The Oregon Question

The United States have the same right as Great Britain, and are equally bound, to protect their citizens residing in the Oregon territory, in the exercise of all the rights secured to them by the convention. It has been fully admitted that these rights embrace the right to settle in and over any part of the territory, and that they are to be, in all cases whatever, amenable only to the jurisdiction of their own country. The subjects of Great Britain, who are not in the employ of the Hudson Bay Company, are forbidden to trade with the natives; and the company does in fact control and govern all the British subjects residing in the territory. This gives a strong guaranty against the violation, by rash individuals, of the rights of the citizens of the United States. Should any of them, however, be disturbed in the exercise of their legitimate rights, and the company should be unable or unwilling to relieve and indemnify them, the United States would be justly entitled to appeal to the British Government for the redress of a violation of rights secured by the convention; for the British Government has preserved a control over the Hudson Bay Company, and does in fact, through it, govern the British subjects who reside in the territory.

The United States are placed, in that respect, in a very different situation. It is not believed that the General Government is authorized to incorporate, as a political body, a commercial company, with such powers as would give it an efficient control over the private citizens residing in the territory. Such delegation of powers, either by any of the States or by Congress, is wholly inconsistent with our institutions. The United States may indeed give to their citizens in Oregon a regular and complete judiciary system; and they may also extend to them, as the British Government has done on its part, the laws of an adjacent territory. But an executive local power is wanted in this case, as it is everywhere else, under any form of government whatever, to cause the laws to be executed, and to have that general control which is now exercised, through the Hudson Bay Company, by the British Government. There are, besides, various acts of a public though local nature, such as opening roads, making bridges, erecting block-houses for protection against the natives, providing for the destitute, &c., all which are performed by the Hudson Bay Company, and cannot be accomplished by insulated individuals, bound by no legal association or government.

Whether any measures may be devised, other than a territorial government, that will be sufficient for the purpose intended; whether all the American citizens residing in Oregon might not be incorporated and made a body politic, with powers equivalent to those vested in the Hudson Bay Company, and with the reservation by the General Government of a check or control analogous to that reserved by the Government of Great Britain, are questions worthy of serious consideration. But Great Britain has the same interest as the United States to prevent collision during the continuance of the convention; and it is believed that, if negotiations should be renewed, with an equal and sincere desire on both sides to preserve friendly relations, there would be no difficulty at this time in coming to an understanding on the subject. It would seem sufficient that this should be accompanied with provisions, preventing the possibility of the powers exercised by the United States being ever applied to British subjects, and with an explicit declaration that these powers should never be construed as an admission by Great Britain of any claim of the United States to exclusive sovereignty.

There is another important subject which has not, it is believed, ever been discussed by the two Powers. This is the claim to the ownership of the places settled and improved under the convention. It seems to me that, on the principles of both natural and international law, these rights, to a defined extent, should be respected by each Power respectively, whose sovereignty over the portion of the territory in which such improved settlements may be situated will ultimately be recognized. It appears also that the United States may, in conformity with the convention, and without affecting in any shape the claims advanced by Great Britain, pass a law declaring that they abandon or grant without warranty, to such of their citizens as shall have made actual and bonâ fide settlements in any part of Oregon, under the convention, all the rights of and claims to the ownership of the soil, on which such settlements shall have been made, which the United States may now or hereafter claim or acquire: limiting and defining the extent of the grant in the same manner as would be done if such grant was absolute; and promising that the title should be confirmed, in case and whenever the sovereignty of the United States was recognized or asserted and maintained.

The prolongation, in 1827, of the convention of 1818, was evidently intended as a temporary measure, since it was made revocable at the will of either party. The plenipotentiaries of the two Powers had been unable to agree on the terms of a definitive arrangement, or even in defining with precision the conditions on which the convention of 1818 might be continued for a determinate period. It will be seen, by reference to the protocols and correspondence, that, although it was generally admitted that neither party ought during such continuance to exercise any exclusive sovereignty over the territory, the American Plenipotentiary declined to agree to any convention containing an express provision to that effect, or accompanied by the insertion in the protocol of a declaration for the same purpose by the British Plenipotentiaries. The reason was not only because an exclusive right over Astoria and its dependencies was claimed by the United States, but principally because it was anticipated that, in order to have in fact an authority equal to that exercised by the Hudson Bay Company, it would become necessary for the United States to perform acts which the British Government might contend to be forbidden by such express provision or declaration. The consequence was, that the convention recognizes some certain rights, and imposes no positive restrictions but only such, as may be supposed to be implied in the clause which declares, that nothing contained in it should be construed to impair or affect the claims of either party. The probability that it might become necessary for the United States to establish a territory or some sort of government over their own citizens was explicitly avowed; the deficiencies of the renewed convention of 1827, and the inconveniences which might ensue, were fully understood; and the continuance of that of 1818, made revokable at will, was agreed on, with the hope that the two Powers would embrace an early opportunity, if not to make a definitive arrangement, at least to substitute for the convention another, defining with precision the acts which both parties should be allowed or forbidden to perform so long as the sovereignty remained in abeyance.

