The Works of Samuel Johnson, LL.D. Volume 11

The arguments upon which he has chiefly insisted, are the danger of hiring the troops of Hanover in any circumstances, and the impropriety of hiring them now without the previous approbation of the senate.

The danger of taking into our pay the forces of Hanover, the contrariety of this conduct to the act of settlement, and the infraction of our natural privileges, and the violation of our liberties which is threatened by it, have been asserted in very strong terms, but I think not proved with proportionate force; for we have heard no regular deduction of consequences by which this danger might be shown, nor have been informed, how the engagement of sixteen thousand Hanoverians to serve us against France for the ensuing year, can be considered as more destructive to our liberties than any other forces.

It is, indeed, insinuated, that this conduct will furnish a dangerous precedent of preference granted to Hanover above other nations; and that this preference may gradually be advanced, till in time Hanover may, by a servile ministry, be preferred to Britain itself, and that, therefore, all such partiality ought to be crushed in the beginning, and its authors pursued with indignation and abhorrence.

That to prefer the interest of Hanover to that of Britain would be in a very high degree criminal in a British ministry, I believe no man in this house will go about to deny; but if no better proof can be produced, that such preference is intended than the contract which we are now desired to ratify, it may be with reason hoped, that such atrocious treachery is yet at a great distance; for how does the hire of Hanoverian troops show any preference of Hanover to Britain?

The troops of Hanover are not hired by the ministry as braver or more skilful than those of our own country; they are not hired to command or to instruct, but to assist us; nor can I discover, supposing it possible to have raised with equal expedition the same number of forces in our own country, how the ministry can be charged with preferring the Hanoverians by exposing them to danger and fatigue.

But if it be confessed, that such numbers would not possibly be raised, or, at least, not possibly disciplined with the expedition that the queen of Hungary required, it will be found, that the Hanoverians were at most not preferred to our own nation, but to other foreigners, and for such preference reasons have been already given which I shall esteem conclusive, till I hear them confuted.

The other objection on which the honourable gentleman thought it proper to insist, was the neglect of demanding from the senate a previous approbation of the contract which is now before us; a neglect, in his opinion, so criminal, that the ministry cannot be acquitted of arbitrary government, of squandering the publick money by their own caprice, and of assuming to themselves the whole power of government.

But the proof of this enormous usurpation has not yet been produced; for it does not yet appear, that there was time to communicate their designs to the senate, or that they would not have been defeated by communication; and, therefore, it is yet not evident, but that when they are censured for not having laid their scheme before the senate, they are condemned for omitting what was not possibly to be done, or what could not have been done, without betraying their trust, and injuring their country.

It is allowed, that the senate had resolved to assist the queen of Hungary; and, therefore, nothing remained for the ministers but to execute with their utmost address the resolution that had been formed; if for the prosecution of this design they should be found to have erred in their choice of means, their mistakes, unless some ill designs may justly be suspected, are to be imputed to the frailty of human nature, and rather to be pitied, and relieved as misfortunes, than punished as crimes.

But I doubt not, that in the course of our deliberations, we shall find reason for concluding that they have acted not only with fidelity but prudence; that they have chosen the means by which the great end which the senate proposed, the succour of the queen of Hungary, and consequently the reestablishment of the balance of power, will be most easily attained; and that they have taken into the pay of this nation those troops which may be trusted with the greatest security, as they have the same prince, and the same interest.

But the honourable gentleman appears inclined to advance a new doctrine, and to insinuate, that when any vote is passed by the senate, the ministers are to suppose some conditions which are to be observed, though they were never mentioned, and without which the voice of the senate is an empty sound. In pursuance of this supposition, he calls upon us to recollect the time and circumstances in which this vote was passed; he reminds us, that the concession was made in a sudden exultation of our hearts, in the raptures of triumph, and amidst the shouts of conquest, when every man was forming expectations which have never been gratified, and planning schemes which could never be perfected.

He seems therefore to think, that our ministers insidiously took advantage of our intoxication, and betrayed us in a fit of thoughtless jollity to a promise, which when made, we hardly understood, and which we may, therefore, now retract. He concludes, that the concession which might then escape us ought not to have been snatched by our ministers, and made the foundation of their conduct, because they knew it was made upon false suppositions, and in prospect of a recompense that never would be granted.

