England, Canada and the Great War

On the 12th of February, Lord Lansdowne answered Lord Derby that the Dominion Government was ready to approve recruiting in Canada for service in Egypt or elsewhere, provided that the men would be enlisted under the authority of the Imperial Army Discipline Act, and the expense paid by the Imperial Treasury.

It consequently follows from the above despatches that the Soudanese campaign offered to many officers of our volunteer Militia the long wished for opportunity to freely tender their services to the Imperial Government; that the British authorities never applied to the Canadian Government, then presided by Sir John A. Macdonald, for armed support in Soudanese Africa; that, on being officially informed of the offers of service received by His Excellency the Governor General, the Colonial Secretary, before accepting or declining them, enquired if the Canadian Government sanctioned and recommended them; that the Governor General answered him in the affirmative, the recruiting to be made according to the Imperial Military Act at the expense of the Imperial exchequer.

On the 16th of February, the War Minister, then the Marquis of Hartington, informed the Colonial Secretary that he had come to the conclusion to decline with thanks the offers of service from Canada, for the reason that it would have taken too long a time to recruit and organize the regiments offered by General Laurie and Colonel Williams.

Was I not right, when I refuted Mr. Bourassa's assertion, in saying that if a refusal was then given, it was by the British Government who had received the freely tendered services, and not by the Canadian Government, to whom no demand of armed support had been made by Great Britain?

If it is indeed very astonishing that Mr. Bourassa should have taken the responsibility to affirm that the Government of Sir John A. Macdonald had refused to help Great Britain in the Soudanese campaign, it is easy to understand his object in so doing. His purpose was to convince his French Canadian readers that the political leaders at the head of the Government, in 1899 and 1914, together with the Canadian Parliament, had, in a revolutionary way, reversed the traditional policy of Canada of non-intervention in the "wars of the Empire" —les guerres de l'empire. And to achieve his end, so detrimental to the best interests of the Dominion, he did not hesitate to draw an absolutely erroneous conclusion from undeniable historical facts.

The "Nationalist" leader was very anxious to charge the chieftains of the two great political parties with an equal responsibility for what he terms a "Revolution" in our relations with the Mother Country. With this object constantly in view, he pretended that the intervention of Canada in the South African War created the precedent which brought about the Dominion participation in the European war, in 1914. In order to stir up to the utmost the prejudices of the French Canadians, he boldly qualified the South African conflict as an infamous crime on the part of England.

Unfortunately, the true history of the difficulties which culminated in the Boer War of 1899, was at the time little known throughout Canada, and even less particularly in the Province of Quebec. At the outbreak of the struggle, wishing to form a sound opinion of the causes of which it was the direct outcome, I made an exhaustive study of the South African question, beginning at the very inception of the Dutch settlement dating as far back as 1652, the year during which the Dutch East India Company occupied Table Bay. Six years later, in 1658, French Huguenots reached South Africa, joining with the Dutch Reformists, who rather energetically did all they could to assimilate them. Still later on, besides some few German immigrants, a third group of Europeans settled on the African coast. They were Englishmen.

All the Europeans, on landing in South Africa, few in numbers, had at once to contend with the black race numbering many millions. The history of the long struggle between European civilization, represented by the English and Dutch immigrants, and African barbarity, is indeed very interesting. Carefully read and studied in all its bearings, it strongly impressed upon my mind the conviction that had it not been for the timely armed protection they often solicited and received from England, the Dutch Boers would certainly have been annihilated by the tribes of the black race. They could not hope to successfully resist the onslaughts to which they were repeatedly submitted. They were saved from utter destruction by the strong arm of Great Britain, occupying an important strategical position by her Cape Colony. The British Government had favoured the settlement of the sons of England in South Africa, for the purpose of assuring, by a powerful naval station, the freedom of communication with the great regions soon to develop into her vast Indian Empire.

How, and under what circumstances, was British Sovereignty established in South Africa? I considered this question the most important to ascertain, in order to judge fairly the history of the last century in those regions. It was settled by the Peace Congress of Vienna, in 1815. All the European nations represented at that congress, have sanctioned British Sovereignty in South Africa upon the condition of the payment by England to the Kingdom of the Netherlands, of which Holland was then a part, of the sum of $30,000,000. Consequently the Sovereign Rights of Great Britain in South Africa were henceforth undeniable.

