In August, 1914, he went with the B.E.F. to France. After the First Battle of Ypres Sir Douglas Haig was promoted full general for distinguished service, and in December, on the formation of armies, was selected to be the commander of the First Army, then newly formed. In that command, under the orders of Sir John French, he fought Neuve Chapelle, Aubers Ridge, Festubert, and Loos.
When, on December 22, 1915, Sir Douglas Haig took over the command of the British Armies in France, on the removal of Sir John French, he had many great problems to face. His first efforts were directed towards the reorganisation, training, and reinforcement of the British forces in the France and Flanders theatre of war. Nothing from without − political, military, or popular − diverted his purpose from the prosecution of direct war while he remained the commander. He could be dismissed, but that was the affair of higher authority. His duty was for the day and the days to come.
His powers were set to a test at an early date. The Germans, ever alive to vital points in war, began an intensive attack on Verdun, a citadel recognised as of primary importance in the War on the Western Front. In the defence of that place the French had to exert the greatest military effort they made in the War. That effort was great in every sense of the word, but it was not sufficient to avert disaster to the Allies if it was to be fought alone. A support for the French in that defence was obviously necessary, and that support was promptly given by Sir Douglas Haig.
In cooperation with Joffre, with whom he was always in the closest sympathy, he began his preparations for the great series of the battles of the Somme. The sector of attack was selected with a high degree of military wisdom that relief might be given to Verdun, that the Allies in other theatres of war might be assisted, and that the German strength in front − never slight in the face of British troops − might be worn down. His former skill as a Staff officer was displayed in his direction of the very complicated preparations for battle. With a full knowledge of the great issues, he gave his firm support to those engaged in matters which those outside might consider to be minor detail, and yet are in themselves the seed of victory. There were then no solutions for the apparent deadlock of siege warfare, save, possibly, direct attack. The method of direct attack was chosen, accompanied by an artillery support previously unknown in the annals of war.
The great effort failed in many ways, but its failure was in the main due to climatic conditions. Yet the effort was in one important sense not a failure − it served to save Verdun, and it broke the spirit of the German Army, which entered the battle at the zenith of its efficiency and enthusiasm. It was a great venture, and it cost many lives − a cost which humanity is apt to remember without admitting the profit. In the judgment of history it may be that the country will recognise the wisdom and discount the cost. The Somme over, there was a disposition on the part of those who did not understand its effect on the enemy to criticise the Commander-in-Chief. He was accused of being reckless of life; and he was blamed for his supposedly premature use of the tanks on September 15.
Immediately after the Somme, Haig began his preparations for a new offensive. He still believed that a “break-through” was possible. The Arras offensive, designed for the early spring in that year, was modified into a relatively minor attack over a front of 15 miles from Vimy Ridge southwards to Croisilles. The same attention to initial preparations was made, and the same early success was attained. The weather again took its share in the decision, and an early burst of success ended in a dreary series of days of heavy bombardment, in which the vast losses outweighed the territory gained.
Arras over, the long-contemplated attack on Messines was undertaken. It was admittedly a perfect battle of its kind, and the Commander-in-Chief deserves his share of credit in an enterprise which needed the support of his authority at a time when his popular reputation was declining. Success − complete success − attended the effort, and there was a general revival of spirit throughout the armies in France.
Yet at this moment of success a period of gloom was beginning for the Allies. Certain French troops, dissatisfied with their leaders, failed, whole divisions refusing to go to the front and to obey the orders of their officers. It was an ugly episode, but it was overcome by tact and decision. In the task of maintaining the line and keeping the Germans engaged, Haig and the British troops took a great part. In June, 1917, prompt preparations were made for the series of operations now known as the Battles of Ypres, 1917. Here, again, there was a minor degree of tactical success attended by very great loss. Miles of territory were nibbled away in nearly three months of action, but the German reserves were sent to the Dutch frontier to meet the expected arrival of the British from that direction. The weather again played its deadly part, the ground became a quagmire, and the mechanical weapons on which, properly, so much store was set failed in their task.
In March, 1918, came the great test of the War. The Germans, aided by climatic conditions − the weather, it seemed, never failed them in the operations of war − overran large sectors of the British front. At each point the Allied troops fell back, and there was consternation among the general public. On the other hand, there was definite confidence at General Headquarters. It was known that in so swift an advance the Germans must overreach themselves, and that ultimately, after two or three such offensives, victory must be in the hands of the Allies. To ensure complete cooperation of the Allies, at Haig’s suggestion Foch was now given supreme command. At the darkest hour, on April 12, in the second German offensive, on the Lys, against Kemmel, Sir Douglas issued his “backs to the wall” order.
Thenceforward the tale is no less complicated, but it deals with victory. Haig had his plans, and, after due consideration, in almost every case Foch adopted them in preference to his own. There was a mass of heavy fighting, but in each stage it was inspired, so far as the British troops were concerned, by Haig. There were no mistakes, and future generations may turn to the military record of that year with pride, not only in the British troops, but in their commander, who had borne without complaint the stress of the years that had passed. There will be credit for Lord Haig in the earlier years of his effort, but in military achievement in the field his reputation may well rest on his share in the history of the last months of the War, when the fate of nations was in the balance, and when he never lost heart.
When Haig came home after the War was over he might have claimed any appointment in the gift of his fellow-countrymen. But he had marked out the course he meant to pursue – namely, to devote himself to the interests of ex-Service officers and men. He began a determined, and in the end successful, attempt to group together all ex-Service men into a single organisation, which should be non-political and non-sectarian, and in which officers and men should find a common opportunity of serving the country in peace as they had served her together in war.
