Dio's Rome, Volume 3

[-18-] "I speak to you who know these facts and make you who hear them my witnesses not in the intention of uttering idle boasts about myself,—your consciousness of the truth being sufficient glory for me,—but to the end that you may in this way bring home to yourselves how much better we are equipped than our opponents. For, while they are inferior to us in quantity both of soldiers and of money and in diversity of equipment, in no one respect are they so strikingly lacking as in the age and inexperience of their general. About him I need in general make no exact or detailed statement, but to sum up I will say this, which you all understand, that he is a veritable weakling in body and has never himself been victor in any important battle either on land or on the sea. Indeed, at Phillipi and in the same conflict I won the day, whereas he was defeated.

"To this degree do we differ from each other, and usually victories fall to the better equipped. And if they have any strength at all, you would find it to exist in their heavy-armed force on land; as for their ships, they will not so much as be able to sail out against us. You yourselves can of course see the size and stoutness of our vessels, which are such that if the enemy's were equivalent to them in number, yet because of these advantages the foe could do no damage either by charges from the side or by charges from the front. For first the thickness of the timbers and second the very height of the ships would certainly check them, even if there were no one on board to defend them. Where will any one find a chance to assail ships which carry so many archers and slingers striking assailants, moreover, from the towers up aloft? If any one should approach, how could he fail to get sunk by the very number of the oars or how could he fail to be plunged under water when shot at by all the warriors on the decks and in the towers? [-19-] Do not think that they have any nautical ability because Agrippa won a sea-fight off Sicily: they contended not against Sextus but against his slaves, not against a like equipment with ours but against one far inferior. If, again, any one makes much of their good fortune in that combat, he is bound to take into equal consideration the defeat which Caesar himself suffered at the hands of Sextus. By this comparison he will find that conditions are not the same, but that all our advantages are more numerous and greater than theirs. And, in general, how large a part does Sicily form of the whole empire and how large a fraction of our equipment did the troops of Sextus possess, that any one should properly fear Caesar's armament, which is precisely the same as before and has grown neither larger nor better, just on account of his good luck, instead of taking courage from the defeat that he endured? Reflecting on this fact I have not cared to risk our first engagement with the infantry, where they appear to have strength in a way, in order that no one of you should be liable to discouragement as a result of any failure in that department: instead, I have chosen to begin with the ships where we are strongest and have a vast superiority over our antagonists, to the end that after a victory with these we may despise the infantry. You know well that the whole outcome of the war depends on each side on our fleets. If we come out victorious in this engagement, we shall suffer no harm from any of the rest but cut them off on a kind of islet,—for all surrounding regions are in our possession,—and without effort subdue them, if in no other way, by hunger.

[-20-] "Now I do not think that further words are necessary to tell you that we shall be struggling not for small or unimportant interests, but it will prove true that if you are zealous you will obtain the greatest rewards, but if careless will suffer the most frightful misfortunes. What would they not do to us, if they should prevail, when they killed practically all the followers of Sextus that had been of any prominence, and even destroyed many followers of Lepidus that coöperated with Caesar's party? But why should I mention this, seeing that they have removed Lepidus, who was guilty of no wrong and was further their ally, from all his powers as general and keep him under guard as if he were some captive? They have further hounded for money all the freedmen in Italy and likewise other men who possess any land to such an extent as to force some of them to take up arms, with the consequence that not a few perished. Is it possible that those who spared not their allies will spare us? Will those who seized for funds the property of their own adherents refrain from our wealth? Will they show humanity as victors who before victory have committed every conceivable outrage? Not to spend time in speaking of the concerns of other people, I will enumerate the audacity that they have displayed toward us who stand here. Who was ignorant that I was chosen a partner and colleague of Caesar and received charge of the management of public affairs equally with him, received similar honors and offices, and have been a great while now in possession of them? Yet of all of them, so far as is in his power, I have been deprived; I have become a private citizen instead of a leader, an outcast from the franchise instead of consul, and this not by the action of the people or the senate but by his own act and that of his adherents, who do not comprehend that they are preparing a sovereign for themselves first of all. For how could one speak of enactments of people and senate, when the consuls and some others fled straightway from the city, in order to escape casting any such vote? How will that man spare either you or anybody else, when he dared while I was alive, in possession of such great power, a victor over the Armenians, to seek for my will, take it by violence from those who had received it, open it, and read it publicly? And how will he manifest any humanity to others with whom he has no connection, when he has shown himself such a man toward me,—his friend, his table companion, his relative?