I hope there is no necessity for declaring, that this reasoning cannot safely be admitted, since, if the vote of the senate be not a sufficient warrant for any measure, no man can undertake the administration of our affairs, and that government which no man will venture to serve must be quickly at an end.

For my part, I know not how the nation or the senate has been disappointed of any just expectations, nor can I conceive that any such disappointments vacate their votes or annul their resolutions, and therefore I cannot but think the ministry sufficiently justified, if they can show that they have not deviated from them.

Lord QUARENDON spoke next to the effect following:—Sir, I am so far from thinking that the past conduct or the present proposals of the ministry deserve approbation, that, in my opinion, all the arguments which have been produced in their favour are apparently fallacious, and even the positions on which they are founded, and which are laid down as uncontrovertible, are generally false.

It is first asserted, that we are indispensably obliged to assist the queen of Hungary against France, and to support her in the possession of the hereditary dominions of the Austrian house, and from thence is precipitately inferred the necessity of assembling armies, and hiring mercenaries, of exhausting our treasure, and heaping new burdens upon the publick.

That we concurred with other powers in promising to support the Pragmatick sanction is not to be denied, nor do I intend to insinuate, that the faith of treaties ought not strictly to be kept; but we are not obliged to perform more than we promised, or take upon ourselves the burden which was to be supported by the united strength of many potentates, and of which we only engaged to bear a certain part. We ought, undoubtedly, to furnish the troops which we promised, and ought to have sent them when they were first demanded; but there is no necessity that we should supply the deficiencies of every other power, and that we should determine to stand alone in defence of the Pragmatick sanction; that we should, by romantick generosity, impoverish our country, and entail upon remotest posterity poverty and taxes. We ought to be honest at all events; we are at liberty, likewise, to be generous at our own expense, but I think we have hardly a right to boast of our liberality, when we contract debts for the advantage of the house of Austria, and leave them to be paid by the industry or frugality of succeeding ages.

It is, therefore, at least, dubious, whether we ought to hazard more than we promised in defence of the house of Austria; and, consequently, the first proposition of those who have undertaken the defence of the ministry requires to be better established, before it becomes the basis of an argument.

But though it be allowed, that we ought to exceed our stipulations, and engage more deeply in this cause than we have promised, I cannot yet discover upon what principles it can be proved, that sixteen thousand Hanoverians ought to be hired. Why were not our troops sent which have been so long maintained at home only for oppression and show? Why have they not at last been shown the use of those weapons which they have so long carried, and the advantages of that exercise which they have been taught to perform with so much address? Why have they not, at length, been shown for what they had so long received their pay, and informed, that the duty of a soldier is not wholly performed by strutting at a review?

If it be urged, that so great a number could not be sent out of the kingdom without exposing it to insults and irruptions, let it be remembered how small a force was found sufficient for the defence of the kingdom in the late war, when the French were masters of a fleet which disputed, for many years, the empire of the sea; and it will appear, whether it ought to be imputed to prudence or to cowardice, that our ministers cannot now think the nation safe without thrice the number, though our fleets cover the ocean, and steer from one coast to another without an enemy.

But to show more fully the insufficiency of the vindication which has been attempted, and prove, that no concession will enable the ministry to defend their schemes, even this assertion shall be admitted. We will allow for the present, that it is necessary to garrison an island with numerous forces against an enemy that has no fleet. I will grant, that invaders may be conveyed through the air, and that the formidable, the detestable pretender may, by some subterraneous passage, enter this kingdom, and start on a sudden into the throne. Yet will not all this liberality avail our ministers, since it may be objected, that new forces might easily have been raised, and our own island have been, at once, defended, and the queen of Hungary assisted by our native troops.

Since the necessity of expedition is urged, it may reasonably be inquired, what it was that appeared so immediately necessary, or what has been brought to pass by this wonderful expedition? Was it necessary to form an army to do nothing? Could not an expedition in which nothing was performed, in which nothing was attempted, have been delayed for a short time, and might not the queen of Hungary have been preserved equally, whether the troops of her allies slept and fattened in her country or their own?

