves out of poles and green boughs cut in the neighboring woods. The relief parties, told off each day for work in the trenches, were marched to their stations after dark, as the enemy’s fire swept the ground over which they must pass. For a like reason, the fatigue parties could only bring up the daily supplies of provisions and ammunition to the trenches from Gabarus Bay, after darkness had set in. By great good-fortune, the weather continued dry and pleasant; otherwise the bad housing and severe toil must have told on the health of the army even more severely than it did, while work in the trenches would have been suspended during the intervals of wet weather.