The Works of Samuel Johnson, LL.D. Volume 11

The other princes, my lords, have long wished for a king with whom they might treat upon the level; a king who might owe his dignity only to their votes, and who, therefore, would be willing to favour them in gratitude for the benefit. They know, that the princes of the house of Austria considered their advancement to the empire as the consequence of their numerous forces and large dominions, and made use of their exaltation only to tyrannise under the appearance of legal right, and to oppress those as sovereigns, whom they would otherwise have harassed as conquerors.

Before we can, therefore, hope for the concurrence of the princes of the empire, we must inform them of our design, if any design has been yet laid out. Is it your intention to restore the house of Austria to the full enjoyment of its former greatness? This will certainly be openly opposed by all those powers who are strong enough to make head against it, and secretly obstructed by those, whose weakness makes them afraid of publick declarations. Do you intend to support the Pragmatick sanction? This can only be done by defeating the whole power of France; and for this you must necessarily provide troops who shall dare to act against the present king. So that it appears, my lords, that we are attempting nothing, or attempting impossibilities; that either we have no end in view, or that we have made use of an absurd choice of means by which it cannot be attained.

Whatever be our design with regard to Germany, the war against Spain is evidently neglected; and, indeed, one part of our conduct proves at once, that we intend neither to assist the Austrians, nor to punish the Spaniards; since we have in a great measure disabled ourselves from either by the neutrality which captain Martin is said to have granted, and by which we have allowed an asylum both to the troops of Spain, which shall fly before the Austrians, and the privateers which shall be chased by our ships in the Mediterranean.

I am, therefore, convinced, my lords, that our designs are not such as they are represented, or that they will not be accomplished by the measures taken. I am convinced in a particular manner, that the troops of Hanover can be of no use, and that they will raise the resentment of the nation, already overwhelmed with unnecessary burdens. I know, likewise, that they have been taken into pay without the consent of the senate, and am convinced, that if no other objection could be raised, we ought not to ratify a treaty which the crown has made, without laying it before us in the usual manner. I need not, therefore, inform your lordships, that I think the motion now under your consideration necessary and just; and that I hope, upon an attentive examination of the reasons which have been offered, your lordships will concur in it with that unanimity which evidence ought to enforce, and that zeal which ought to be excited by publick danger.

To which the duke of NEWCASTLE made answer to the following purport:—My lords, I know not by what imaginary appearances of publick danger the noble lord is so much alarmed, nor what fears they are which he endeavours with so much art and zeal to communicate to this assembly. For my part, I can upon the most attentive survey of our affairs, discover nothing to be feared but calumnies and misrepresentations; and these I shall henceforward think more formidable, since they have been able to impose upon an understanding so penetrating as that of his lordship, and have prevailed upon him to believe what is not only false, but without the appearance of truth, and to believe it so firmly, as to assert it to your lordships.

One of the facts which he has thus implicitly received, and thus publickly mentioned, is the neutrality supposed to have been granted to the king of Sicily, from which he has amused himself and your lordships with deducing very destructive consequences, that perhaps need not to be allowed him, even upon supposition of the neutrality; but which need not now be disputed, because no neutrality has been granted. Captain Martin, when he treated with the king, very cautiously declined any declarations of the intentions of the British court on that particular, and confined himself to the subject of his message, without giving any reason for hope, or despair of a neutrality. So that if it shall be thought necessary, we are this hour at liberty to declare war against the king of Sicily, and may pursue the Spaniards with the same freedom on his coasts as on those of any other power, and prohibit any assistance from being given by him to their armies in Italy.

His lordship's notion of the interposition of the king of Prussia in the king's favour, is another phantom raised by calumny to terrify credulity; a phantom which will, I hope, be entirely dissipated, when I have informed the house, that the whole suspicion is without foundation, and that the king of Prussia has made no declaration of any design to support the king, or of opposing us in the performance of our treaties. This prince, my lords, however powerful, active, or ambitious, appears to be satisfied with his acquisitions, and willing to rest in an inoffensive neutrality.

Such, my lords, and so remote from truth are the representations which the enemies of the government have with great zeal and industry scattered over the nation, and by which they have endeavoured to obviate those schemes which they would seem to favour; for by sinking the nation to a despair of attaining those ends which they declare at the same time necessary not only to our happiness, but to our preservation, what do they less than tell us, that we must be content to look unactive on the calamities that approach us, and prepare to be crushed by that ruin which we cannot prevent?