The inconveniences alluded to have been fairly stated in this paper, and some of the means by which they may be avoided have been suggested. It is not, therefore, on account of the intrinsic value of the convention that its abrogation is objectionable and dangerous. It is because nothing is substituted in its place; it is because, if the two Powers are not yet prepared to make a definitive agreement, it becomes the duty of both Governments, instead of breaking the only barrier which still preserves peace, to substitute for the existing convention one adapted to the present state of things, and which shall prevent collisions until the question of sovereignty shall have been settled. The inconveniences which were only anticipated have become tangible, from the time when American citizens, whom the United States are bound to protect, began to make settlements in the territory of Oregon. The sudden transition, from an agreement however defective to a promiscuous occupancy, without any provisions whatever that may prevent collisions, is highly dangerous. When this is accompanied by an avowed determination on the part of the United States to assume that exclusive sovereignty which Great Britain has positively declared she would resist, War becomes inevitable.

NUMBER V

It may not be possible to calculate, with any degree of certainty, the number of citizens of the United States who, aided by these various measures, will, within any given period, remove to the territory beyond the Stony Mountains. It is certain that this number will annually increase, and keep pace with the rapid increase of the population of the Western States. It cannot be doubted that ultimately, and at no very distant time, they will have possession of all that is worth being occupied in the territory. On what principle, then, will the right of sovereignty be decided?

It may, however, be asked whether, if this be the inevitable consequence of the continuance of the convention, England will not herself give notice that it shall be abrogated. It might be sufficient to answer that we must wait till that notice shall have been given, and the subsequent measures which England means to adopt shall have been made known to us, before we assume rashly a hostile position. The United States may govern themselves; although they may irritate Great Britain, they cannot control the acts of her Government. The British Government will do whatever it may think proper; but for the consequences that may ensue it will be alone responsible. Should the abrogation of the convention on her part be followed by aggressive measures; should she assume exclusive possession over Oregon or any part of it, as it is now proposed that the United States should do, America will then be placed in a defensive position; the war, if any should ensue, will be one unprovoked by her, a war purely of defence, which will be not only sustained, but approved by the unanimous voice of the nation. We may, however, be permitted to examine what motive could impel England, what interest she might have, either in annulling the convention or in adopting aggressive measures.

When it is recommended that the United States should give notice of the abrogation of the convention, it is with the avowed object of adopting measures forbidden by the convention, and which Great Britain has uniformly declared she would resist. But, according to the view of the subject uniformly taken by her, from the first time she asserted the rights she claims to this day, the simple abrogation of her convention with the United States will produce no effect whatever on the rights, relations, and position of the two Powers. Great Britain, from the date at least of Cook's third voyage, and prior to the Nootka convention, did deny the exclusive claim of Spain, and assert that her subjects had, in common with those of other States, the right freely to trade with the natives, and to settle in any part of the Northwestern coast of America, not already occupied by the subjects of Spain. The Nootka convention was nothing more than the acquiescence, on the part of Spain, in the claims thus asserted by Great Britain, leaving the sovereignty in abeyance. And the convention between the United States and Great Britain is nothing more nor less than a temporary recognition of the same principle, so far as the two parties were concerned. England had, prior to that convention, fully admitted that the United States possessed the same rights as were claimed by her. The abrogation of the convention by her will leave those rights precisely in the same situation as they now stand, and as they stood prior to the convention. It cannot therefore be perceived what possible benefit could accrue to Great Britain from her abrogation of that instrument; unless, discarding all her former declarations, denying all that she has asserted for more than sixty years, retracting her admission of the equal rights of the United States to trade, to occupy, and to make settlements in any part of the country, she should, without cause or pretext, assume, as is now threatened on the part of the United States, exclusive sovereignty over the whole or part of the territory. It may be permitted to believe that the British Government entertains no such intention.