Nothing, surely, can be more ridiculous than to expatiate upon the necessity of raising with expedition an useless body of forces, which has only been a burden to the country in which it has been stationed, and for which pay is now demanded, though they have neither seen a siege nor a battle; though they have made no attempt themselves, nor hindered any that might have been made by the enemy.

To make this plea yet more contemptible, we are informed, that if we had raised an army of our countrymen, they would have been unacquainted with arms and discipline, and, therefore, they could not have done what has been done by these far-famed Hanoverians. This, indeed, I cannot understand, having never found, that the Britons needed any documents or rules to enable them to eat and drink at the expense of others, to bask in the sun, or to loiter in the street, or perform any of the wonders that may be ascribed to our new auxiliaries; and, therefore, I cannot but think, that all the actions of the four months for which those forces expect to be paid, might have been brought to pass by new-raised Britons, who might in the mean time have learned their exercise, and have been made equal to any other soldiers that had never seen a battle.

But if foreign troops were necessary, I am still at a loss to find out why those of Hanover were chosen, since it appears to me, that by hiring out his troops to Britain, our monarch only weakens one hand to strengthen the other. It might be expected, that he should have employed these troops against France without hire, since he is not less obliged, either by treaty or policy, to protect the house of Austria as elector of Hanover, than as king of Britain.

Since, therefore, the troops of Hanover were hired, without the consent of the senate, they have hitherto performed nothing; and since it is reasonable to expect, that without being paid by Britain they will be employed against the French, I think it expedient to discharge them from our service, and to delay the pay which is required for the last four months, till it shall appear how they have deserved it.

Mr. FOX then rose, and spoke to the following purport:—Sir, though the observations of the right honourable gentleman must be allowed to be ingenious, and though the eloquence with which he has delivered them, naturally excites attention and regard, yet I am obliged to declare, that I have received rather pleasure than conviction from his oratory; and that while I applaud his imagination and his diction, I cannot but conclude, that they have been employed in bestowing ornaments upon errour.

I shall not, indeed, attempt to confute every assertion which I think false, or detect the fallacy of every argument which appears to me sophistical, but shall leave to others the province of showing the necessity of engaging in the war on the continent, of employing a large force for the preservation of the house of Austria, and of forming that army with the utmost expedition, and of taking auxiliaries into our pay, and confine myself to this single question, whether, supposing auxiliaries necessary, it was not prudent to hire the troops of Hanover?

Nothing can be, in my opinion, more apparent, than that if the necessity of hiring troops be allowed, which surely cannot be questioned, the troops of Hanover are to be chosen before any other, and that the ministry consulted in their resolutions the real interest of their country, as well as that of our ally.

The great argument which has in all ages been used against mercenary troops, is the suspicion which may justly be entertained of their fidelity. Mercenaries, it is observed, fight only for pay, without any affection for the master whom they serve, without any zeal for the cause which they espouse, and without any prospect of advantage from success, more than empty praises, or the plunder of the field, and, therefore, have no motives to incite them against danger, nor any hopes to support them in fatigues; that they can lose nothing by flight, but plunder, nor by treachery, but honour; and that, therefore, they have nothing to throw into the balance against the love of life, or the temptations of a bribe, and will never be able to stand against men that fight for their native country under the command of generals whom they esteem and love, and whom they cannot desert or disobey, without exposing themselves to perpetual exile, or to capital punishment.

These arguments have always been of great force, and, therefore, that nation whose defence has been intrusted to foreigners, has always been thought in danger of ruin. Yet there have been conjunctures in which almost every state has been obliged to rely upon mercenaries, and in compliance with immediate necessity, to depend upon the fidelity of those who had no particular interest in supporting them. But with much greater reason may we trust the success of the present war, in some degree, to the troops of Hanover, as they are, perhaps, the only foreign forces against which the arguments already recited are of no force. They are foreigners, indeed, as they are born in another country, and governed by laws different from ours; but they are the subjects of the same prince, and, therefore, naturally fight under the same command; they have the same interest with ourselves in the present contest, they have the same hopes and the same fears, they recommend themselves equally to their sovereign by their bravery, and can neither discover cowardice nor treachery, without suffering all the punishment that can be feared by our native troops, since their conduct must be censured by the same prince of whose approbation they are equally ambitious, and of whose displeasure they are equally afraid.

