The Works of Samuel Johnson, LL.D. Volume 11

What influence my arguments will have upon your lordships, I cannot foresee. As every man flatters himself that his own opinions are right, I hope to find this house concurring in my sentiments; but whatever may be the determination of your lordships, I am so fully convinced of the pernicious tendency of this bill, and the embarrassments which must be produced by an attempt to execute it, that if it be not rejected by this house, I shall willingly resign my office to others of more courage, or of greater abilities; for I can have no hopes of performing my duty under these restrictions, either to my own honour, or to the advantage of my country.

The duke of BEDFORD spoke next, to the following effect:—My lords, though the noble lord has produced very specious arguments against every paragraph of the bill before us, and though many of his observations are just, and some of his objections not easily to be answered, yet I cannot admit that it will produce those fatal consequences which he seems to foresee, nor am yet convinced that it will be either pernicious or useless.

It has always, my lords, been the practice of this house, to attend to every proposal for the publick advantage, to consider it without any regard to the character of those by whom it is offered, and to approve or reject it upon no other motives than those of justice and reason.

The same equity and prudence has always influenced your lordships to distinguish between the several parts of the same bill; to reject those expedients, of which, however plausible, either experience or reason may discover the impropriety, and to retain those from which any real benefit can reasonably be expected. We should never throw away gold because it is mingled with dross, or refuse to promote the happiness of the nation, because the expedients which were offered for that end happened to be conjoined with some others of a disputable nature.

By the prosecution of this method, a method, my lords, too rational and just to be neglected or forgotten, I doubt not but this bill, which, as I shall readily admit, is not yet perfect, may be improved into a law, from which the nation will receive great advantages, by which our trade will be extended, and our riches increased.

Many of the clauses, my lords, may, in my opinion, admit of an easy vindication, others may be amended by very slight alterations, and very few are either wholly useless, or manifestly improper.

The chief defect of the first clause is such, that the noble lord has, by declaring his disapprobation of it, given a very uncommon proof of his integrity, disinterestedness, and moderation; for it is imperfect only by placing too much confidence in the admiralty, which is left in full power to determine the number of cruisers in or near the Channel and soundings.

The noble lord has remarked, that the act of queen Anne, on which the present bill is founded, exacted a determinate number of ships to be employed in this particular service, and that it was, therefore, more prudently drawn up than the present bill. But I cannot see the wisdom of diminishing the authority of the lord high admiral; for had that act been extended in the same manner to other services, it would have left him only the name and shadow of an office, without power and without use.

This clause, my lords, rightly understood, is only a declaration of confidence in his majesty's officers, an evident confession of their abilities to discern the interest of the publick, and of their zeal for the prosecution of it.

With as little reason, my lords, can it be objected, that the ships are required to be careened three times a-year. The necessity of careening frequently those ships, of which the chief use arises from their celerity, every sailor can declare to your lordships; nor will any man whom his employments or his amusements have made acquainted with navigation, allege that any thing is proposed in the bill, which it would not be detrimental to the publick service to neglect.

It has been objected by the noble lord, that they are directed to be careened oftener, if there be occasion; terms by which a discretionary power is implied, of which yet it does not appear in whose hands it is lodged. Let us consider, my lords, what inconvenience can arise from the clause as it now stands, and what corruption or negligence can be encouraged by it.

The discretionary right of bringing the ship into the ports to be careened oftener than thrice a-year, must be, without controversy, placed in the captain; for none but those that are in the ship can discover the necessity of careening it, or know the inconveniencies that are produced by the adhesion of extraneous substances to its sides and bottom.

I own, my lords, it may be objected, that every captain will, by this clause, be furnished with an excuse for deserting his station at pleasure; that under pretence of uncommon ardour to pursue the enemy, he may waste his time in endless preparations for expedition; that he may loiter in the port to careen his ship; that before it is foul he may bring it back again, and employ the crew in the same operation; and that our merchants may be taken at the mouth of the harbours in which our ships of war lie to be careened.

But, my lords, it is to be remembered, that in the third clause a commissioner is appointed, by whom accounts are regularly to be transmitted to the admiralty, of the arrival and departure of every ship, and by whom the conduct of every captain is to be inspected; and that he may easily detect such truant commanders, as shall careen their ships only for the sake of deserting their stations.

Nor can the merchants suffer by any negligence or corruption of the captains, because it is intended that the place of every ship returning into port shall be supplied by another; and that the same number shall be always in the same station, unless more important service makes them more necessary in another place.