From this cold dejection, my lords, arises that despair which so many lords have expressed, of prevailing upon the Dutch to unite with us. The determinations of that people are, indeed, always slow, and the reason of their slowness has been already given; but I am informed, that the general spirit which now reigns among them, is likely soon to overrule the particular interests of single provinces, and can produce letters by which it will appear, that had only one town opposed those measures to which their concurrence is now solicited, it had been long since overruled; for there want not among them men equally enamoured of the magnanimity and firmness of the queen of Hungary, equally zealous for the general good of mankind, equally zealous for the liberties of Europe, and equally convinced of the perfidy, the ambition, and the insolence of France, with any lord in this assembly.

These men, my lords, have long endeavoured to rouse their country from the sloth of avarice, and the slumber of tranquillity, to a generous and extensive regard for the universal happiness of mankind; and are now labouring in the general assembly to communicate that ardour with which they are themselves inflamed, and to excite that zeal for publick faith, of which their superiour knowledge shows them the necessity.

It has been, indeed, insinuated, that all their consultations tend only to place garrisons in those towns from which the queen of Hungary has withdrawn her forces; but this supposition, my lords, as it is without any support from facts, is, likewise, without probability. For to garrison the barrier towns requires no previous debates nor deliberations; since it never was opposed even by those by whom the assistance of the queen of Hungary has been most retarded. Nor have even the deputies of Dort, whose obstinacy has been most remarkable, denied the necessity of securing the confines of their country, by possessing with their own troops those places which the Austrians are obliged to forsake. Their present disputes, my lords, must be, therefore, on some other question; and what question can be now before them which can produce any difficulties, but that which regards the support of the Pragmatick sanction?

If these deliberations should be so far influenced by the arrival of the army in the pay of Britain, as to end in a resolution to send a sufficient number of forces into Germany, it will not be denied, that the troops which give occasion for this debate, have really been useful to the common cause; nor will his majesty lose the affections of any of his subjects, by the false accounts which have been spread of an invidious preference given to the troops of Hanover.

That every government ought to endeavour to gain the esteem and confidence of the people, I suppose we are all equally convinced; but I, for my part, am very far from thinking that measures ought only to be pursued or rejected, as they are immediately favoured or disliked by the populace. For as they cannot know either the causes or the end of publick transactions, they can judge only from fallacious appearances, or the information of those whose interest it may perhaps be to lead them away from the truth. That monarch will be most certainly and most permanently popular, who steadily pursues the good of his people, even in opposition to their own prejudices and clamours; who disregards calumnies, which, though they may prevail for a day, time will sufficiently confute, and slights objections which he knows may be answered, and answered beyond reply.

Such, my lords, are the objections which have been hitherto raised against the troops of Hanover, of which many arise from ignorance, and many from prejudice; and some may be supposed to be made only for the sake of giving way to invectives, and indulging a petulant inclination of speaking contemptuously of Hanover.

With this view, my lords, it has been asked, why the Hanoverians are preferred to all other nations? why they have been selected from all other troops, to fight, against France, the cause of Europe? They were chosen, my lords, because they were most easily to be procured. Of the other nations from whom forces have usually been hired, some were engaged in the care of protecting, or the design of extending their own dominions, and others had no troops levied, nor could, therefore, furnish them with speed enough for the exigence that demanded them.

It has been asked with an air of triumph, as a question to which no answer could be given, why an equal number of Britons was not sent, since their valour might be esteemed at least equal to that of Hanoverians? I am far, my lords, from intending to diminish the reputation of the British courage, or detract from that praise which has been gained by such gallant enterprises, and preserved by a long succession of dangers, and of victories; nor do I expect that any nation will ever form a just claim to superiority. The reason, therefore, my lords, for which the troops of Hanover were hired, was not that the bravery of our countrymen was doubted, but that the transportation of such numbers might leave us naked to the insults of an enemy. For though the noble lord has declared, that after having sent sixteen thousand into Flanders, we should still have reserved for our defence a body of seven thousand, equal to that to which the protection of this kingdom was intrusted in the late war, his opinion will upon examination be found to have arisen only from the enumeration of the names of our regiments, many of which are far from being complete, and some almost merely nominal; so that, perhaps, if a body of sixteen thousand more had been sent, there would not have remained a single regiment to have repelled the crew of any daring privateer that should have landed to burn our villages, and ravage the defenceless country.

It was desired, my lords, by the queen of Hungary, that a British army might appear on the continent in her favour, for she knew the reputation and terrour of our arms; and as her demand was equitable in itself, and honourable to the nation, it was complied with; and as many of our native troops were sent, as it was thought convenient to spare, the rest were necessarily to be hired; and it is the business of those lords who defend the motion, to show from whence they could be called more properly than from Hanover.

It has been urged with great warmth, that the contract made for these troops has not been laid before the senate, a charge which the noble lord who spoke last but one, has shown to be ill grounded; because the former determinations of the senate enabled the crown to garrison the frontier towns without any new deliberations, but which may be, perhaps, more satisfactorily confuted by showing, that it is an accusation of neglecting that which was in reality not possible to be performed, or which at least could not be performed without subjecting the government to imputations yet more dangerous than those which it now suffers.