[-21-] "Now in case we are to draw any inferences from his decrees, he threatens you openly, having made the majority of you enemies outright, but against me personally no such declaration has been made, though he is at war with me and is already acting in every way like one who has not only conquered me but murdered me. Hence, when he treated me in such a way whom he pretends not yet even at this day to regard as an enemy, he will surely not keep his hands off you, with whom he clearly admits that he is at odds. What does it signify that he is threatening us all alike with arms but in his decree declares he is at war with some and not with others? It is not, by Jupiter, with the intention of making any distinction between us, or treating one class in one way and another in another, if he prevails, but it is in order to set us at variance and in collision and thus render us weaker. He is not unaware that while we are in accord and doing everything as one body he can never in any way get the upper hand, but if we quarrel, and some choose one policy and the rest another, he may perhaps prevail. [-22-] It is for this reason that he assumes this kind of attitude toward us. I and the Romans that cleave to me foresee the danger, although so far as the decrees are concerned we enjoy a kind of amnesty: we comprehend his plot and neither abandon you nor look personally to our own advantage. In like manner you, too, whom he does not even himself deny that he regards as hostile, yes, most hostile, ought to bear in mind all these facts, and embracing common dangers and common hopes coöperate in every way and show enthusiasm to an equal degree in our enterprise and set over against each other carefully first what we shall suffer (as I said), if defeated, and what we shall gain, if victorious. For it is a great thing for us to escape being worsted and so enduring any form of insult or rapacity, but greatest of all to conquer and effect whatever any one of us may wish. On the other hand, it is most disgraceful for us, who are so many and so valiant, who have weapons and money and ships and horses, to choose the worse instead of the better course, and when we might afford the other party liberty to prefer to join them in slavery. Our aims are so utterly opposed that, whereas he desires to reign as sovereign over you, I wish to free you and them together, and this I have confirmed by oath. Therefore as men who are to struggle for both sides alike and to win blessings that shall be common to all, let us labor, fellow-soldiers, to prevail at the present juncture and to gain happiness for all time."

[-23-] After delivering a speech of this sort Antony put all his most prominent associates aboard the boats, to prevent them from concerting revolutionary measures when they got by themselves, as Deillius and some other deserters had done; he also embarked great numbers of archers, slingers, and hoplites. And since the defeat of Sextus had been largely due to the size of Caesar's ships and the number of his marines, Antony had equipped his vessels to surpass greatly those of his opponents, for he had had constructed only a few triremes, but the rest were ships with four banks and with ten banks, and represented all the remaining degrees of capacity: upon these he had built lofty towers, and he had put aboard a crowd of men who could fight from behind walls, as it were. Caesar for his part was observing their equipment and making his preparations; when he learned from Deillius and others their intention he himself assembled the army and spoke to this effect:—