It may also be observed that England has heretofore evinced no disposition whatever to colonize the territory in question. She has, indeed, declared most explicitly her determination to protect the British interests that had been created by British enterprise and capital in that quarter. But, by giving a monopoly of the fur trade to the Hudson Bay Company, she has virtually arrested private efforts on the part of British subjects. Her Government has been in every other respect altogether inactive, and apparently careless about the ultimate fate of Oregon. The country has been open to her enterprise at least fifty years; and there are no other British settlements or interests within its limits than those vested in, or connected with the Hudson Bay Company. Whether the British Government will hereafter make any effort towards that object cannot be known; but as long as this right to colonize Oregon shall remain common to both Powers, the United States have nothing to apprehend from the competition.

The negotiations on that subject between the two Governments have been carried on, on both sides, with perfect candor. The views and intentions of both parties were mutually communicated without reserve. The conviction on the part of America that the country must ultimately be occupied and settled by her agricultural emigrants, was used as an argument why, in case of a division of the territory, the greater share should be allotted to the United States. The following quotation, from the American statement of the case of December, 1826, proves that this expectation was fairly avowed at the time:

"If the present state of occupancy is urged on the part of Great Britain, the probability of the manner in which the territory west of the Rocky Mountains must be settled belongs also essentially to the subject. Under whatever nominal sovereignty that country may be placed, and whatever its ultimate destinies may be, it is nearly reduced to a certainty that it will be almost exclusively peopled by the surplus population of the United States. The distance from Great Britain, and the expense incident to emigration, forbid the expectation of any being practicable from that quarter but on a comparatively small scale. Allowing the rate of increase to be the same in the United States and in the North American British possessions, the difference in the actual population of both is such that the progressive rate which would, within forty years, add three millions to these, would within the same time give a positive increase of more than twenty millions to the United States. And if circumstances, arising from localities and habits, have given superior facilities to British subjects of extending their commerce with the natives, and to that expansion which has the appearance, and the appearance only, of occupancy, the slower but sure progress and extension of an agricultural population will be regulated by distance, by natural obstacles, and by its own amount."

There was no exaggeration in that comparative view; the superiority of the progressive increase of population in the United States was, on the contrary, underrated. The essential difference is, that migration from the United States to Oregon is the result of purely natural causes, whilst England, in order to colonize that country, must resort to artificial means. The number of American emigrants may not, during the first next ensuing years, be as great as seems to be anticipated. It will at first be limited by the amount of provisions with which the earlier settlers can supply them during the first year, and till they can raise a crop themselves; and the rapidity with which a new country may be settled is also lessened where maize cannot be profitably cultivated.

Whether more or less prompt, the result is nevertheless indubitable. The snowball sooner or later becomes an avalanche: where the cultivator of the soil has once made a permanent establishment game and hunters disappear; within a few years the fur trade will have died its natural death, and no vestige shall remain, at least south of Fuca's Straits, of that temporary occupancy, of those vested British interests, which the British Government is now bound to protect. When the whole territory shall have thus fallen in the possession of an agricultural industrious population, the question recurs, by what principle will then the right of sovereignty, all along kept in abeyance, be determined?

The answer is obvious. In conformity with natural law, with that right of occupancy for which Great Britain has always contended, the occupiers of the land, the inhabitants of the country, from whatever quarter they may have come, will be of right as well as in fact the sole legitimate sovereigns of Oregon. Whenever sufficiently numerous, they will decide whether it suits them best to be an independent nation or an integral part of our great Republic. There cannot be the slightest apprehension that they will choose to become a dependent colony; for they will be the most powerful nation bordering on the American shores of the Pacific, and will not stand in need of protection against either their Russian or Mexican neighbors. Viewed as an abstract proposition, Mr. Jefferson's opinion appears correct, that it will be best for both the Atlantic and the Pacific American nations, whilst entertaining the most friendly relations, to remain independent rather than to be united under the same Government. But this conclusion is premature; and the decision must be left to posterity.

It has been attempted in these papers to prove —

1. That neither of the two Powers has an absolute and indisputable right to the whole contested territory; that each may recede from its extreme pretensions without impairing national honor or wounding national pride; and that the way is therefore still open for a renewal of negotiations.