In my French book, I somewhat extensively summarized the development of the British and Dutch groups of settlers in South Africa. It is well known that the Boers are of Dutch origin. That a rivalry did develop between the two national elements, is not to be wondered at by any one having some knowledge of the history of the world.

I do not consider it necessary to go at any length in relating the vicissitudes of the conflict between the aspirations of the Boer element and the undoubted rights of British suzerainty. As a rule they are sufficiently well known by my English readers.

But I wish to emphasize the two undeniable facts: first, that throughout this protracted contest, England did perseveringly try to favour South Africa with the largest possible measure of political liberty. Second, that the crisis was finally brought about by the persistent determination of the Government of Pretoria to refuse justice to the Uitlanders and to the British capitalists who, at the urgent request of President Kruger, had invested many millions in the development of the very valuable mines recently discovered in the Transvaal territory.

Though England had agreed to the establishment of the two Republics of the Transvaal and Orange, she had maintained her suzerainty on those territories, which suzerainty the Government of Pretoria had again recognized by the Convention of 1884.

The most convincing proof that England did not intend any unfair design against the South African Republics, is the fact that she did not prepare to resist the armed attack of the Government of Pretoria which could be easily foreseen by the intense organization they were evidently making to impose Boer supremacy in South Africa.

In his very unjust appreciation of the policy of Great Britain in South Africa, Mr. Bourassa kept no account whatever of the very important fact that war was declared against England by the South African Republic. How could Great Britain have been guilty of a hideous crime in not bowing to the dictate of President Kruger and his Government, as the "Nationalist" leader said, is beyond comprehension.

England was absolutely within her right in accepting the challenge of the Government of Pretoria, and fighting to maintain her flag and her Sovereignty in South Africa.

Fortunately, the South African War, characterized by deeds of heroism on both sides, has had the most satisfactory conclusion. It is to be hoped that for many long years the future of that great country is settled with all the blessings that political liberty and free institutions will surely confer on that important part of the British Empire. The Boers themselves have fully recognized that their own national development cannot be better guaranteed and safeguarded than by the powerful Sovereignty pledged to their protection, on the only condition of their loyal allegiance to the flag waving on the fair land where they can multiply in peace, prosperity and happiness. The enthusiasm and the admirable courage with which they have rallied to the support of Great Britain and her Allies in the present war, is the best evidence how much they appreciate the advantages of their new conditions in the great South African Dominion destined to such a grand future.

I most sincerely deplore the persistent efforts of the "Nationalist" leader to pervert more and more the mind of my French Canadian countrymen by his so very unfair appreciation of the nature of the South African conflict. It was with the hope of counteracting them that I introduced a special chapter in my French edition explaining, as fully as I could, though in a condensed form, the South African question.

The assertion that the participation of Canada in the present European war was the sequence of the precedent of our intervention in the South African struggle, is also most injustifiable and untenable. Had Canada taken no part whatever in the South African War, it would not have made the least difference with regard to the decision of the Canadian people to support Great Britain and the Allies in their gigantic effort to put an end to Prussian terrorism. The assertion which I most emphatically contradict could have no other object but to prejudice the public mind against Canadian intervention in any of the wars of the Empire —les guerres de l'empire.

CHAPTER XIII.

British and German Aspirations Compared

In the attempt to justify his opposition to the Canadian armed support of the Allies' cause, Mr. Bourassa repeatedly asserted that Great Britain was as much as Germany aspiring to rule the whole world. He pretends that there is no difference between Anglo-Saxonism and Germanism.

How unjust and dangerous is such a doctrine is evident to any fair minded man. It was no doubt calculated to prejudice the French Canadians against Great Britain, by telling them that the sacrifices they were called upon to make were imposed upon them only to favour the British determination to reach the goal of her ambition: – universal domination.

I strongly repudiated such assertions and vindicated England's course and policy.

To accuse Great Britain to aspire to universal domination is a most unwarranted charge, contradicted by the whole history of the last century during which she was the most determined supporter of peace.

Though one of the great Powers of the world, England never undertook to organize a large standing army. How could she aspire to the world's domination without a complete military organization comprising many millions of men, is what I am unable to understand.