[-24-] "Having discovered, fellow-soldiers, both from what I have learned from hearsay and from what I have tested by experience, that the most and greatest military enterprises, or, indeed, I might say human affairs in general, turn out in favor of those persons who both think and act in a more just and pious manner, I am keeping this strictly in mind myself and I advise you to consider it. No matter how numerous and mighty the force we possess, no matter if it be such that even a man who chose the less just of two courses might expect to win with its aid, nevertheless I base my confidence far more upon the causes underlying the war than upon this factor. For that we who are Romans and lords of the greatest and best portion of the world should be despised and trodden under foot of an Egyptian woman is unworthy of our fathers who overthrew Pyrrhus, Philip, Perseus, Antiochus, who uprooted the Numantini and the Carthaginians, who cut down the Cimbri and the Ambrones; it is unworthy also of ourselves who have subjugated the Gauls, have subdued the Pannonians, have advanced as far as the Ister, have crossed the Rhine, have gone over into Britain. How could all those who have had a hand in the exploits mentioned fail to grieve vehemently, if they should learn that we had succumbed to an accursed woman? Should we not be guilty of a gross deviation from right conduct, if, after surpassing all men everywhere in valor, we should then bear humbly the insults of this throng, who, O Hercules, are Alexandrians and Egyptians (what worse or what truer name could one apply to them?), who serve reptiles and other creatures as gods, who embalm their bodies to secure a reputation for immortality, who are most reckless in braggadocio but most deficient in bravery, and worst of all are slaves to a woman instead of a man? Yet these have dared to lay claim to our possessions and to acquire them through us, evidently expecting that we will give up the prosperity which we possess for them. [-25-] Who can help lamenting to see Roman soldiers acting as body-guards of their queen? Who can help groaning when he hears Roman knights and senators flattering her like eunuchs? Who can help weeping when he both hears and sees Antony himself, the man twice consul, often imperator, to whom was committed in common with me the superintendence of the public business, who was entrusted with so many cities, so many legions,—when he sees that this man has now abandoned all his ancestors' habits of life, has emulated all alien and barbaric customs, that he pays no honor to us or to the laws or to his fathers' gods, but worships that wench as if she were some Isis or Selene, calling her children Sun and Moon, and finally himself bearing the title of Osiris and Dionysus, in consequence of which he has bestowed entire islands and some of the continents, as though he were master of the whole earth and the whole sea? I am sure that this appears marvelous and incredible to you, fellow-soldiers: therefore you ought to be the more indignant. For if that is actually so which you do not even believe on hearing it, and if that man in his voluptuary career commits acts at which any one who learns of them must grieve, would you not properly become exceedingly enraged?

[-26-] "Yet at the start I was so devoted to him that I gave him a share of my leadership, married my sister to him, and granted him legions. Even after this I felt so kindly, so affectionately toward him that I was unwilling to wage war on him because of his insulting my sister, or because he neglected the children she had borne him, or because he preferred the Egyptian woman to her, or because he bestowed upon the former's children practically all your possessions, or, in fine, for any other reason. The cause is that, first of all, I did not think it proper to assume the same attitude toward Antony as toward Cleopatra. I deemed her by the very fact of her foreign birth to be at the outset hostile to his career, but I believed that he, as a citizen, could be corrected. Later I entertained the hope that if not voluntarily at least reluctantly he might change his mind as a result of the decrees passed against her. Consequently I did not declare war upon him. He, however, has looked haughtily and disdainfully upon my efforts and will neither be released, though we would fain release him, nor be pitied though we try to pity him. He is either unreasonable or mad,—and this which I have heard I do believe, that he has been bewitched by that accursed female,—and therefore pays no heed to our kindness or humaneness, but being in slavery to that woman he undertakes in her behalf both war and needless dangers which are both against our interests and against those of his country. What else, then, is our duty except to fight him back together with Cleopatra? [-27-]Hence let no one call him a Roman but rather an Egyptian, nor Antony but rather Serapio. Let no one think that he was ever consul or imperator, but only gymnasiarch. He has himself of his own free will chosen the latter title instead of the former, and casting away all the august terms of his own land has become one of the cymbal players from Canopus.65 Again, let no one fear that he can give any unfavorable turn to the war. Even previously he was of no ability, as you know clearly who conquered him near Mutina. And even if once he did attain to some capacity through campaigning with us, be well assured that he has now ruined all of it by his changed manner of life. It is impossible for one who leads an existence of royal luxury and coddles himself like a woman to think any valorous thoughts or do valorous deeds, because it is quite inevitable that a person takes the impress of the practices with which he comes in contact. A proof of this is that in the one war which he has waged in all this long time and the one campaign that he has made he lost great numbers of citizens in the battles, returned in thorough disgrace from Praaspa, and parted with very many additional men in the flight. If any one of us were obliged to perform a set dance or cordax66 in an amusing way, such a person would surely yield the honors to him; he has practiced this: but since it is a case of arms and battle, what is there about him that any one should dread? His physical condition? He has passed his prime and become effeminate. His strength of mind? He plays the woman and has surrendered himself to unnatural lust. His piety toward our gods? He is at war both with them and his country. His faithfulness to his allies? But is any one unaware how he deceived and imprisoned the Armenian? His liberal treatment of his friends? But who has not seen the men who have miserably perished at his hands? His reputation with the soldiers? But who even of them has not condemned him? Evidence of their feeling is found in the fact that numbers daily come over to our side. For my part I think that all our citizens will do this, as on a former occasion when he was going from Brundusium into Gaul. So long as they expected to get rich without danger, some were very glad to cleave to him. But they will not care to fight against us, their own countrymen, in behalf of what does not belong to them at all, especially when they are given the opportunity to win without hazard both preservation and prosperity by joining us.