2. That the avowed object of the United States, in giving notice of the abrogation of the convention, is the determination to assert and maintain their assumed right of absolute and exclusive sovereignty over the whole territory; that Great Britain is fully committed on that point, and has constantly and explicitly declared that such an attempt would be resisted, and the British interests in that quarter be protected; and that war is therefore the unavoidable consequence of such a decisive step – a war not only necessarily calamitous and expensive, but in its character aggressive, not justifiable by the magnitude and importance of its object, and of which the chances are uncertain.

3. That the inconveniences of the present state of things may in a great degree be avoided; that, if no war should ensue, they will be the same, if not greater, without than under a convention; that not a single object can be gained by giving the notice at this time, unless it be to do something not permitted by the present convention, and therefore provoking resistance and productive of war. If a single other advantage can be gained by giving the notice, let it be stated.

4th. That it has been fully admitted by Great Britain that, whether under or without a convention, the United States have the same rights as herself, to trade, to navigate, and to occupy and make settlements in and over every part of the territory; and that, if this state of things be not disturbed, natural causes must necessarily give the whole territory to the United States.

Under these circumstances, it is only asked, that the subject may be postponed for the present; that Government should not commit itself by any premature act or declaration; that, instead of increasing the irritation and excitement which exist on both sides, time be given for mutual reflection, and for the subdual or subsidence of angry and violent feelings. Then, and then only, can the deliberate opinion of the American people on this momentous question be truly ascertained. It is not perceived how the postponement for the present and for a time can, in any shape or in the slightest degree, injure the United States.

It is certainly true that England is very powerful, and has often abused her power, in no case in a more outrageous manner than by the impressment of seamen, whether American, English, or other foreigners, sailing under and protected by the American flag. I am not aware that there has ever been any powerful nation, even in modern times, and professing Christianity, which has not occasionally abused its power. The United States, who always appealed to justice during their early youth, seem, as their strength and power increase, to give symptoms of a similar disposition. Instead of useless and dangerous recriminations, might not the two nations, by their united efforts, promote a great object, and worthy of their elevated situation?

With the single exception of the territory of Oregon, which extends from 42 to 54° 40´ north latitude, all the American shores of the Pacific Ocean, from Cape Horn to Behring's Straits, are occupied, on the north by the factories of the Russian Fur Company, southwardly by semi-civilized States, a mixture of Europeans of Spanish descent and of native Indians, who, notwithstanding the efforts of enlightened, intelligent, and liberal men, have heretofore failed in the attempt to establish governments founded on law, that might ensure liberty, preserve order, and protect persons and property. It is in Oregon alone that we may hope to see a portion of the western shores of America occupied and inhabited by an active and enlightened nation, which may exercise a moral influence over her less favored neighbors, and extend to them the benefits of a more advanced civilisation. It is on that account that the wish has been expressed that the Oregon territory may not be divided. The United States and England are the only Powers who lay any claim to that country, the only nations which may and must inhabit it. It is not, fortunately, in the power of either Government to prevent this taking place; but it depends upon them, whether they shall unite in promoting the object, or whether they shall bring on both countries the calamities of an useless war, which may retard but not prevent the ultimate result. It matters but little whether the inhabitants shall come from England or from the United States. It would seem that more importance might be attached to the fact that, within a period of fifteen years, near one million of souls are now added to the population of the United States by migrations from the dominions of Great Britain; yet, since permitted by both Powers, they may be presumed to be beneficial to both. The emigrants to Oregon, whether Americans or English, will be united together by the community of language and literature, of the principles of law, and of all the fundamental elements of a similar civilisation.

The establishment of a kindred and friendly Power on the North-west Coast of America is all that England can expect, all perhaps that the United States ought to desire. It seems almost incredible that, whilst that object may be attained by simply not impeding the effect of natural causes, two kindred nations, having such powerful motives to remain at peace, and standing at the head of European and American civilisation, should, in this enlightened age, give to the world the scandalous spectacle, perhaps not unwelcome to some of the beholders, of an unnatural and an unnecessary war; that they should apply all their faculties and exhaust their resources in inflicting, each on the other, every injury in their power, and for what purpose? The certain consequence, independent of all the direct calamities and miseries of war, will be a mutual increase of debt and taxation, and the ultimate fate of Oregon will be the same as if the war had not taken place.

