The Works of Samuel Johnson, LL.D. Volume 11
It might be at least hoped, my lords, that the princes of the house of Hanover might have the same regard to this nation as to kings from whom they never received any benefit, and whom they ought in reality always to have considered as enemies, yet even from such levy-money was not always required; or if required, was not always received.
There was once a time, my lords, before any of this race wore the crown of Britain; when the great French monarch, Lewis the fourteenth, being under a necessity of hiring auxiliary troops, applied to the duke of Hanover, as a prince whose necessities would naturally incline him to set the lives of his subjects at a cheap rate. The duke, pleased with an opportunity of trafficking with so wealthy a monarch, readily promised a supply of troops; and demanded levy-money to be paid him, that he might be enabled to raise them. But Hanoverian reputation was not then raised so high, as that the French king should trust him with his money. Lewis suspected, and made no scruple of declaring his suspicion, that the demand of levy-money was only a pretence to obtain a sum which would never afterwards be repaid, and for which no troops would be obtained; and therefore, with his usual prudence insisted, that the troops should first march, and then be paid. Thus for some time the treaty was at a stand; but the king being equally in want of men, as the duke of money, and perceiving, perhaps, that it was really impracticable for so indigent a prince to raise troops without some pecuniary assistance, offered him at length a small sum, which was gladly accepted, though much below the original demand. The troops were engaged in the service of France; and the duke of Hanover thought himself happy in being able to amuse himself at his leisure with the rattle of money.
Such, my lords, were the conditions on which the troops of Hanover were furnished in former times; and surely what could then be produced by the love of money, or the awe of a superiour power, might now be expected as the effect of gratitude and kindness.
But not to dwell any longer, my lords, upon particular circumstances of measures, of which the whole scheme is contrary to the apparent interest of this empire, I shall not inquire farther, why auxiliaries are employed on this occasion rather than Britons, rather than those whose bravery is celebrated to the most distant corners of the earth; why, if mercenaries are necessary, those of Hanover are preferred to others: or why, if they are, indeed, preferable, they are now to be hired at a higher rate than at any former time? It appears to me of far more importance to undermine the foundation, than to batter the superstructure of our present system of politicks; and of greater use to inquire, why we have engaged in a war on the continent, than why we carry it on with ridiculous profusion.
It appears to me, my lords, that there are many reasons which, with the same circumstances, would have withheld any nation but this from such a dangerous interposition. The Dutch, we see, are content to look on without action, though they are more interested in the event, and less embarrassed on any other side. We are already engaged in a war, of which no man can foresee the conclusion; but which cannot be ended unsuccessfully, without the utmost danger to our most important interests; and which yet has hitherto produced only losses and disgrace, has impoverished our merchants, and intimidated our soldiers. Whether these losses are the effects of weakness or treachery, is a question which I am not ambitious of endeavouring to decide, and of which the decision is, indeed, by no means necessary in the present debate; since if we are too weak to struggle with Spain, unassisted as she is, and embarrassed with different views, I need not say what will be our condition, when the whole house of Bourbon shall be combined against us; when that nation which stood alone for so many years against the united efforts of Europe, shall attack us, exhausted with taxes, enervated with corruption, and disunited from all allies. Whether the troops of Hanover will assist us at that time, I cannot determine. Perhaps, in the destruction of the British dominions, it may be thought expedient to secure a more valuable and important country by a timely neutrality; but if we have any auxiliaries from thence, we must then necessarily obtain them upon cheaper terms.
If our inactivity in the European seas, and our ill success in those of America be, as it is generally suspected, the consequence of perfidious counsels, and private machinations; if our fleets are sent out with orders to make no attempt against our enemies, or our admirals commanded to retreat before them; surely no higher degree of madness can be imagined, than that of provoking new enemies before we have experienced a change of counsels, and found reason to place in our ministers and statesmen that confidence which war absolutely requires.