This proviso, my lords, a proviso undoubtedly reasonable, is established in the second clause, but has not had the good fortune to escape the censure of the noble lord, who has inquired, what must be the conduct of the commanders of cruising vessels, if a seafight should happen beyond the cape, which they are in this clause forbidden to pass?

That the clause may admit of expressions not only more proper, but more agreeable to the intention of those by whom it was drawn up, I cannot deny; for I suppose it very far from their design to limit the operations of our navy to any part of the ocean, and am confident that they meant only that the cruisers should not be despatched to such a distance from their stations, as that our coasts should be left long unguarded, or the enemy have time to collect his forces, and pour his navies or his privateers upon our defenceless traders.

If by the commissioners mentioned in the third clause be intended a new swarm of officers, the proposition is such as I confess myself very far from approving; for it will be to little purpose that we protect the trade, if we invent new commissioners to devour its profits; nor can we hope for any other consequence from additional wealth, if it be procured by increasing the influence of the crown, but that we should become a more tempting prey to the harpies of a court.

But, my lords, to accomplish all that is intended by this clause, there is not any need of new officers; for there are not many ports in which ships of war can be commodiously careened, and perhaps there is not one which can be used for this purpose, in which there is not already some officer of the crown, whose employment allows him leisure sufficient for the execution of a new charge, and whose present salary will afford an ample recompense for some casual addition of employment.

The fourth clause, in which is provided that no commander shall wilfully spring his mast, or desert his station, is such as I should be willing, with the noble lord, to think unnecessary; but must appeal to your lordships, whether the late conduct of the convoys has not too evidently shown the defect of our present establishment.

The injuries, my lords, which the publick may suffer by the negligence of the commanders of the ships of war, are such as it is worthy of the legislature to obviate with the utmost caution; and, therefore, it is by no means improper to enact a punishment for those who shall, upon any false pretences, leave their station; for though such neglect of duty is, in the present state of our naval establishment, considered as disreputable and irregular, yet it does not appear that it has been censured with the detestation which it deserves, or punished with the severity necessary to its prevention.

It is observed, my lords, with relation to the following paragraph, that either house may, at present, require accounts of the conduct of the captains of the navy, and that, therefore, it is unnecessary to provide, by any new law, that they shall be laid before them; but if it be considered, my lords, how many inquiries, which we have a right to make, are year after year constantly omitted, and how many may be excited by curiosity to read accounts which lie before them, who yet will not move the house to demand the accounts, or engage in the debate which such a motion may produce, it will not be thought unnecessary to provide, that they shall be subject to examination without the formality of a regular vote.

As to the sixth clause, my lords, which regards the nomination of convoys at a certain time, I can discover no reasonable objection to such a provision, or none that can preponderate against the advantages which may arise from it. By the certain establishment of convoys, the value of insurance may be nearly fixed; merchants will know what confidence is to be reposed in the force of the ships, and, what they have, perhaps, had of late equal reason to examine, how much trust can be placed in the fidelity of the commanders.

The nomination of convoys, my lords, is, in my opinion, more likely to affright our enemies, and to deter their attempts, than to encourage them by the information which it will afford them; for nothing but our own negligence can conceal from us the naval strength of any power on earth; and we may always, while we are careful to preserve our maritime superiority, protect our merchants so powerfully, that none of our enemies shall be incited to attack them by the knowledge of the number and force of the ships appointed for their defence.

I come now, my lords, to the seventh clause; and surely to ascertain the duties of the captains to whose protection our trading vessels are intrusted, cannot appear superfluous to any of your lordships, who have read the lists of our losses, heard the complaints of our merchants, or made any inquiry into the conduct of our sea captains. There is, I fear, too much reason to believe, that some of them have, with premeditated design, deserted the traders in places where they have known them most exposed to the incursions of the enemy; and it is to the last degree evident, that others have manifested such contempt of the merchants, and such a disregard of their interest, as may most justly expose them to the suspicion of very criminal negligence, of negligence which no community can be too watchful against, or too severely punish.

It has been affirmed by the noble lord, that it is not equitable to subject the commanders of convoys to penalties for the loss of the trading vessels, which may, perhaps, either rashly or negligently quit their protection. That it is not reasonable to subject them to penalties, is undoubtedly true; but, my lords, it is far from being equally certain, that it is not just to expose them to a trial, in a case in which it must be almost impossible to determine falsely; in a case where the crews of, perhaps, twenty ships may be called as witnesses of their conduct, and where none, but those whose ship is lost, can be under the least temptation to offer a false testimony against them.