APPENDIX

WAR EXPENSES

Those expenses may be arranged under three heads: 1st. Such as are of a permanent nature, and should be considered as belonging to the Peace establishment of the country. 2dly. Those which should be adopted when there is an impending danger of war. 3dly. Those which actual war renders necessary.

To the first class belong all those, which provide for objects that require considerable time to be executed, and cannot, without great difficulty, be accomplished pending a war. Such are fortifications, building ships of war including steamers, accumulating materials for the same purpose, Navy Yards, providing a sufficient artillery, and other important objects of the ordnance department. It may be taken for granted, that Government has done, or will do all that is necessary and practicable in that respect.

The preparatory measures which should be adopted, when there is danger of war, are those respecting which the greatest variety of opinions must be expected. It has been repeatedly asserted, that such is the structure of our Government, that it never will or can prepare for war, till after it has actually commenced; that is to say, that, because Congress was dilatory in making effectual provision for carrying on the last war against Great Britain, and because the Administration, at the time when it was declared, was inefficient and not well calculated for conducting it, the United States are bound for ever to incur, at the commencement of every war, the disasters of one or two years, before they can be induced to put on their armor. The past is irrevocable and of no other use, than as far as it may teach us to avoid the faults that were formerly committed. When our Government relies on the people for being sustained in making war, its confidence must be entire. They must be told the whole truth; and if they are really in favor of war, they will cheerfully sustain Government in all the measures necessary to carry it into effect. The frank annunciation of the necessity of such measures is called, "creating a panic." It is not the first time that under similar circumstances the same language has been held. If there be no danger or intention of making war, those create a panic, who proclaim a determination to assert the exclusive sovereignty of the United States over the whole contested territory, with the full knowledge that Great Britain has uniformly and explicitly declared, that she would resist any such attempt. If instead of telling the people the whole truth, the attempt to conceal from them the necessity of the measures requisite for carrying on the war should be successful, a reaction in the public sentiment will most certainly take place, whenever it will have become impossible to delay any longer the heavy burden of taxation, for which the Nation had not been prepared.

I will not dwell on the necessary preparations of a military character, otherwise than by referring to some notorious facts.

The primary causes of the disastrous results of the campaign of 1812, were the want of a naval force on the Lakes, and that of a sufficient regular force. Government had obtained a correct statement of the regular force of the British in Canada, with the exception of the garrison of Quebec. This last was estimated at about three thousand men, and could not be lessened without great inconvenience and some danger. The regular force at Montreal, St. John's, and Three Rivers, amounted to 1130 men; that in the whole of Upper Canada, to 720. The act to raise an additional military force of 25,000 men was passed on the 11th of January, 1812. The selection of the officers was not completed before the termination of that year; the recruiting service was not organized in time; the enlistments for the regular army fell short of the most moderate calculation; and the total number recruited was so small, as to render it impossible to strike a decisive blow on any one of the most important points from Montreal upwards, insignificant as was the force by which they were defended. The volunteer act was also extremely unproductive. At that time the treasury was amply supplied; and the want was not that of money, but of a regular force.

Such force cannot be raised without money; and yet it will be admitted that it would be extremely difficult to induce Congress to lay internal taxes or duties before war was declared or certain. In order to provide means for having an additional regular force ready to act as soon as actual war takes place, a loan and Treasury notes must be resorted to. But it is deemed absolutely necessary, that the internal taxes should be imposed simultaneously with the declaration of war, and that provision should be made for their immediate collection. With the exception of the act for doubling the duties on importations, Congress did not pass any law for imposing any new taxes or duties, till more than one year after the declaration of the last war; nor did it even lay a second direct tax in the year 1814. It was not till after public credit was ruined, after Treasury notes which were had due remained unpaid, and after Mr. Dallas had been placed at the head of the Treasury, that at last the laws for imposing a double direct tax, for increasing the rate of the existing internal duties, and for laying new ones, were enacted. The peace was ratified immediately after; and in point of fact, no more than 3,877,000 dollars were paid in the Treasury before the end of the war, on account of the direct tax and all other internal taxes or duties. There were received from the same sources 20,654,000 dollars in the years 1815, 1816 and 1817.