[-28-] "Some one may say, however, that he has many allies and a store of wealth. Well, how we have been accustomed to conquer the dwellers on Asia the mainland is known to Scipio Asiaticus the renowned, is known to Sulla the fortunate, to Lucullus, to Pompey, to my father Caesar, and to your own selves, who vanquished the supporters of Brutus and Cassius. This being so, if you think their wealth is so much more than others', you must be all the more eager to make it your own. It is but fair that for the greatest prizes the greatest conflicts should be undergone. And I can tell you nothing else greater than that prize which lies within your grasp,—namely, to preserve the renown of your forefathers, to guard your individual pride, to take vengeance on those in revolt against us, to repulse those who insult you, to conquer and rule all mankind, to allow no woman to make herself equal to a man. Against the Taurisci and Iapudes and Dalmatians and Pannonians you yourselves now before me battled most zealously and frequently for some few walls and desert land; you subdued all of them though they are admittedly a most warlike race; and, by Jupiter, against Sextus also, for Sicily merely, and against this very Antony, for Mutina merely, you carried on a similar struggle, so that you came out victorious over both. And now will you show any less zeal against a woman whose plots concern all your possessions, and against her husband, who has distributed to her children all your property, and against their noble associates and table companions whom they themselves stigmatize as 'privy' councillors? Why should you? Because of their number? But no number of persons can conquer valour. Because of their race? But they have practiced carrying burdens rather than warfare. Because of their experience? But they know better how to row than how to fight at sea. I, for my part, am really ashamed that we are going to contend with such creatures, by vanquishing whom we shall gain no glory, whereas if we are defeated we shall be disgraced.

[-29-] "And surely you must not think that the size of their vessels or the thickness of the timbers of their ships is a match for our valour. What ship ever by itself either wounded or killed anybody? Will they not by their very height and staunchness be more difficult for their rowers to move and less obedient to their pilots? Of what use can they possibly be to the fighting men on board of them, when these men can employ neither frontal assault nor flank attack, manoeuvres which you know are essential in naval contests? For surely they do not intend to employ infantry tactics against us on the sea, nor on the other hand are they prepared to shut themselves up as it were in wooden walls and undergo a siege, since that would be decidedly to our advantage—I mean assaulting wooden barriers. For if their ships remain in the same place, as if fastened there, it will be possible for us to rip them open with our beaks, it will be possible, too, to damage them with our engines from a distance, and also possible to burn them to the water's edge with incendiary missiles; and if they do venture to stir from their place, they will not overtake anyone by pursuing nor escape by fleeing, since they are so heavy that they are entirely too inert to inflict any damage, and so huge that they are exceptionally liable to suffer it.

