The Works of Samuel Johnson, LL.D. Volume 11

By this method of carrying on the war, we might have secured our ally from danger which I cannot but think imminent and formidable, though it seems, at present, not to be feared. By so large an addition to her troops, she would have been enabled to frustrate those designs, which her success may incline the king of Prussia to form against her; for with whatever tranquillity he may now seem to look upon this general commotion, his conduct gives us no reason to imagine, that he has changed his maxims, that he is now forgetful or negligent of his own interest, or that he will not snatch the first opportunity of aggrandizing himself by new pretensions to the queen of Hungary's dominions.

At least, my lords, it may without scruple be asserted, that the hopes which some either form or affect of engaging him in a confederacy for the support of the Pragmatick sanction, are merely chimerical. He who has hitherto considered no interest but his own, he who has perhaps endangered himself by attempting to weaken the only power to which he, as well as the other princes of the empire, can have recourse for protection from the ambition of France, and has, therefore, broken the rules of policy only to gratify a favourite passion, will scarcely concur in the exaltation of that family which he has so lately endeavoured to depress, and which he has so much exasperated against him. If he is at length, my lords, alarmed at the ambition of the house of Bourbon, and has learned not to facilitate those designs which are in reality formed against himself, it cannot be doubted, that he looks with equal fear on the house of Austria, that he knows his safety to consist only in the weakness of both, and that in any contest between them, the utmost that can be hoped from him is neutrality.

But, my lords, he whose security depends only on a supposition that men will not deviate from right reason or true policy, is in a state which can afford him very little tranquillity or confidence: whatever is necessarily to be preserved, ought to be defended, not only from certain and constant danger, but from casual and possible injuries; and amongst the rest, from those which may proceed from the mutability of will, or the depravation of understanding; nor shall we sufficiently establish the house of Austria, if we leave it liable to be shaken whenever the king of Prussia shall feel his ambition rekindled, or his malevolence excited; we must not leave it dependant on the friendship or policy of the neighbouring powers, but must enable it once more to awe the empire, and set at defiance the malice of its enemies.

This, my lords, might have been done by a liberal subsidy, by which armies might have been levied, garrisons established, and cities fortified; and why any other method was pursued, what reason can be assigned? what, but an inclination to aggrandize and enrich a contemptible province, and to deck with the plunder of Britain the electorate of Hanover?

It has been suspected, my lords, (nor has the suspicion been without foundation,) that our measures have long been regulated by the interest of his majesty's electoral territories; these have been long considered as a gulf into which the treasures of this nation have been thrown; and it has been observed, that the state of the country has, since the accession of its princes to this throne, been changed without any visible cause; affluence has begun to wanton in their towns, and gold to glitter in their cottages, without the discovery of mines, or the increase of their trade; and new dominions have been purchased, of which it can scarcely be imagined, that the value was paid out of the revenues of Hanover.

This, my lords, is unpopular, illegal, and unjust; yet this might be borne, in consideration of great advantages, of the protection of our trade, and the support of our honour. But there are men who dare to whisper, and who, perhaps, if their suspicions receive new confirmation, will publickly declare, that for the preservation of Hanover, our commerce has been neglected, and our honour impaired; that to secure Hanover from invasion, the house of Bourbon has been courted, and the family of Austria embarrassed and depressed. These men assert, without hesitation, that when we entered into a league with France against the emperour and the Spaniards, in the reign of the late emperour, no part of the British dominions were in danger; and that the alarm which was raised to reconcile the nation to measures so contrary to those which former ages had pursued, was a fictitious detestable artifice of wicked policy, by which Britain was engaged in the defence of dominions to which we owe no regard, as we can receive no real advantage from them.

It were to be wished, that no late instance could be produced of conduct regulated by the same principles; and that this shameful, this pernicious partiality had been universally allowed to have ceased with the late reign; but it has never yet been shown, that the late neutrality, by which Hanover was preserved, did not restrain the arms of Britain; nor when it has been asked, why the Spanish army was, when within reach of the cannon of the British navy, peaceably transported to Italy, has any other reason been assigned, than that the transports could not be destroyed without a breach of the neutrality of Hanover?

This, my lords, is a subject on which I could have only been induced to dwell, by my zeal for the present establishment, and my personal affection for his majesty. It is universally allowed, that not only the honour and prosperity, but the safety of a British monarch, depends upon the affections of his subjects; and that neither splendid levees, nor large revenues, nor standing armies, can secure his happiness or his power any longer than the people are convinced of his tenderness and regard, of his attention to their complaints, and his zeal for their interest. If, therefore, it should ever be generally believed, that our king considers this nation only as appendent to his electoral dominions, that he promotes the interest of his former subjects at the expense of those by whom he has been exalted to this awful throne, and that our commerce, our treasures, and our lives, are sacrificed to the safety, or to the enlargement of distant territories, what can be expected? what but murmurs, disaffection, and distrust, and their natural consequences, insurrection and rebellion; rebellion, of which no man can foresee the event, and by which that man may perhaps be placed upon the throne, whom we have so wisely excluded and so solemnly abjured.