This is the conduct, my lords, which I should think most rational, even though we were attacked in some of our real rights, and though the quarrel about which we were debating was our own; I should think the nearest danger the greatest, and should advise patience under foreign insults, till we had redressed our domestick grievances; till we had driven treachery from the court, and corruption from the senate. But much more proper do I think this conduct, when we are invited only to engage in distant war, in a dispute about the dominion of princes, in the bowels of the continent; of princes, of whom it is not certain, that we shall receive either advantage or security from their greatness, or that we should suffer any loss or injury by their fall.
But, my lords, I know it will be answered, that the queen of Hungary has a right by treaty to our assistance; and that in becoming guarantees of the Pragmatick sanction, we engaged to support her in the dominions of her ancestors. This, my lords, is an answer of which I do not deny the justness, and of which I will not attempt to invalidate the strength. I allow that such a stipulation was made, and that treaties ought to be observed, at whatever hazard, with unviolated faith. It has been, indeed, objected, that many nations engaged with us in the same treaty, whom interest or cowardice have inclined to neglect it; and that we ought not to become the standing garrison of Europe, or to defend alone those territories, to the preservation of which so many states are obliged to contribute equally with ourselves. But this, my lords, appears to me an argument of which the ill consequences can never be fully discovered; an argument which dissolves all the obligations of contracts, destroys the foundation of moral justice, and lays society open to all the mischiefs of perfidy, by making the validity of oaths and contracts dependant upon chance, and regulating the duties of one man by the conduct of another. I pretend not, my lords, to long experience, and, therefore, in discussing intricate questions, may be easily mistaken. But as, in my opinion, my lords, morality is seldom difficult, but when it is clouded with an intention to deceive others or ourselves, I shall venture to declare with more confidence, that in proportion as one man neglects his duty, another is more strictly obliged to practise his own, that his example may not help forward the general corruption, and that those who are injured by the perfidy of others, may from his sincerity have a prospect of relief.
I believe all politicks that are not founded on morality will be found fallacious and destructive, if not immediately, to those who practise them; yet, consequentially, by their general tendency to disturb society, and weaken those obligations which maintain the order of the world. I shall, therefore, allow, that what justice requires from a private man, becomes, in parallel circumstances, the duty of a nation; and shall, therefore, never advise the violation of a solemn treaty. The stipulations in which we engaged, when we became guarantees of the Pragmatick sanction, are, doubtless, to be observed; and it is, therefore, one of the strongest objections against the measures which we are now pursuing, that we shall be perfidious at a greater expense than fidelity would have required, and shall exhaust the treasure of the nation without assisting the queen of Hungary.
To explain this assertion, my lords, it is necessary to take a view of the constitution of the German body, which consists of a great number of separate governments independent on each other, but subject, in some degree, to the emperour as the general head. The subjects of each state are governed by their prince, and owe no allegiance to any other sovereign; but the prince performs homage to the emperour, and having thereby acknowledged himself his feudatory, or dependant, may be punished for rebellion against him. The title of the emperour, and consequently his claim to this allegiance, and the right of issuing the ban against those who shall refuse it, is confirmed by many solemn acknowledgments of the diet, and, amongst others, by the grant of a pecuniary aid; this the present emperour has indisputably received, an aid having been already granted him in the diet, of a subsidy for eighteen months; and, therefore, none of the troops of Germany can now be employed against him, without subjecting the prince to whom they belong to the censure of the ban, a kind of civil excommunication.
To what purpose, then, my lords, are we to hire, at a rate never paid, or perhaps demanded before, troops which cannot serve us without subjecting their prince to the charge of rebellion? Or how shall we assist the queen of Hungary, by collecting forces which dare not act against the only enemy which she has now to fear? Or in what new difficulties shall we be engaged, should the inestimable dominions of Hanover be subjected to the imperial interdiction.