The accounts, my lords, by which the ministry were determined to send the army into Flanders, arrived only fifteen days before the recess of the senate; nor was the resolution formed, as it may easily be imagined, till several days after; so that there was very little time for senatorial deliberations, nor was it, perhaps, convenient to publish at that time the whole scheme of our designs.

But let us suppose, my lords, that the senate had, a few days before they rose, been consulted, and that a vote of credit had been required to enable the crown to hire forces during the interval of the sessions, what would those by whom this motion is supported have urged against it? Would they not with great appearance of reason have alleged the impropriety of such an application to the thin remains of a senate, from which almost all those had retired, whom their employments did not retain in the neighbourhood of the court? Would it not have been echoed from one corner of these kingdoms to another, that the ministry had betrayed their country by a contract which they durst not lay before a full senate, and of which they would trust the examination only to those whom they had hired to approve it. Would not this have been generally asserted, and generally believed? Would not those who distinguished themselves as the opponents of the court, have urged, that the king ought to exert his prerogative, and trust the equity of the senate for the approbation of his measures, and the payment of the troops which he had retained for the support of the common cause, the cause for which so much zeal had been expressed, and for which it could not with justice be suspected, that any reasonable demands would be denied? Would not the solicitation of a grant of power without limits, to be exerted wholly at the discretion of the ministry, be censured as a precedent of the utmost danger, which it was the business of every man to oppose, who had not lost all regard to the constitution of his country?

These insinuations, my lords, were foreseen and allowed by the ministry to be specious, and, therefore, they determined to avoid them by pursuing their schemes at their own hazard, without any other security than the consciousness of the rectitude of their own designs; and to trust to the equity of the senate when they should be laid before them, at a time when part of their effects might be discovered, and when, therefore, no false representations could be used to mislead their judgment. They knew the zeal of the commons for the great cause of universal liberty; they knew that their measures had no other tendency than the promotion of that cause, and, therefore, they confidently formed those expectations which have not deceived them, that the pay of the troops would be readily granted, and ordered them, therefore, to march; though if the commons had disapproved their plan, they must have returned into their own country, or have been supported at the expense of the electorate.

The objections raised against these troops, have apparently had no influence in the other house, because supplies have been granted for their pay; and I believe they will, upon examination, be found by your lordships not to deserve much regard.

It is asserted, that they cannot act against the emperour, established and acknowledged by the diet, without subjecting their country to an interdict; and it was, therefore, suspected, that they would in reality be of no use. This suspicion, my lords, I suppose, it is now not necessary to censure, since you have heard from his majesty, that they are preparing to march; and as the consequences of their conduct can only affect the electorate, its propriety or legality with regard to the constitution of the empire, falls not properly under our consideration.

How his majesty's measures may be defended, even in this view, I suppose I need not inform any of this assembly. It is well known, that the emperour was chosen not by the free consent of the diet, in which every elector voted according to his own sense, but by a diet in which one vote of the empire was suspended without any regard to law or justice, and in which the rest were extorted by a French army, which threatened immediate ruin to him who should refuse his consent. The emperour thus chosen, was likewise afterwards recognised by the same powers, upon the same motives, and the aid was granted as the votes were given by the influence of the armies of France.

For this reason, my lords, the queen of Hungary still refuses to give the elector of Bavaria the style and honours which belong to the imperial dignity; she considers the throne as still vacant, and requires that it should be filled by an uninfluenced election.

It has been observed, my lords, that his majesty gave his vote to the elector of Bavaria; and it has been, therefore, represented as an inconsistency in his conduct, that he should make war against him. But, my lords, it will by no means follow, that because he voted for him he thinks him lawfully elected, nor that it is unjust to dispossess him; though it is to be observed, that we are not making war to dethrone the emperour, however elected, but to support the Pragmatick sanction.

This observation, though somewhat foreign from the present debate, I have thought it not improper to lay before your lordships, that no scruples might remain in the most delicate and scrupulous, and to show that the measures of his majesty cannot be justly charged with inconsistency.

But this, my lords, is not the only, nor the greatest benefit which the queen of Hungary has received from these troops; for it is highly probable, that the states will be induced to concur in the common cause, when they find that they are not incited to a mock confederacy, when they perceive that we really intend to act vigorously, that we decline neither expense nor danger, and that a compliance with our demands will not expose them to stand alone and unassisted against the power of France, elated by success, and exasperated by opposition.