Of this unreasonable regard to the interest of Hanover, the contract which we are now considering exhibits, if not a proof too apparent to be denied, yet such an appearance as we ought for our own sakes and that of his majesty to obviate; and therefore I think the, address which is now proposed in the highest degree reasonable; and am convinced, that by complying with our request, his majesty will regain the affections of many of his subjects, whom a long train of pernicious measures have filled with discontent; and preserve the loyalty of many others, who, by artful representations of the motives and consequences of this contract, may be alienated and perverted.

Lord BATHURST replied to the following purport:—My lords, as I have no reason to doubt of the noble duke's affection to the present royal family, I am convinced, that the ardour of his expressions is the effect of his zeal, and that the force of his representations proceeds only from the strength of his conviction; and, therefore, I am far from intending to censure any accidental negligence of language, or any seeming asperity of sentiment. I know, that the openness and dignity of mind which has incited him to declare his opinion with so much freedom, will induce him likewise to retract it, when he shall be convinced, that he has been deceived by false representations, or that he has formed his conclusions too hastily, without an attentive examination of the question in its whole extent.

I shall, therefore, endeavour to explain the motives upon which all these measures have been formed which we have heard so warmly censured; and show, that they were the consequences not of haste and negligence, but of vigilance and circumspection; that they were formed upon a deliberate survey of the complicated interests of the European powers, and dictated not by a partiality to Hanover, but a faithful attention to the interest of Britain.

It has been already observed by a noble lord, that there was no choice allowed us; that the state of Europe required that we should not sit unactive; and that yet there was no other method of acting, by which we could benefit our allies, or injure our enemies; and that, therefore, though our interposition had not produced all the effects which our zeal might incline us to wish, yet our conduct ought not to be condemned; because, though we did not press forward through the nearest path to the great object of our pursuit, we exerted our utmost speed in the only way that was left open. This, my lords, is, in my opinion, a very just apology; nor do I see, that this vindication can be confuted or invalidated, otherwise than by showing, that some different measures, measures equally reasonable, were equally in our power.

But because the plea of necessity may, perhaps, be evaded; and because it is, at least, pleasing to discover, that what was necessary was likewise convenient, I shall endeavour to show, that our measures have produced already such effects as have sufficiently rewarded our expenses; and that we may yet reasonably hope, that greater advantages will arise from them.

There are, indeed, some whom it will not be easy to satisfy, some who declare not against the manner in which the war is prosecuted, but against the war itself; who think the power of France too formidable to be opposed, and the British people too much exhausted or enervated to hold any longer the balance of the continent.

I have, indeed, my lords, always declared myself of a different opinion, and have frequently endeavoured to rouse others from a kind of indolent despair and tame acquiescence in the attempts of the French, by representations of the wealth and force, the influence and alliances of our own nation. I have often asserted, that I did not doubt but her conquests might be stopped by vigorous opposition, and that the current of her power, which had by artificial machines of policy been raised higher than its source, would subside and stagnate, when its course was no longer assisted by cowardice, and its way levelled by submission.

These, my lords, were my sentiments, and this was my language, at a time when all the powers of Europe conspired to flatter the pride of France by falling at her feet, when her nod was solicitously watched by all the princes of the empire, when there was no safety but by her protection, nor any enterprise but by her permission; when her wealth influenced the councils of nations, when war was declared at her command in the remotest corners of Europe, and every contest was submitted to her arbitration.

Even at this time, my lords, was I sufficiently confident of the power of my own country, to set at defiance, in my own mind, this gigantick state. I considered all additions to its greatness rather as the tumour of disease than the shootings of vigour, and thought that its nerves grew weaker as its corpulence increased. Of my own nation I saw, that neither its numbers nor its courage were diminished; I had no reason to believe our soldiers or our sailors less brave than their fathers; and, therefore, imagined that whenever they should be led out against the same enemies, they would fight with the same superiority and the same success.

But for these hopes, my lords, I was sometimes pitied by those who thought themselves better acquainted with the state of Europe than myself, and sometimes ridiculed by those who had been long accustomed to depress their own country, and to represent Britain as only the shadow of what it once was; to deride our armies and our fleets, and describe us impoverished and corrupted, sunk into cowardice, and delighted with slavery.