These, my lords, are questions to which, I hope, we shall hear a more satisfactory answer than I am able to conceive; for, indeed, I do not see what remains, but to confess, that these troops are hired only for a military show, to amuse this nation with a false appearance of zeal for the preservation of Europe, and to increase the treasures of Hanover at the expense of Britain.
These are designs, my lords, which no man will avow, and yet these are the only designs which I can yet discover; and, therefore, I shall oppose all the measures that tend to their execution. If the heat of indignation, or the asperity of resentment, or the wantonness of contempt, have betrayed me into any expressions unworthy of the dignity of this house, I hope they will be forgiven by your lordships; for any other degree of freedom I shall make no apology, having, as a peer, a right to deliver my opinion, and as a Briton, to assert the independence of my native country, when I see, or imagine myself to see, that it is ignominiously and illegally subjected to the promotion of the petty interest of the province of Hanover.
Lord CARTERET then rose, and made answer to the following effect:—My lords, as I doubt not but I shall be able to justify the measures which are now pursued, in such a manner as may entitle them to the approbation of your lordships, I proposed to hear all the objections that should be made, before I attempted a vindication, that the debate might be shortened, and that the arguments on both sides might be considered as placed in the full strength of opposition; and that it might be discerned how objections, however specious in themselves, would vanish before the light of reason and truth.
But the noble lord has made it necessary for me to alter my design, by a speech which I will not applaud, because it has, in my opinion, an ill tendency; nor censure, because it wanted neither the splendour of eloquence, nor the arts of reasoning; and had no other defect than that which must always be produced by a bad cause, fallacy in the arguments, and errours in the assertions.
This speech I am obliged to answer, because his lordship has been pleased to call out for any lord who will assert, that the Dutch have agreed to concur with us in assisting the queen of Hungary. That all the provinces of that republick have agreed to assist us, is indeed not true; nor do I know, my lords, by whom or upon what authority it was asserted; but the concurrence of the province of Holland, the most important of all, and whose example the rest seldom delay to follow, has been obtained, which is sufficient to encourage us to vigorous resolutions, by which the rest may be animated to a speedy compliance.
The concurrence of this province has been already the consequence of the measures which have been lately pursued; measures from which, though just and successful, the ministry cannot claim much applause; because all choice was denied, and they were obliged either to remain passive spectators of the ruin of Europe, and, by consequence, of Britain, or to do what they have done. And surely, my lords, that necessity which deprives them of all claim to panegyrick, will be, likewise, a sufficient security from censure. There is, indeed, no reason to fear censure from judges so candid and experienced as your lordships, to whom it may without difficulty be proved, that the balance of Europe has already changed its position, and the house of Bourbon is now not able to preponderate against the other powers.
By entering into an alliance with Sardinia, we have taken from the crown of Spain all the weight of the territories of Italy, of which the Austrian forces are now in possession, without fear or danger of being interrupted; while the passes of the ocean are shut by the fleets of Britain, and those of the mountains by the troops of Sardinia.
Those unhappy forces which were transported by the Spanish fleet, are not only lost to their native country, but exposed without provision, without ammunition, without retreat, and without hope: nor can any human prospect discover how they can escape destruction, either by the fatigue of marches, or the want of necessaries, or the superiour force of an army well supplied and elated with success.
This, my lords, is an embarrassment from which the Spaniards would gladly be freed at any expense, from which they would bribe us to relieve them, by permitting the demolition of new fortresses, or restoring the army which we lost at Carthagena.
Of this alliance the queen of Hungary already finds the advantage, as it preserves countries in her possession, which, if once lost, it might be impossible to recover; and sets her free from the necessity of dividing her army for the protection of distant territories.
Thus, my lords, the Spaniards are obstructed and distrusted; of their armies, one is condemned to waste away at the feet of impassable mountains, only to hear of the destruction of their countrymen whom they are endeavouring to relieve, and the establishment of peace in these regions of which they had projected the conquest; and the other, yet more unfortunate, has been successfully transported, only to see that fleet which permitted their passage preclude their supplies, and hinder their retreat.