If this, my lords, should be the consequence of our measures, and this consequence is, perhaps, not far distant, it will no longer be, I hope, asserted, that these mercenaries are an useless burden to the nation, that they are of no advantage to the common cause, or that the people have been betrayed by the ministry into expenses, merely that Hanover might be enriched. When the grand confederacy is once revived, and revived by any universal conviction of the destructive measures, the insatiable ambition, and the outrageous cruelty of the French, what may not the friends of liberty presume to expect? May they not hope, my lords, that those haughty troops which have been so long employed in conquests and invasions, that have laid waste the neighbouring countries with slaughters and devastations, will be soon compelled to retire to their own frontiers, and be content to guard the verge of their native provinces? May we not hope, that they will soon be driven from their posts; that they will be forced to retreat to a more defensible station, and admit the armies of their enemies into their dominions; and that they will be pursued from fortress to fortress, and from one intrenchment to another, till they shall be reduced to petition for peace, and purchase it by the alienation of part of their territories.

I hope, my lords, it may be yet safely asserted that the French, however powerful, are not invincible; that their armies may be destroyed, and their treasures exhausted; that they may, therefore, be reduced to narrow limits, and disabled from being any longer the disturbers of the peace of the universe.

It is well known, my lords, that their wealth is not the product of their own country; that gold is not dug out of their mountains, or rolled down their rivers; but that it is gained by an extensive and successful commerce, carried on in many parts of the world, to the diminution of our own. It is known, likewise, that trade cannot be continued in war, without the protection of naval armaments; and that our fleet is at present superiour in strength to those of the greatest part of the universe united. It is, therefore, reasonably to be hoped, that though by assisting the house of Austria we should provoke the French to declare war against us, their hostilities would produce none of those calamities which seem to be dreaded by part of this assembly; and that such a confederacy might be formed as would be able to retort all the machinations of France upon herself, as would tear her provinces from her, and annex them to other sovereignties.

It has been urged, that no such success can be expected from the conduct which we have lately pursued; that we, who are thus daring the resentment of the most formidable power in the universe, have long suffered ourselves to be insulted by an enemy of far inferiour force; that we have been defeated in all our enterprises, and have at present appeared to desist from any design of hostilities; that the Spaniards scarcely perceive that they have an enemy, or feel, any of the calamities or inconveniencies of war; and that they are every day enriched with the plunder of Britain, without danger, and without labour.

That the war against Spain has not hitherto been remarkably successful, must be confessed; and though the Spaniards cannot boast of any other advantages than the defence of their own dominions, yet they may, perhaps, be somewhat elated, as they have been able to hold out against an enemy superiour to themselves. But, my lords, I am far from believing, that they consider the war against us as an advantage, or that they do not lament it as one of the heaviest calamities that could fall upon them. If it be asked, in what part of their dominions they feel any effects of our hostility, I shall answer with great confidence, that they feel them in every part which is exposed to the evils of a naval war; that they are in pain wherever they are sensible; that they are wounded wherever they are not sheltered from our blows, by the interposition of the nations of the continent.

If we examine, my lords, the influence of our European armaments, we shall find that their ships of war are shut up in the harbour of France, and that the fleets of both nations are happily blocked up together, so that they can neither extricate each other by concerted motions, in which our attention might be distracted, and our force divided, nor by their united force break through the bars by which they are shut up from the use of the ocean.

But this, my lords, however important with respect to us, is perhaps the smallest inconvenience which the Spaniards feel from our naval superiority. They have an army, my lords, in Italy, exposed to all the miseries of famine, while our fleet prohibits the transportation of those provisions which have been stored in vessels for their supply, and which must be probably soon made defenceless by the want of ammunition, and fall into the hands of their enemies without the honour of a battle.

But what to the pride of a Spaniard must be yet a more severe affliction, they have on the same continent a natural confederate, who is yet so intimidated by the British fleets, that he dares neither afford them refuge in his dominions, nor send his troops to their assistance. The queen, amidst all the schemes which her unbounded ambition forms for the exaltation of her family, finds her own son, after having received a kingdom from her kindness, restrained from supporting her, and reduced to preserve those territories which she has bestowed upon him, by abandoning her from whom he received them.

These, my lords, are the inconveniencies which the Spaniards feel from our fleets in the Mediterranean; and even these, however embarrassing, however depressing, are lighter than those which our American navy produces. It is apparent, that money is equivalent to strength, a proposition of which, if it could be doubted, the Spanish monarchy would afford sufficient proof, as it has been for a long time supported only by the power of riches. It is, therefore, impossible to weaken Spain more speedily or more certainly, than by intercepting or obstructing the annual supplies of gold and silver which she receives from her American provinces, by which she was once enabled to threaten slavery to all the neighbouring nations, and incited to begin, with the subjection of this island, her mighty scheme of universal monarchy, and by which she has still continued to exalt herself to an equality with the most powerful nations, to erect new kingdoms, and set at defiance the Austrian power.