On this occasion, my lords, it may not be improper to obviate the objection produced by the seeming omission of penal sanctions, which is only another proof of implicit confidence in the officers of the admiralty, who have already the power, allowed to military courts, of proceeding against those who shall deviate from their orders. This power, which is in a great degree discretionary, it was thought improper to limit, by ascertaining the punishment of crimes, which so many circumstances may aggravate or diminish; and, therefore, in my opinion, this clause is far from being so defective as the noble lord represented it.

The last three clauses, by which the ships in America are prohibited to leave their station, by which it is required that accounts should be once in six months transmitted to the admiralty, and by which the captains are subjected to the command of the governours of our colonies, are, in my opinion, justly to be censured. The first is impossible to be observed, the second is unnecessary, and the third will probably produce more inconveniencies than benefits.

Thus, my lords, I have endeavoured to show, that this bill, though not perfect, is yet such as, with some emendations, may produce great advantages to the traders of this empire. For, though it is undoubtedly a just observation, that the success of military attempts cannot be promoted by rigid restrictions and minute regulations, yet it is equally certain that no nation has yet been so fortunate as to be served by men of integrity superiour to laws, or of wisdom superiour to instructions; and every government has found it necessary to direct the conduct of its officers by general rules, though they have been allowed to comply with particular circumstances, and to give way to sudden accidents.

I think it, therefore, my lords, necessary to propose, that this bill shall be more particularly examined in a committee, that, after having received the necessary explanations and amendments, it may be referred again to the other house.

Lord DELAWARE rose next, and spoke to the purpose following:—My lords, the noble duke has, by his arguments in favour of this bill, given a very eminent proof of great abilities; he has shown every clause in that light which may least expose to view its improprieties and defects; but has at length only shown, that it is not impossible to make a useful law, for the purposes mentioned in the title of this bill; not that any of the expedients, now proposed, will afford the desired advantage to the publick, or obviate any of the inconveniencies of which the traders have been so long and so importunately complaining.

This bill, my lords, is, indeed, founded upon a law made in a reign celebrated for the wisdom of our conduct and the success of our arms; but it will not, I suppose, be asserted, that nothing was, even in that period, ill conducted; nor will it be an argument, sufficient for the justification of an expedient, that it was practised in the victorious reign of queen Anne.

If we inquire into the consequences of that law, we shall find no inducement to revive it on this or any future occasion. For it had no other effect than that of exposing us to our enemies by dividing our forces; a disadvantage of which we soon found the effects, by the loss of two large ships of seventy guns, and of a multitude of trading vessels, which, by that diminution of our naval armament, necessarily fell into the hands of privateers and small cruisers, that ravaged the ocean without fear or molestation.

If we examine the present establishment of our navy, my lords, it will be discovered, that nothing is proposed in this bill, which is not more efficaciously performed by the methods now in use, and more judiciously established by laws, of which long experience has shown the usefulness. This, my lords, will easily appear from the perusal of the orders which every commander of a convoy regularly receives, and of the printed rules, established by his majesty in council, for the royal navy.

In these, my lords, much more is comprehended than can properly be inferred in a law not occasionally variable; nor do I think any thing omitted, which an experienced and candid inquirer will think useful to the increase of our naval strength, or necessary to the protection of our commerce.

In considering this bill, I shall not trouble your lordships with a minute consideration of every single paragraph, though every paragraph might furnish opportunity for animadversions; but shall content myself with endeavouring to evince the reasonableness of some of the objections made by the noble lord who spoke first, and enforcing his opinion with such arguments as have occurred to me, though, indeed, it requires no uncommon sagacity to discover, or superiour skill in ratiocination to prove, that where this bill will produce any alteration in our present scheme, it will manifestly change it for the worse.

For surely, my lords, it will not be necessary to show, by any elaborate and refined reasoning, the absurdity of confining cruisers to particular stations, with an absolute prohibition to depart from them, whatever may be the certainty of destruction, or prospect of advantage.

If the intention of cruising ships is to annoy the enemies of the nation, ought they to be deprived of the liberty of pursuing them? If they are designed for the protection of our merchants, must they not be allowed to attend them till they are out of danger.

Every one, my lords, has had opportunities of observing, that there are men who are wholly engrossed by the present moment, and who, if they can procure immoderate profit, or escape any impending danger, are without the least solicitude with regard to futurity, and who, therefore, live only by the hour, without any general scheme of conduct, or solid foundation of lasting happiness, and who, consequently, are for ever obliged to vary their measures, and obviate every new accident by some new contrivance.