That my opinion is now likely to be justified, and that those who have hitherto so confidently opposed me, will soon be obliged to acknowledge their mistake, is of very small importance; nor is my self-love so predominant as to incline me to reckon the confirmation of my predictions, or the vindication of my sagacity among the benefits which we are now about to receive. We are now soon to be convinced that France is not irresistible, nor irresistible to Britain. We are now to see the embroilers of the universe entangled in their own schemes, and the depopulators of kingdoms destroyed in those fields which they have so wantonly laid waste. We shall see justice triumphant over oppression, and insolence trampled by those whom she has despised. We shall see the powers of Europe once more equally balanced, and the balance placed again in the hands of Britain.

If it be required upon what events these expectations are founded; and if it be alleged, that we have no such resolutions to hope from the measures that have been hitherto pursued; it has been affirmed by a noble lord, that our armies in Flanders are useless, and that our motions have given neither courage nor strength to any other powers; that the queen of Hungary is yet equally distressed, and that the French still pursue their schemes without any interruption from us or our allies, I shall hope by an impartial account of the present state of the continent to show, that his assertions are groundless, and his opinion erroneous.

The inactivity of our army in Flanders has, indeed, furnished a popular topick of declamation and ridicule. It is well known how little the bulk of mankind are acquainted, either with arts of policy, or of war; how imperfectly they must always understand the conduct of ministers or generals, and with what partiality they always determine in favour of their own nation. Ignorance, my lords, conjoined with partiality, must always produce expectations which no address nor courage can gratify; and it is scarcely, therefore, to be hoped, that the people will be satisfied with any account of the conduct of our generals, which does not inform them of sieges and battles, slaughter and devastation. They expect that a British army should overrun the continent in a summer, that towns should surrender at their summons, and legions retire at their shout; that they should drive nations before them, and conquer empires by marching over them.

Such, my lords, are the effects which the people of Britain expect; and as they have hitherto been disappointed, their disappointment inclines them to complain. They think an army useless which gains no victories, and ask to what purpose the sword is drawn, if the blood of their enemies is not to be shed? But these are not the sentiments of your lordships, whose acquaintance with publick affairs informs you, that victories are often gained where no standards are taken, nor newspapers filled with lists of the slain; and that by drawing the sword opportunely, the necessity of striking is often prevented. You know, that the army which hovers over a country, and draws the forces which defend it to one part, may destroy it without invading it, by exposing it to the invasion of another; and that he who withholds an army from action, is not less useful to his ally than he that defeats it.

This, my lords, is the present use of our troops in Flanders; the French are kept in continual terrour, and are obliged to detach to that frontier those troops which, had they not been thus diverted, would have been employed in the empire; and, surely, an army is not unactive which withholds a double number from prosecuting their design.

That our motions have not encouraged other powers to fulfil their engagements, or to unite in the defence of the general liberty of Europe, cannot truly be asserted. The Dutch apparently waken from their slumber; whether it was real or affected, they at least discover less fear of the French, and have already given such proofs of their inclination to join with us, as may encourage us to expect, that they will, in a short time, form with us another confederacy, and employ their utmost efforts in the common cause.

What they have already offered will at least enable us to assist the queen of Hungary with greater numbers, and her to employ her troops where she is most pressed; for they have engaged to garrison the towns of Flanders, which, since they cannot be evacuated, is in effect an offer of auxiliary troops; since, if those forces had been added to the Austrian army, an equal number of Austrians must have been subducted to garrison the frontier.

It is, therefore, without reason, that narrow-minded censurers charge us with becoming the slaves of the Dutch, with fighting their battles and defending their barrier, while they pursue their commerce in tranquillity, enjoy peace at the expense of British blood, and grow rich by the profusion of British treasure. It appears, that they concur in the preservation of themselves and of Europe, though with delays and caution; since, though they do not send forces into the field, they supply the place of those which are sent, and enable others to destroy those whom they are not yet persuaded to attack themselves.

The constitution of that republick is, indeed, such as makes its alliance not valuable, on sudden emergencies, in proportion to its wealth and power. The determinations of large assemblies are always slow; because there are many opinions to be examined, many proposals to be balanced, and many objections to be answered. But with much more difficulty must any important resolution be formed, where it must be the joint act of the whole assembly, where every individual has a negative voice, and unanimity alone can make a decision obligatory. Wherever this is the form of government, the state lies at the mercy of every man who has a vote in its councils; and the corruption or folly or obstinacy of one may retard or defeat the most important designs, lay his country open to the inroads of an enemy, dissolve the most solemn alliances, and involve a nation in misery.