[-30-] "Indeed, what need is there to spend time in speaking further of them, when we have already often made trial of them, not only off Leucas but also here just the other day, and so far from proving inferior to them, we have everywhere shown ourselves superior? Hence you should be encouraged not so much by my words as by your own deeds, and should desire to put an end forthwith to the whole war. For be well assured that if we beat them to-day we shall have no further trouble. For in general it is a natural characteristic of human nature everywhere, that whenever a man fails in his first contests he becomes disheartened with respect to what is to come; and as for us, we are so indisputably superior to them on land that we could vanquish them even if they had never suffered any injury. And they are themselves so conscious of this truth—for I am not going to conceal from you what I have heard—that they are discouraged at what has already happened and despair of saving their lives if they stay where they are, and they are therefore endeavouring to make their escape to some place or other, and are making this sally, not with the desire to give battle, but in expectation of flight. In fact, they have placed in their ships the best and most valuable of the possessions they have with them, in order to escape with them if they can. Since, then, they admit that they are weaker than we, and since they carry the prizes of victory in their ships, let us not allows them to sail anywhere else, but let us conquer them here on the spot and take all these treasures away from them."

Such were Caesar's words. [-31-]After this he formed a plan to let them slip by, intending to fall upon them from the rear: he himself by fast sailing expected to capture them directly, and when the leaders had plainly shown that they were attempting to run away he thought that the remainder would make no contest about surrendering. He was restrained, however, by Agrippa, who feared that they might not overtake the fugitives, who would probably use sails, and he also felt some confidence of conquering without much effort because meantime a squall of rain with large quantities of spray had driven in the face of Antony's fleet alone and had created disturbance all through it. Hence he abandoned this plan, and after putting vast numbers of infantry aboard the ships himself and placing all his associates into auxiliary boats for the purpose of sailing about quickly, giving notice of requisite action to the warriors, and reporting to him what he ought to know, he awaited the onset of the foe. They weighed anchor to the sound of the trumpet and with ships in close array drew up their line a little outside the narrows, not advancing any farther: he in turn started out as if to come to close quarters or even make them retire. When they neither made a corresponding advance nor turned about, but remained in position and further made their array extremely dense, he became doubtful what to do. Therefore he ordered the sailors to let their oars rest in the water and waited for a time: then suddenly at a given signal led forward both the wings and bent around in the hope chiefly of surrounding the enemy, or otherwise of at least breaking their formation. Antony was afraid of this movement of his to wheel about and surround them, and hence adopted so far as he could corresponding tactics, which brought him, though reluctantly, into close combat. [-32-] So they attacked and began the conflict, both sides uttering many exhortations in their own ranks as to both artifice and zeal, and hearing many from the men on shore that shouted to them. The struggle was not of a similar nature on the two sides, but Caesar's followers having smaller and swifter ships went with a rush, and when they rammed were fenced about on all sides to avoid being wounded. If they sank any boat, well: if not, they would back water before a close engagement could be begun, and would either ram the same vessels suddenly again, or would let some go and turn their attention to others; and having damaged them slightly, to whatever degree the limited time would allow, they would proceed against others and then still others, in order that their assault upon any vessel might be so far as possible unexpected. Since they dreaded the defence of the enemy from a distance and likewise the battle at close quarters, they delayed neither in the approach nor in the encounter, but running up suddenly with the object of arriving before the opposing archers could work, they would inflict some wounds and cause a disturbance merely, so as to escape being held, and then retire out of range. The enemy tried to strike the approaching ships with many stones and arrows flying thick and fast, and to cast the grapnels upon the assailants. And in case they could reach them, they got the better of it, but if they missed, their boats would be pierced and they begin to sink, or else in their endeavor to avoid this calamity they would waste time and lay themselves open to attack on the part of some others. For when two or three at once fell upon the same ship, part would do all the damage they could and the rest suffer the brunt of the injuries. On the one side the pilots and the rowers endured the most annoyance and fatigue, and on the other the marines: and the one side resembled cavalry, now making a charge, now withdrawing, on account of the manoeuvres on their part in assaulting and backing water, and the other was like heavy-armed men guarding against the approach of foes and trying as much as possible to hold them. As a result they gained mutual advantages: the one party fell unobserved upon the lines of oars projecting from the ships and shattered the blades, whereas the other party with rocks and engines from above tried to sink them. There were also certain disadvantages: the one party could not injure those approaching it, and the other party, if it failed to sink some vessels by its ramming, was hemmed in and found no longer an equal contest.