The British Legion is essentially the work of one man, Haig. It is a work carried through in the face of no little doubt and suspicion in its early days, but the fact that the work of demobilisation, and after that the yet vaster work of absorption of the discharged millions of the Army, went through without active civil commotion is very largely due to the work that Haig did in 1919 and 1920 in giving the ex-Service men an object to work for; and thereafter, when the Legion had been formed, in directing its activities into right and worthy channels.
Sir Douglas Haig’s return with his Army commanders after the War, in December, 1918, was celebrated with great public rejoicings. In March, 1919, he was appointed to be Field-Marshal Commanding-in-Chief the Forces of Great Britain, a post which was abolished in 1920. Many honours were conferred on him. Twelve Universities gave him honorary degrees, including Oxford, where his old college, Brasenose, had already made him an honorary Fellow. He was installed as Rector of St. Andrews, and was later elected Chancellor. Many cities and boroughs conferred on him their honorary freedom. He had been made a Knight of the Thistle in 1917, the year of his promotion to field marshal, and in June, 1919, he received the honour of the Order of Merit, while all the Allies conferred on him high decorations. From France he received the Médaille Militaire, the greatest distinction available for a foreign general.
On August 6, 1919, a vote, including £100,000 to Sir Douglas Haig, was moved in the House of Commons by Mr. Lloyd George, then Prime Minister. In 1921 Bemersyde House and fishings, on the River Tweed, were presented to Lord Haig by his fellow-countrymen in the Empire in recognition of his services in the War, and he thus became 29th Laird of Bemersyde.
Lord Haig is survived by his widow and four children. He is succeeded by his only son, Viscount Dawick, who was born in March, 1918. His daughters are Lady Alexandra Henrietta Louise, for whom Queen Alexandra was sponsor, Lady Victoria Doris Rachel, for whom Princess Victoria was sponsor, and Lady Irene Violet Janet Haig.
Richard Burdon,
Lord Haldane
Lawyer, philosopher, and one of the greatest of all war ministers
20 August 1928
Lord Haldane, whose death we announce this morning, possessed one of the most powerful, subtle, and encyclopædic intellects ever devoted to the public service of this country. He was a lawyer whose profound learning broadened instead of narrowing his sympathies, a philosopher of distinction, an apostle of education, and an admin-istrator of equal courage and efficiency. The work for which, as Secretary of State for War, he was chiefly responsible is among the most important in the annals of the War Office, and his service on the Woolsack, which he occupied for two periods, gives him high rank among the long and distinguished roll of the Lord Chancellors of England.
Because his visit to Germany in 1912 did not lead him to anticipate the War of 1914, he was at the outbreak of hostilities, at the very moment when his work of Army organisation was bearing its most brilliant fruit, violently attacked, and his own sayings were distorted to give colour to the accusations. Extravagantly unjust though this campaign against him was, it did not fail of effect, and he became extremely unpopular. Some of those colleagues who shared with him responsibility for the advice offered to the nation and the conduct of its affairs between 1912 and 1914 failed to give him, when he most needed it, the support which he had every right to expect of them, and when the First Coalition was formed, with Mr. Asquith as Prime Minister, in 1915, Lord Haldane was not included in the Government. He did not return to power for eight years, emerging at last as the first Labour Lord Chancellor. His adherence was, at the outset, of considerable value to a party without administrative experience and his advice was continually sought, but his new associates were not bound to him by such strong ties of temperament, manner, or opinion as make for enduring confidence.
That he was, at more than one stage of his career, unfortunate in his friends, few will deny; that he was subjected, during the early stages of the War, to ignorant or malicious abuse, is clear to all who are able to distinguish between disloyalty and misjudgment. But he suffered more than most men would have suffered in the same circumstances, for he had a manner in his own defence which was the worst of weapons against the calumnies of the market-place, and did little to conciliate his more reasoning critics. This appearance of aloof tactlessness was due, in part, to his voice, which was not well suited to eloquence, but even more to something within himself which, while it raised him in intellect far above most of his contemporaries, made him almost a stranger to the workings of the general mind of England. He was a subtle thinker who found it hard to understand − and unfortunately allowed his audience to become aware of his difficulty in understanding − why others did not think as subtly as he.
By nature a metaphysician and by profession a lawyer, he had an exact and an exacting mind, and, though he was in private a kindly and generous man who was neither unduly puffed up by success nor soured by misfortune, he was, in public, singularly without those qualities, good and bad − qualities of ease and warmth and humour on the one hand, of flattery and smooth persuasion on the other − which endear a politician to the masses and, perhaps, to more exalted audiences as well. He had, in short, a seeming tendency, when engaged in controversy, to treat the world as a class-room which made it at once intolerant of his mistakes and less grateful than it might otherwise have been for his high administrative and intellectual services.
Richard Burdon Haldane was born on July 30, 1856, of Scottish and Northumbrian stock. His father, Robert Haldane, belonged to an old Scottish family, and was a Writer to the Signet in Edinburgh. His mother, who died on May 21, 1925, in her 101st year, was a daughter of Richard Burdon-Sanderson, a country gentleman with property in Northumberland, and a great-niece of Lords Stowell and Eldon. Haldane was educated at Edinburgh and Gottingen Universities, obtaining first-class honours in philosophy at Edinburgh, and the Gray and Ferguson scholarships open to the four Scottish Universities.
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