This, my lords, I need not observe to be the Dutch constitution, nor need I tell this assembly, that we are not always to judge of the general inclination of that people by the procedure of their deputies, since particular men may be influenced by private views, or corrupted by secret promises or bribes; and those designs may be retarded by their artifices which the honest and impartial universally approve. This is, perhaps, the true reason of the present delays which have furnished occasion to such loud complaints, complaints of which we may hope quickly to have an end; since it can hardly be doubted, but the general voice of the people will there, as in other places, at last prevail, and the prejudices or passions of private men give way to the interest of the publick.

That the queen of Hungary is now equally distressed, and that she has received no advantage from the assistance, which we have, at so great an expense, appeared to give her, is, likewise, very far from being true. Let any man compare her present condition with that in which she was before Britain engaged in her cause, and it will easily be perceived how much she owes to the alliance of this nation. She was then flying before her enemies, and reduced to seek for shelter in the remotest part of her dominions, while her capital was fortified in expectation of a siege. Those who then were distributing her provinces, and who almost hovered over her only remaining kingdom, are now retiring before her troops. The army by which it was intended that her territories in Italy should be taken from her, is now starving in the countries which it presumed to invade; and the troops which were sent to its assistance are languishing at the feet of mountains which they will never pass.

These are the effects, my lords, of those measures, which, for want of being completely understood, or attentively considered, have been so vehemently censured. These measures, my lords, however injudicious, however unseasonable, have embarrassed the designs of France, and given relief to the queen of Hungary; they have animated the Dutch to action, and kindled in all the powers of Europe, who were intimidated by the French armies, new hopes and new resolutions; they have, indeed, made a general change in the state of Europe, and given a new inclination to the balance of power. Not many months have elapsed, since every man appeared to consider the sovereign of France as the universal monarch, whose will was not to be opposed, and whose force was not to be resisted. We now see his menaces despised and his propositions rejected; every one now appears to hope rather than to fear, though lately a general panick was spread over this part of the globe, and fear had so engrossed mankind, that scarcely any man presumed to hope.

But it is objected, my lords, that though our measures should be allowed not to have been wholly ineffectual, and our money appear not to have been squandered only to pay the troops of Hanover, yet our conduct is very far from meriting either applause or approbation; since much greater advantages might have been purchased at much less expense, and by methods much less invidious and dangerous.

The queen of Hungary might, in the opinion of these censurers, have raised an hundred thousand men with the money which we must expend in hiring only sixteen thousand, and might have destroyed those enemies whom we have hitherto not dared to attack.

Those who make this supposition the foundation of their censures, appear not to remember, that the queen of Hungary's dominions, like those of other princes, may, by war, be in time exhausted; that the loss of inhabitants is not repaired in any country but by slow degrees; and that there is no place yet discovered where money will procure soldiers without end, or where new harvests of men rise up annually, ready to fight those quarrels in which their predecessors were swept away. If the money had, instead of being employed in hiring auxiliaries, been remitted to the queen, it is not probable that she could, at any rate, have brought a new army together. But it is certain, that her new troops must have been without arms and without discipline. It might have been found, perhaps, in this general disturbance of the world, not easy to have supplied them with weapons; and it is well known how long time is required to teach raw forces the art of war, and enable them to stand before a veteran enemy.

It was, therefore, necessary to assist her rather with troops than money; and since troops were necessarily to be hired, why should we employ the forces of Hanover less willingly than those of any other nation? To assert that they have more or less courage than others is chimerical, nor can any man suppose them either more brave or timorous than those of the neighbouring countries, without discovering the meanest prejudices, and the narrowest conceptions; without showing that he is wholly unacquainted with human nature, and that he is influenced by the tales of nurses, and the boasts of children.

There was, therefore, no objection against the troops of Hanover, that was not of equal strength against all foreign troops; and there was at least one argument in their favour, that they were subjects of the same prince; and that, therefore, we could have no reason to fear their defection, or to suspect their fidelity.

The electorate of Hanover, with whatever contempt or indignation some persons may affect to mention it, is to be considered, at least, as a state in alliance with Britain, and to receive from us that support which the terms of that alliance may demand.

Any other regard, my lords, indeed, it is not necessary to contend for; since it cannot be proved, that in this transaction we have acted otherwise than as with allies, or hired the troops on conditions which those of any other nation would not have obtained, or on any which they will not deserve; since your lordships have received assurances, that they are ready to enter the field, and to march into Germany against the common enemy. That we might have raised new troops in our own nation, and have augmented our army with an equal number of men, cannot be denied; nor do I doubt, my lords, but our countrymen would be equally formidable with any other forces; but it must be remembered, that an army is not to be levied in an instant, and that our natives, however warlike, are not born with the knowledge of the use of arms; and who knows, whether Europe might not have been enslaved before a British army could have been raised and disciplined for its deliverance?