By men of this disposition, my lords, a temper by which they are certainly very little qualified for legislators, the bill now before us seems to have been drawn up; for their attention is evidently so engaged by the present occurrences, that there is no place left for any regard to distant contingencies. The conclusion of this war is to them the period of human existence, the end of all discord and all policy. They consider Spain as the only enemy with whom we can ever be at variance, and have, therefore, drawn up a law, a law without any limitation of time, to enable us to oppose her. They have with great industry and long searches discovered, that cruisers on this side cape Finisterre, may be of use against the Spaniards, and propose, therefore, that in all times of war they are to be despatched to that individual station, though we should be engaged in disputes with the northern crowns, or fit out fleets to make conquests in the East Indies.

In all our wars, my lords, however judiciously concerted, and however happily concluded, the pleasures of success have been abated by the mortification of losses, and some complaints have been at all times mingled with the shouts of triumph. How much soever the glory of the nation has been elevated, the fortunes of particular persons have been impaired, and those have never thought themselves recompensed by the general advantages of the publick, who have suffered by the acquisition of them; they have always imagined themselves marked out for ruin by malevolence and resentment, and have concluded that those disasters which fell upon them only by the common chance of war, were brought on them by negligence or design.

The losses of our merchants in the present war must be acknowledged to have been more than common, but if we examine accurately into the causes that may be assigned for so great a number of captures, we shall find them such as this law will have no tendency to remove, such as might be easily imagined before the commencement of hostilities, and such as it will be extremely difficult on any future occasion of the same kind, to hinder from producing the same effects.

The first and greatest cause, my lords, of the number of our losses, is the number of our ships, which cannot all be sufficiently protected. The extent, therefore, of our commerce, in proportion to that of our enemies, exposes us to double disadvantage; we necessarily lie open in more parts to the depredations of privateers, and have no encouragement to attempt reprisals, because they have few ships of value to be seized. The profit of our commerce naturally withholds our sailors from our ships of war, and makes part of our navy an idle show; the certainty of plunder incites them to turn their merchant ships into cruisers, and to suspend their trade for more profitable employment. Thus they at once increase the number of plunderers, and take away from us the opportunity of repairing our losses by the same practice.

And, my lords, if the losses of our merchants have been greater than in former wars, our trade is more extensive, and our ships far more numerous. Nor is it to be forgotten that a very important part of our commerce is carried on before the eyes of the Spaniards, so that they may issue out upon our merchants from their own coasts, and retire immediately beyond danger of pursuit.

But, my lords, neither the situation of Spain, nor the extent of our commerce, would have made this war so destructive, had not our merchants sometimes facilitated the attempts of our enemies by their own negligence or avarice.

I have been informed, my lords, that as the masters of trading vessels complain of having been deserted by their convoys, the captains of the ships of war have, in their turn, exhibited such representations of the conduct of the trading masters, as may prove that their caution is not proportioned to their clamour, and that in however melancholy terms they may recount the miseries of captivity, the calamities of ruined families, and the interruption of the trade of Britain, they will not endeavour to escape their enemies at the expense of much circumspection, and that the prospect of no large profit will be sufficient to overbalance the danger of those evils which they so pathetically lament.

It is not uncommon, my lords, when the fleet has entered the open seas, for the traders to take different courses both from the convoy and from each other, and to disperse themselves beyond the possibility of receiving assistance in danger or distress; and what wonder is it if part of them be lost, since only part of them can be protected?

It may be imagined, my lords, that this is only an excuse forged by the commanders to cover their own negligence or treachery. It may be asked, what motives could induce the merchants to expose themselves to unnecessary dangers, or what proofs they have ever given of such wild negligence of their own interest or safety, as that they should be suspected of rushing precipitately into the jaws of rapine?

This, my lords, is an objection specious in itself, and such as those who have not inquired into the present state of our traffick will not very readily discover to be fallacious; but it may easily be removed, by showing that the danger of being taken by the enemy is generally not so great to those who have the direction of the ship as it is commonly believed.

By the present custom of insurance, my lords, the merchant exempts himself from the hazard of great losses, and if he insures so much of the value of the ship and cargo, that the chance of arriving first at market is equivalent to the remaining part, what shall hinder him from pressing forward at all events, and directing his course intrepidly through seas crowded with enemies?