The preparatory measures necessary, in order to insure an immediate collection of internal taxes, whenever the laws imposing such taxes shall have been passed, are those on which I may speak with confidence. These consist simply in a previous organization of the machinery necessary for the collection of every species of internal taxes, and the assessment of a direct tax. The proper selection of the numerous officers necessary for the collection always consumes several months. A previous selection and appointment of those officers would obviate that difficulty, and would cost nothing, as though appointed they should receive no pay till called into actual service; this would be the natural consequence of the manner in which collectors are paid, this being a per centage on the money collected. The only other necessary measure in that respect, is that the Secretary of the Treasury should, at the time of their appointment, supply the collectors with all the necessary forms of keeping and rendering their accounts.

The assessment in each State of the taxable property of every individual who possesses such property, is the only operation which requires considerable time and causes a proportionate delay. This cannot be otherwise obviated than by making that assessment a preparatory measure, to be completed before actual war takes place.

In order to facilitate and hasten the process of assessment, I undertook, in the year 1812, to apportion the direct tax on the several Counties and State Districts in each State; and the Act of 2d August, 1813, which laid a direct tax of three millions of dollars, was passed in conformity with that apportionment The process was easy for every State in which there was a direct State tax; but though derived from the best data that could be collected, it was defective and partly arbitrary for the States in which there was no State tax. As there is at present hardly any (if any) State which has not laid a direct State tax, this mode may be adopted for the proposed preparatory assessment. This will reduce the duty of the assessors to the assessment of the quota of each County or District, on the several individuals liable to the tax, and the total expense of the assessment to a sum not exceeding probably two hundred thousand dollars. A more regular and correct assessment will, of course, be provided for, with respect to the direct taxes which may be laid after the first year of the war.

The only objection is that of the expense, which would prove useless if the tax should not be laid, or in other words, if war should not take place; but certainly this is too small an item to deserve consideration.

This organization, easy and cheap as it is, is all that is necessary in order to secure an immediate collection of a direct and other internal taxes and duties, from the moment when they shall have been imposed by Congress.

The probable annual expenses which must be incurred in a war with England, and the resources for defraying them, are the next objects of inquiry.

It is extremely difficult to draw any correct inference from the expenses of the last war with England: the amount of the arrearages due on account of the military services at the time when the peace was ratified, is not stated with precision in any of the public documents which I have seen. Although the laws show the number of men voted, that of those actually raised has never to my knowledge been officially stated. There can be no doubt that the want of a proper organization increased the amount of expenditure much beyond that which would have been sufficient under a regular and efficient system. This has undoubtedly been much improved; yet the expenses incurred in the Seminole war, compared with the number of men employed and that of the hostile Indians, show that either there are still some defects in the organization, or that there were great abuses in the execution.

The payments from the Treasury for the military department, embracing only those for the army proper, militia and volunteers, and exclusive of those for fortifications and the Indian department, amounted for the year 1813 to 18,936,000 dollars, and for the year 1814 to 20,508,000 dollars. The disbursements for the navy are stated at 6,446,000 and 7,311,000 dollars for these two years respectively. By comparing the reports of the Secretaries of the Treasury of December 1815, 1816, 1817, it would appear that the arrearages due on 1st January, 1815, exceeded ten millions of dollars: and it seems certain that the actual war expenses of 1814 could not have fallen short of 35 to 40 millions of dollars. It has been asserted that the regular force during that year amounted to 35,000 men.

The population of the United States has nearly trebled during the thirty-four years which have elapsed since that in which the last war against England was declared. Their wealth and resources have increased in the same ratio; and that, in case of war, these should be brought into action as promptly as possible, admits of no doubt. Once engaged in the conflict, to make the war as efficient as possible will shorten its duration, and can alone secure honorable terms of peace. I have not the documents necessary for making an approximate estimate of the annual expenses of a war with Great Britain; and if I had, I could not at this time perform that amount of labor which is absolutely necessary in order to draw correct inferences. Taking only a general view of the subject, and considering the great difference of expense in keeping a navy in active service, between one of eight frigates and one of ten ships of the line, fourteen frigates and a competent number of steamers; that Texas and Oregon are additional objects of defence; that the extensive system of fortifications which has been adopted will require about fifteen thousand additional men; and that, in order to carry a successful and decisive war against the most vulnerable portion of the British dominions, a great disposable regular force is absolutely necessary; I am very sure that I fall below the mark in saying that, after the first year of the war, and when the resources of the country shall be fully brought into action, the annual military and naval expenses will amount to sixty or seventy millions of dollars. To this must be added the expenses for all other objects, which, for the year ending on the 30th of June, 1845, amounted to near fifteen millions, but which the Secretary of the Treasury hopes may be reduced to eleven millions and a half. The gross annual expenses for all objects will be estimated at seventy-seven millions; to be increased annually by the annual interest on each successive loan.