Nor do we, my lords, after having thus efficaciously opposed one of the princes of the house of Bourbon, fear or shun the resentment of the other; we doubt not to show, that Britain is still able to retard the arms of the haughty French, and to drive them back from the invasion of other kingdoms to the defence of their own. The time is at hand, my lords, in which it will appear, that however the power of France has been exaggerated, with whatever servility her protection has been courted, and with whatever meanness her insolence has been borne, this nation has not yet lost its influence or its strength, that it is yet able to fill the continent with armies, to afford protection to its allies, and strike terrour into those who have hitherto trampled under foot the faith of treaties and rights of sovereigns, and ranged over the dominions of the neighbouring princes, with the security of lawful possessors, and the pride of conquerors.
It has been objected by the noble lord, that this change is not to be expected from an army composed of auxiliary troops from any of the provinces of the German empire, because they cannot act against the general head. I can easily, my lords, solve this difficulty, from my long acquaintance with the constitution of the empire, which I understood before the noble lord, who has entertained you with a discourse upon it, was in being; but I will not engross your time, or retard your determination by a superfluous disquisition, which may be now safely omitted; since I am allowed by his majesty to assure your lordships, that the Hessian and Hanoverian troops shall be employed in assisting the queen of Hungary, and that they have already received orders to make the preparations necessary for marching into the empire.
After this declaration, my lords, the most formidable objection against the present measures will, I hope, be no more heard in this debate; for it will be by no means proper for any lord to renew it by inquiring, whether his majesty's resolution is not a breach of the imperial constitution, or whether it will not expose his electoral dominions to danger. For it is not our province to judge of the laws of other nations, to examine when they are violated, or to enforce the observation of them; nor is it necessary, since the interests of Britain and Hanover are irreconcilably opposite, to endeavour the preservation of dominions which their own sovereign is inclined to hazard.
Thus, my lords, I hope it appears, that the common interest of Britain and Europe is steadily pursued; that the Spaniards feel the effects of a war with Britain by their distress and embarrassment; that the queen of Hungary discovers, that the ancient allies of her family have not deserted her; and that France, amidst her boasts and her projects, perceives the determined opposers of her grandeur again setting her at defiance.
The duke of BEDFORD spoke to the following effect:—My lords, the assurance which the noble lord who spoke last declares himself to have conceived of being able to demonstrate the propriety of the present measures, must surely arise from some intelligence which has been hitherto suppressed, or some knowledge of future events peculiar to himself; for I cannot discover any force in the arguments which he has been pleased to use, that could produce in him such confidence of success, nor any circumstances in the present appearance of Europe, that do not seem to demand a different conduct.
The reasonableness of our measures at this time, as at all others, must be evinced by arguments drawn from an attentive review of the state of our own country, compared with that of the neighbouring nations; for no man will deny, that those methods of proceeding which are at one time useful, may at another be pernicious; and that either a gradual rotation of power, or a casual variation of interest, may very properly produce changes in the counsels of the most steady and vigorous administration.
It is therefore proper, in the examination of this question, to consider what is the state of our own nation, and what is to be hoped or feared from the condition of those kingdoms, which are most enabled by their situation to benefit or to hurt us: and in inquiry, my lords, an inquiry that can give little pleasure to an honest and benevolent mind, it immediately occurs, that we are a nation exhausted by a long war, and impoverished by the diminution of our commerce; and the result, therefore, of this first consideration is, that those measures are most eligible which are most frugal; and that to waste the publick treasure in unnecessary expenses, or to load the people with new taxes only to display a mockery of war on the continent, or to amuse ourselves, our allies, or our enemies, with the idle ostentation of unnecessary numbers, is to drain from the nation the last remains of its ancient vigour, instead of assisting its recovery from its present languors.