Mr. Bourassa's argument to prove his assertion is based on the efforts of England to maintain and develop her naval forces so as to guarantee her supremacy on the high seas of the world. How he failed to realize that Great Britain, on account of her insular position, close to the European continent, is by nature itself bound, of sheer necessity, to protect herself by the strength of her military naval power, is beyond comprehension. Supremacy on the seas is for the Mother Country a mere question of national existence, – to be or not to be. But supremacy on the seas cannot, and will never, permit England to attain anything like universal domination. And why? For the obvious reason that Great Britain is not, and never can become, a continental Power, in the exact sense of the word.

I explained, conclusively, I believe, that the case would be very different if Germany succeeded in her efforts to supplant England's supremacy on the seas. When the Berlin Government undertook to build a huge military fleet, Germany was the greatest continental military Power. What were her expectations when she adopted that threatening naval policy? The Berlin authorities were very confident that when they would decide to bring on the great war for which they had been strenuously preparing for half a century, they would in a few months have continental Europe at their feet and under their sway. Triumphant over Europe they would have at once dominated Asia and a great part of Africa. The next surest way for the German Empire to reach universal domination was to break England's power on the seas. What is impossible for England to accomplish, on account of her insular position, Germany, being a continental Empire, could achieve if she became mistress of the seas.

The present war is the proof evident that the mighty power of England on the seas has been the salvation of her national existence and, almost equally, that of France and Italy. It kept the oceans open for the trade of all the Allied and neutral nations. He is willingly blind, intellectually, the man who does not see that deprived of the matchless protection of her naval forces, Great Britain could be starved and subdued in a few months by an enemy ruling the waves against her.

Is it possible to suppose that any man aspiring to help moulding the public opinion of his countrymen, ignores that with the relatively small extent of the territory it can devote to agricultural production, Great Britain can never feed her actual population of over forty-five millions, most likely to reach sixty millions in the not very distant future. Consequently how unjust, how extravagant, is it to accuse England of any aspiration to dominate the world by means of the sacrifices she is absolutely bound to make for the only sake of her self-defence, her self-protection.

If he does not know, I will no doubt cordially oblige the "Nationalist" leader by informing him that Great Britain, usually importing food products to the amount of seven to eight hundred millions of dollars, for many years past, required as much as a billion dollars worth of them in the war year of 1915. It is so easy to foresee that the continual increase of the population of the United Kingdom, by the new large developments which will surely follow the war in all industrial, commercial and financial pursuits, will cause a relative increase in the importations of food products likely to reach, and even exceed before long, an average total annual value of a billion and a quarter dollars.

None of the European continental Powers has the same imperious reasons as England to take the proper means to guarantee her control of the seas. How is it then that Germany is the only Power to object to England's policy, if it is not for the ultimate object to attain universal domination by the overthrow of Great Britain's ascendency on the wide oceans, which would permit her to realize her long cherished aim by the combined powerful effort of her gigantic military forces both on land and sea.

With regard to England's naval supremacy, the "Nationalist" leader is also committed to other opinions which I strongly contradicted. He entirely forgets that beyond the sea coast limits, well defined by International Law, no Sovereign rights can be claimed on the high seas. The navigation of the ocean is free to all nations by nature itself. Has any Government ever entertained the foolish idea that the broad Atlantic could, for instance, be divided into so many parts as the European, Asiatic, or American continents, over which several States could exercise Sovereign powers? No Chinese Wall can be built on the seas.

My own view of the case, which I believe to be the correct one, is that England's naval supremacy means nothing more nor less than the police of the seas, and the protection of the flags of all the Nations navigating them, besides being, of course and necessarily, the guarantee of her National existence.

Blind also, intellectually, is the British subject not sufficiently inspired by the true sense of the duties of Loyalty, who does not understand that once Great Britain's maritime power would be crushed and the United Kingdom either conquered or obliged to an humiliating peace which would ruin all her future prospects, the Colonial Empire would equally be at the mercy of the victorious enemy of the Mother Country.

With the most earnest conviction, I have tried, to the best of my ability, to persuade my French-Canadian compatriots of the inevitable dangers ahead if the false views which were so persistingly impressed upon their minds were ever to prevail, and the aim they undoubtedly favour to be realized.