In order to ascertain the amount of new revenue and loans required to defray that expense, the first question which arises, is the diminution of the revenue derived from customs, which will be the necessary consequence of the war.

The actual receipts into the Treasury, arising from that source of revenue, were in round numbers for the years 1812, 1813, 1814, respectively 8,960,000, 13,225,000, and 6,000,000 of dollars; and the nett revenue which accrued during those three years respectively amounted to 13,142,000, 6,708,000, and 4,250,000 dollars. From the 1st of July, 1812, the rate of duties on importations was doubled; and in order to compare these receipts with those collected in peace time, they must be reduced for those three years respectively, to 7,470,000,[3] (#x_4_i104) 6,600,000 and 3,000,000; or, if the revenue accrued be compared (which is the correct mode), to 9,850,000,[3 - Estimated for 1812.] 3,354,000, and 2,125,000 dollars. At that time the duties accrued were, on account of the credit allowed, collected on an average only six or eight months later; and the unexpected importations in the latter half of the year 1812 in American vessels which arrived with British licenses, subsequent to the declaration of war and to the act which doubled the rate of duties, swelled considerably the receipts of the year 1813. It was only in 1814 that the full effect of the war on the revenue derived from that source was felt.

The diminution in the amount of American and foreign tonnage employed in the foreign trade of the United States is strongly exhibited by the following statement:

And it must be recollected that during the last nine months of 1814, Great Britain was at peace with all the other Powers of Europe, and that these were therefore neutrals. Yet they hardly ventured to trade with us.

The amount of receipts into the Treasury derived from customs, as well as that of the revenue accrued, exceeded, during the eleven years 1801 to 1811, 132,700,000 dollars, being an annual average of about 12,000,000 dollars. During the same eleven years the average amount of tonnage employed in the foreign trade of the United States was 943,670 tons, of which 844,170 were in American, and 99,500 foreign vessels.

Thus in the year 1814, the revenue derived from customs had been reduced to one fourth part (to nearly one sixth part, if compared according to the revenue accrued, or amount of importations), the tonnage employed in the foreign trade of the United States to nearly one ninth; and that of the American vessels employed in that trade, to one fourteenth part of their respective average amount during the eleven years of peace.

The small American navy did during the last war with England all and more than could have been expected. The fact was established to the satisfaction of the world and of Great Britain herself, that the navy of the United States, with a parity of force, was at least equal to that of England. But the prodigious numerical superiority of the British navy rendered it impossible for a few frigates to protect the commerce of the United States, which was accordingly almost annihilated. We have now ten ships of the line, and a proportionate number of frigates and smaller vessels. The great numerical superiority of the British navy still continues; and it cannot be doubted that, in case of war, every exertion will be made by the British Government to maintain its superiority in our seas and on our coasts. Still it is but a portion of her force that can be employed in that way, and, taking every circumstance into consideration, it may be confidently hoped that our commerce, though much lessened, will be partially protected by our navy. Although the actual diminution which will be experienced is altogether conjectural, I think that no great error is to be apprehended in estimating the revenue from customs, after the first year of the war, at about one half of its present amount; and the whole revenue from that source, from the sale of lands and all the branches of the existing income, at fourteen millions of dollars; leaving to be provided for sixty to sixty-five millions, besides the interest on loans, which, for a war of three years, may be estimated at about six millions of dollars on an average. However energetic and efficient Congress and the Executive may be, the resources and strength of the nation can be but gradually brought forth: the expenses will therefore be less during the first year, after which the whole amount will be required and will be annually wanted. In reference therefore to the second year of the war —

The estimate of 5,000,000 dollars for the interest of the loans the second year after the war, is founded on the supposition that the direct and other internal taxes or duties laid for the first year, together with the existing revenue, and twenty-five millions borrowed by loans or Treasury notes, will be sufficient to defray the expense incurred prior to and during the first year of the war. The deficiency in the regular force for that year must be supplied by large drafts of militia, which will be as expensive at least as the regular soldiers whose place they will supply.