But money, however valuable, however necessary, has sometimes been imprudently and unseasonably spared; and an ill-timed parsimony has been known to hasten calamities, by which those have been deprived of all who would not endeavour to preserve it by the loss of part. It is therefore to be considered, whether measures less expensive would not have been more dangerous; and whether we have not, by hiring foreign troops, though at a very high rate, at a rate which would have been demanded from no other nation, purchased an exemption from distresses, insults, and invasions.
The only nations, my lords, whom we have any reason to suspect of a design to invade us, or that have power to put any such design in execution, are well known to be the French and Spaniards; from these, indeed, it may justly be expected, that they will omit no opportunity of gratifying that hatred which difference of religion and contrariety of interest cannot fail to continue from age to age; and therefore we ought never to imagine ourselves safe, while it is in their power to endanger us. But of these two nations, my lords, the one is already disarmed by the navies of Britain, which confine her fleets to their harbours, and, as we have been just now informed, preclude her armies from supplies: the other is without a fleet able to transport an army, her troops are dispersed in different countries, and her treasures exhausted by expeditions or negotiations equally expensive.
There is, therefore, my lords, no danger of an invasion, even though we had no forces by which it could be opposed; but much less is it to be feared, when it is remembered, that the sea is covered with our ships of war, and that all the coasts of Europe are awed and alarmed by the navies of Britain.
This then, my lords, is surely the time, when we ought not to have sacrificed any immediate and apparent interest to the fear of attempts from Spain or France; when we might without danger have assisted our allies with our national troops, and have spared that money which we have so lavishly bestowed upon auxiliaries; when we might securely have shown the powers of the continent how much the British valour is yet to be feared, and how little our late losses or disgraces are to be imputed to the decline of our courage or our strength.
I suppose, my lords, no man will confess, that foreign troops have been hired as more to be trusted for their skill or bravery than our own. To dispute the palm of courage with any nation would be a reproach to the British name; and if our soldiers are not at least equally disciplined with those of other countries, it must be owned, that taxes have been long paid to little purpose, that the glitter of reviews has been justly ridiculed as an empty show, and that we have long been flattered by our ministers and generals with false security.
But though I am far from believing, that the army has been supported only for the defence of our country; and though I know, that their officers are frequently engaged in employments more important in the opinion of their directors, than that of regulating the discipline of their regiments, and teaching the use of arms and the science of war; yet, as I believe the courage of Britons such as may often supply the want of skill, I cannot but conclude, that they are at least as formidable as the troops of other countries, especially when I remember, that they enter the field incited and supported by the reputation of their country.
Why then, my lords, is the nation condemned to support, at once, a double burden; to pay at home an army which can be of no use, and to hire auxiliaries, perhaps, equally unactive; to make war, if any war be intended, at an unnecessary expense, and to pay, at once, a fleet which only floats upon the ocean, an army which only awes the villages from which it is supported, and a body of mercenaries, of which no man can yet conjecture with what design they have been retained.
That they are intended for the support of the queen of Hungary has been, indeed, asserted; and this contract has been produced as an instance of the zeal of our ministers for the assertion of the Pragmatick sanction, the preservation of the liberties of Europe, and the suppression of the ambitious enterprises of the house of Bourbon; but surely, my lords, had the assistance of that illustrious princess been their sole or principal intention, had they in reality dedicated the sum which is to be received by the troops of Hanover, to the sacred cause of publick faith and universal liberty, they might have found methods of promoting it much more efficaciously at no greater expense. Had they remitted that money to the queen, she would have been enabled to call nations to her standard, to fill the plains of Germany with the hardy inhabitants of the mountains and the deserts, and have deluged the empire of France with multitudes equally daring and rapacious, who would have descended upon a fruitful country like vultures on their prey, and have laid those provinces in ruin which now smile at the devastation of neighbouring countries, secure in the protection of their mighty monarch.