Another argument widely used by our "Nationalist" School to influence the opinion of the French Canadians against Canada's participation in the war, was that Great Britain herself was not doing what she ought to win the victory. I have personally heard this false objection repeated by many – unconsciously of course – who were influenced in so saying by the "Nationalist" press.

No more unfair charge could have been made against England. I could not help being indignant at reading it, knowing as I did, by daily acquired information what an immense effort the United Kingdom had been making, from the very beginning of the hostilities, to play its powerful part in the great war into which it had nobly decided to enter to avenge its honour, to defend the Empire and the whole world against German barbarous militarism.

I have already commented on the immense service guaranteed to the Allied nations by the British fleet. To illustrate the wonderful and admirable military effort of Great Britain, I will quote some very important figures from the most interesting Report of the British War Cabinet, for the year 1917, presented to Parliament by Command of His Majesty.

Under the title "Construction and Supply" the Report says: —

During the past year the Naval Service has undergone continual expansion in order to enable it to meet every demand made upon it, not only in the seas surrounding these islands, but in the Mediterranean, the Persian Gulf, the Red Sea, the Arctic Ocean, the Pacific, and the Atlantic, where it has co-operated with the Naval forces of the Allies. The displacement tonnage of the Royal Navy in 1914 was 2,400,000 tons. To-day it has increased by 75 per cent. ( – making a total of 4,200,000 tons – ). The ships and vessels of all kinds employed in the Naval Service in September, 1914, after the whole of the mobilisation had been completed, had a tonnage of just over 4 million; now the figure is well over 6 million. Transports, fleet attendants and overseas oilers and similar auxiliary vessels at the outbreak of war numbered 23; the Admiralty to-day control nearly 700 such craft. The strength of the personnel, which was 145,000, has been increased to 420,000.

From these brief particulars regarding the ships and their manning, an estimate can be formed of the expansions that have been made in the auxiliary services, such as guns, torpedoes, munitions, and stores of all kinds, anti-submarine apparatus, mines, &c., and some idea is gained of the demands that have been made upon the great army of workers on shore, the men in the Royal dockyards and arsenals, in the shipyards, the engine shops, and the factories, without whose help the Fleet could not be maintained as a fighting force.

As regards warship and auxiliary ship construction, the output during the last 12 months has been between three and four times the average annual output for the few years preceding the war.

The Admiralty now control all the dry docks in the country… – 250 merchant ships are being repaired each week, either in dry dock or afloat.

Since the beginning of the war, 31,470 British war vessels have been placed in dock or on the slips ( – as many as 225 being repaired in one week – )… These figures do not include repair work carried out to the vessels of our Allies…

The Transport Service is of the highest importance in carrying on the war. What has been the achievement of England on that score? Under the title: – "Transportation" the War Cabinet Report proves its immensity as follows: —

The record of what has been done by the transport services for the Armies of the Allies shows a stupendous amount of work accomplished, which constitutes one of the brilliant achievements of the war. There had been transported overseas up till the end of August, 1917, the last date for which complete statistics are available – some: – 13 million human beings – combatants, wounded, medical personnel, refugees, prisoners, &c.; 2 million horses and mules; 1/2 million vehicles; 25 million tons of explosive and supplies for the armies; … 51 million tons of coal and oil fuel for the use of our Fleets, our Armies, and to meet the needs of our Allies.

The operations of the seas are on such a large scale that it is difficult to realize all that is involved in sea transportation; for example, over 7,000 personnel are transported, and more than 30,000 tons of stores and supplies have to be imported daily into France for the maintenance of our own army. About 567 steamers, of approximately 1 3/4 million tons, are continually employed in the service of carrying troops and stores to the Armies in France and to the forces in various theatres of war in the East.

We all know that the Berlin Government expected that the submarine campaign would result in an early final victory for the Central Empires. Herr von Bethmann Hollweg, then the Imperial Chancellor, said: – "The Blockade must succeed within a limited number of weeks, within which America cannot effectively participate in the operations."

How he was mistaken, and extravagant were his expectations, events have proved. This sentence is also proof evident that he realized how effective the United States effort would become, if the submarine campaign did not succeed within a few weeks.