As to the troops which any neutral prince might furnish, there would be reason to fear, that either for larger pay, or upon any casual dispute that might arise, they might be withdrawn from our service when they were most needed, or transferred to the enemy at a time when his distress might compel him to offer high terms, and when, therefore, there was a near prospect of an advantageous peace. But of the troops of Hanover no such suspicion can be formed, since they cannot engage against us without rebelling against their prince; for it cannot be imagined, that his majesty will fight on one side as elector of Hanover, and on the other as king of Britain; or that he will obstruct the success of his own arms, by furnishing the troops of Hanover to the enemies of this kingdom.

It, therefore, appears very evident, that we have more to hope and less to fear from the troops of Hanover, than from any other; since they have the same reason with ourselves to desire the success of the queen of Hungary, and to dread the increasing greatness of the French; and that they can be suspected neither of treachery nor desertion. It is not very consistent with that candour with which every man ought to dispute on publick affairs, to censure those measures which have been proposed, without proposing others that are more eligible; for it is the duty of every man to promote the business of the publick; nor do I know why he that employs his sagacity only to obstruct it, should imagine, that he is of any use in the national council.

I doubt not but I shall hear many objections against the use of these troops, and that upon this question, virulence and ridicule will be equally employed. But for my part, I shall be little affected either with the laughter that may be raised by some, or the indignation that may be expressed by others, but shall vote for the continuance of these measures till better shall be proposed; and shall think, that these troops ought to be retained, unless it can be shown, that any others may be had, who may be less dangerous, or of greater use.

Mr. PITT then rose up, and spoke, in substance as follows:—Sir, if the honourable gentleman determines to abandon his present sentiments as soon as any better measures are proposed, I cannot but believe, that the ministry will very quickly be deprived of one of their ablest defenders; for I think the measures which have hitherto been pursued so weak and pernicious, that scarcely any alteration can be proposed that will not be for the advantage of the nation.

He has already been informed, that there was no necessity of hiring auxiliary troops, since it does not yet appear, that either justice or policy required us to engage in the quarrels of the continent, that there was any need of forming an army in the Low Countries, or that, in order to form an army, auxiliaries were necessary.

But not to dwell upon disputable questions, I think it may be justly concluded, that the measures of our ministry have been ill concerted, because it is undoubtedly wrong to squander the publick money without effect, and to pay armies only to be a show to our friends, and a jest to our enemies.

The troops of Hanover, whom we are now expected to pay, marched into the Low Countries, indeed, and still remain in the same place; they marched to the place most distant from enemies, least in danger of an attack, and most strongly fortified, if any attack had been designed; nor have any claim to be paid, but that they left their own country for a place of greater security.

It is always reasonable to judge of the future by the past; and, therefore, it is reasonable to conclude, that the services of these troops will not, next year, be of equal importance with that for which they are now to be paid; and I shall not be surprised, though the opponents of the ministry should be challenged, after such another glorious campaign, to propose better men, and should be told, that the money of this nation cannot be more properly employed than in hiring Hanoverians to eat and sleep.

But to prove yet more particularly, that better measures may be taken, and that more useful troops may be retained, and that, therefore, the honourable gentleman may be expected to quit those to whom he now adheres, I shall show, that in hiring the forces of Hanover, we have obstructed our own designs; that we have, instead of assisting the queen of Hungary, withdrawn part of her allies from her; and that we have burdened the nation with troops, from whom no service can be reasonably expected.

The advocates for the ministry have, on this occasion, affected to speak of the balance of power, the Pragmatick sanction, and the preservation of the queen of Hungary, not only as if they were to be the chief care of Britain, which, though easily controvertible, might, perhaps, in compliance with long prejudices, be admitted, but as if they were to be the care of Britain alone; as if the power of France were formidable to no other people, as if no other part of the world would be injured by becoming a province to an universal monarchy, and being subjected to an arbitrary government of a French deputy, by being drained of its inhabitants, only to extend the conquests of its masters, and to make other nations equally miserable, and by being oppressed with exorbitant taxes, levied by military executions, and employed only in supporting the state of its oppressors. They dwell upon the importance of publick faith, and the necessity of an exact observation of treaties; as if the Pragmatick sanction had been signed by no other potentate than the king of Britain, or as if the publick faith were to be obligatory to us only.

That we should inviolably observe our treaties, and observe them though every other nation should disregard them; that we should show an example of fidelity to mankind, and stand firm, though we should stand alone in the practice of virtue, I shall readily allow; and, therefore, I am far from advising that we should recede from our stipulations, whatever we may suffer by performing them, or neglect the support of the Pragmatick sanction, however we may be at present embarrassed, or however inconvenient it may be to assert it.

But surely for the same reason that we observe our own stipulations, we ought to incite other powers, likewise, to the observation of theirs; at least not contribute to hinder it. But how is our present conduct agreeable to these principles? The Pragmatick sanction was confirmed not only by the king of Britain, but by the elector, likewise, of Hanover, who is, therefore, equally obliged, if treaties constitute obligation, to defend the house of Austria against the attacks of any foreign power, and to send in his proportion of troops to the support of the queen of Hungary.

Whether these troops have been sent, those whose provinces oblige them to some knowledge of foreign affairs, can inform the house with more certainty than I; but since we have not heard them mentioned in this debate, and have found, by experience, that none of the merits of that electorate are passed over in silence, it may, I think, fairly be concluded, that the distresses of the illustrious queen of Hungary have yet received no alleviation from her alliance with Hanover, that her complaints have moved no compassion at that court, nor the justice of her cause obtained any regard.

To what can we impute this negligence of treaties, this disregard of justice, this defect of compassion, but to the pernicious counsels of those men who have advised his majesty to hire to Britain those troops which he should have employed in the assistance of the queen of Hungary; for it is not to be imagined, that his majesty has more or less regard to justice as king of Britain, than as elector of Hanover; or that he would not have sent his proportion of troops to the Austrian army, had not the temptations of greater profit been industriously laid before him.

But this is not all that may be urged against this conduct; for can we imagine, that the power of France is less, or that her designs are less formidable to Hanover than to Britain? nor is it less necessary for the security of Hanover, that the house of Austria should be reestablished in its former grandeur, and enabled to support the liberties of Europe against the bold attempts for universal monarchy.

If, therefore, our assistance be an act of honesty, and granted in consequence of treaties, why may it not equally be required of Hanover? And if it be an act of generosity, why should this nation alone be obliged to sacrifice her own interest to that of others? Or why should the elector of Hanover exert his liberality at the expense of Britain?

It is now too apparent, that this great, this powerful, this formidable kingdom, is considered only as a province to a despicable electorate; and that, in consequence of a scheme formed long ago, and invariably pursued, these troops are hired only to drain this unhappy nation of its money. That they have hitherto been of no use to Britain, or to Austria, is evident beyond controversy; and, therefore, it is plain, that they are retained only for the purposes of Hanover.

How much reason the transactions of almost every year have given for suspecting this ridiculous, ungrateful, and perfidious partiality, it is not necessary to mention. I doubt not but most of those who sit in this house can recollect a great number of instances, from the purchase of part of the Swedish dominions, to the contract which we are now called upon to ratify. I hope few have forgotten the memorable stipulation for the Hessian troops, for the forces of the duke of Wolfenbuttel, which we were scarcely to march beyond the verge of their own country, or the ever memorable treaty, of which the tendency is discovered in the name; the treaty by which we disunited ourselves from Austria, destroyed that building which we may, perhaps, now endeavour, without success, to raise again, and weakened the only power which it was our interest to strengthen.

To dwell upon all the instances of partiality which have been shown, to remark the yearly visits that have been made to that delightful country, to reckon up all the sums that have been spent to aggrandize and enrich it, would be at once invidious and tiresome; tiresome to those who are afraid to hear the truth, and to those who are unwilling to mention facts dishonourable or injurious to their country; nor shall I dwell any longer on this unpleasing subject than to express my hopes, that we shall not any longer suffer ourselves to be deceived and oppressed; that we shall at length perform the duty of the representatives of the people, and by refusing to ratify this contract, show, that however the interest of Hanover has been preferred by the ministers, the senate pays no regard but to that of Britain.